

Explaining the Strength of Legislative Committees:

A Comparative Analysis

by

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

By what means can legislative committees exercise influence on policy outputs? How and why do committees in different countries differ in their abilities to do so? This dissertation argues that legislative committee power is a multidimensional concept. Committee procedures can be distinguished into three analytic dimensions: 1) committees' positive agenda power, their power to ensure the placement of their preferred legislative versions on the floor; 2) committees' negative agenda power, their power to delay or block the progress of legislation; and 3) committees' information capacity, institutional incentives granted to them to gather and transmit information. These distinct dimensions benefit different legislative actors. Therefore, they reflect different features of a political system, and may not be consistently strong or weak.

Based on an original cross-national data set, the dissertation shows that committee procedures cluster empirically in these three distinct dimensions. Furthermore, the dissertation also demonstrates how legislators' electoral incentives, the composition of multiparty governments, preexisting authoritarian incumbents' uncertainty and bargaining power, and changes in legislative memberships affect different dimensions of committee power.

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1

Introduction

Legislatures¹ are the primary national-level agency through which popular preferences are institutionally represented, laws are passed, and restraint can be imposed on the executive. The strength of legislatures has long been considered by both political science scholars and international donor groups as crucial for the quality of democracy. However, how legislatures in different countries organize themselves to represent constituent preferences, propose and vote on laws, or oversee the executive has not been thoroughly studied. Legislative committee procedures and powers constitute a crucial mechanism for legislatures to exercise democratic representation and to limit the unilateral power of government executives. This dissertation focuses on examining how and why committee systems vary across countries.

By what means can legislative committees exercise influence on policy outputs? How do committees in different countries differ in their abilities to do so? U.S. Congressional Studies have greatly improved our understanding of the internal organization of the U.S. Congress. However, committees and their role in the legislative process have received rather scant attention in the cross-national literature

¹ In the dissertation, *legislatures* are also used to refer *parliaments* in parliamentary systems.

on democracies around the world. This may be due to the challenges posed by accurately describing the complexities of legislative institutions and then accounting for the variance of such institutions with a coherent theoretical framework. These challenges are aggravated by the lack of cross-sectional data on legislative committee systems. This dissertation attempts to address these challenges.

Recent scholarship has devoted great effort to explore the functions of legislative committees in contexts other than the U.S.. For example, data on legislators' preferences, voting records, and professional backgrounds has been collected to test whether the composition of committee members is consistent with the predictions of theories on the existence of committees based on the U.S. Congress (Batto 2005, Ciftci, Forrest, and Tekin 2008, Fujimura 2011, Jones et al. 2002, Nemoto 2008). The assumption about the relationship between electoral systems and committee assignments has been examined (Crisp et al. 2009, Martin 2011). Arguments explaining the relationship between committee power and partisan composition of government have been proposed (Martin and Vanberg 2011, Martin and Depauw 2011, Strøm 1984).

Despite these interesting findings, we still have little information about the differences in the structures, procedures, and powers of committees across countries. Not much scholarly effort has been invested in measuring and classifying the formal procedures of legislative committees². Based on an original dataset, this dissertation is aimed to bridge this gap by proposing and testing a framework to classify and compare committee power. Applying this framework, I also specify the conditions under which committees tend to be powerful.

² Martin and Depauw (2009), Mattson and Strm (1996), and Yläoutinen and Hallerberg (2008) have made great efforts to collect data on various dimensions of legislative committees. However, their data sets only covered parliamentary democracies.

1.1 Alternative Theories for Committee Power

Based on the experience of the U.S. Congress, four main theories have been developed to explain the existence of committee systems.

Viewing committees as an agent of individual members, the *distributive* theory has argued that committees are established to help members secure particularistic spending for their districts. The theory is based on the assumption that legislative institutions reflect preferences of individual members and transaction costs of pursuing their goals (Shepsle and Weingast 1994, Weingast and Marshall 1988). To pursue the reelection goals, legislators have to advance the interests of their constituents by bringing locally targeted goods to their home districts. Since each locally special interest is a minority, each needs to form a coalition with other interests, which generates the needs of exchange and cooperation. Committee systems allow legislators to form durable logrolling coalitions by defining policy areas within which each committee has legislative authority. To serve members' needs of securing distributive benefits, committees should have the power to receive and vote on bills in their jurisdictions. Committees are especially powerful when legislators have more incentives to cultivate personal votes and have more heterogeneous policy preferences (Jenkins 1998, Katz and Sala 1996).

The *partisan* theory has assumed that a majority party is able to design legislative organization in order to achieve its collective policy goals, by excluding opponent parties and coordinating its own members. Committees are creations of parties that allow parties to maintain control over policies. The influence of committees exists only when they serve the ends of the majority parties (Cox and McCubbins 1993). For majority parties to achieve their policy goals, committees are expected to have the ability of legislation. Extending the *partisan* theory, scholars have identified that coalition governments constitute a condition under which government parties

find it in their interests to institute powerful committees to solve the delegation problem faced by multiparty governments (Kim and Loewenberg 2005, Martin and Depauw 2009, Martin and Vanberg 2011).

The *informational* efficiency theory, developed by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989), has pointed out that committees exist for the floor to utilize the informational advantages of members who specialize in particular policy areas. It has assumed legislators do not have complete information to anticipate the outcomes of policy instruments. Committee members acquire the authority and resources to specialize in particular policy areas and explore the consequences of bills more fully than can members of the floor. To achieve this goal, committees should provide incentives for members to collect and transmit information. Based on the theory, if policy outcomes are highly uncertain, such as in period of rapid social and economic change, committees tend to be granted more power to gather information.

The *bicameral rivalry* theory has viewed a legislature as one veto player who wants to maximize ‘rents’ paid by lobbyists in the law-making process. The legislature competes for rents with other veto players, such as the upper chamber or the president with veto power, in the constitutional structure of a government. Committees serve as an additional veto player within a chamber. To serve the end, committees should have the negative power to block legislation. Based on Diermeier and Myerson’s (1999) model, the more veto points there are in a constitutional structure of a government, the more veto players a legislature will create within its own chamber.

These four theories have provided different explanations for the existence and strength of legislative committees. With more variances in contextual and institutional indicators, the literature on legislatures outside of the U.S. has also identified several conditions under which the general capacity of legislative organization, including committee systems, is more likely to be strengthened. Scholars have pointed

out the importance of *socioeconomic modernization* and *political democratization*, and argued that legislatures tend to be more powerful in higher income countries (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2004), because legislators who are willing to challenge the executive and invest in legislative organization are more likely to emerge in countries with large and robust civil society (Barkan 2009), and the overall bureaucratic quality of a country is also correlated with the legislature’s resources (Huber and McCarty 2004). In addition, legislatures are more likely to be strengthened only when the authoritarian institutional legacies have been removed (Pérez-Liñán 2005, Remington 2007). Researches based on case studies has also specified the effects of *political institutions* and *party systems*. It has been argued that legislators have less incentives to enhance the legislative capacity of their institutions if the executives are too powerful and dominate the legislative processes (Khmelko, Wise, and Brown 2010, Kopecký 2004); while minority governments may contribute to legislative autonomy (Carey, Formanek, and Karpowicz 1999). Based on the experience of post-communist countries, scholars have pointed out that unstable party systems work against the development of institutionalized committee systems (Agh 1995, Olson and Crowther 2002, Whitmore 2006). The impacts of legislators’ *electoral incentives and career prospects* have also been stressed in the comparative literature. If legislators tend to rely on the provision of “pork” as a reelection strategy, the legislatures are more likely to be dominated by the executives (Ames 1995, Barkan 2009). Furthermore, low reelection rates and low parliamentary pay also work against legislative professionalization (Morgenstern and Nacif 2002).

1.2 My Explanation for Committee Strength

Scholar have provided different theories explaining the strength of legislative committees. Many of the theories focus on different committee functions. Some of them are contradictory to each other. For example, are “strong” or “weak” parties more likely

to lead to powerful committee systems? Is legislators' reliance on particularistic good provision conducive to strong committees or legislative organization subservient to the presidents? This dissertation provides a new look at how and why committee procedures vary across democratic legislatures. Different from the previous studies, which usually focus solely on one particular dimension of committee power and explore explanations for the one-dimensional phenomena, I provide a theory of multiple dimensions of committee power and specify the conditions under which particular dimensions tend to be developed. I also argue that the *distributive*, *partisan*, and *informational* theories can be reconciled under certain conditions; rather than being viewed as mutually exclusive theories, they may be understood as identifying determinants of committee procedures with regard to different dimensions. Below, I provide a summary of my explanation for committee strength.

Legislative committees are a review system that empowers key actors in the political system to collect information and make decisions on legislation in the respective jurisdiction. Committee procedures that enable actors to achieve these goals can be distinguished into three analytical dimensions: 1) committees' positive agenda power, their power to ensure the placement of their preferred legislative versions on the floor, which rests on committees' ability to receive and amend most proposals at an early stage of legislation and the procedures that allow individual members to have more access to committee affairs; 2) committees' negative agenda power, their power to delay or even block the progress of their less-preferred legislative versions, which rests on committees' authority to freely decide which referred bills to consider and when; and 3) committees' information capacity, institutional incentives granted to them to gather and transmit information, which rests on committees' ability to independently demand documents and evidence.

Committees' positive power benefits both individualistic members and disciplined parties who have an opportunity to be included in a winning coalition for committee

decisions, because every member has equal voting power once a proposal has been put on the committee agenda. Committees' negative power particularly benefits large and disciplined parties, because they are able to restrict the access to committee time only to themselves, and push committee decisions further to their side. The negative power does not necessarily increase individualistic members' welfare, because without party leaders' coordination, the negative power does not increase individual members' probabilities of being included in a winning coalition. Committees' information capacity reduces the information asymmetry between executives and legislatures, and thus potentially benefits all legislators.

Based on these arguments, I identify three conditions conducive to strong committees with regard to different dimensions. First, if legislators tend to rely on the provision of particularistic benefits as a reelection strategy, and if party leaders have less control over members, committees are likely to have extensive positive power. As a way to decentralize legislative authority, committees' positive power allow members more opportunities to express preferences and affect legislative outputs. In contrast, committees are expected to have strong negative power if party leaders exert more control over members.

Second, if parties in multiparty governments tend to be confronted with other relatively powerful coalition partners, committees are likely to be strong with regard to all three dimensions. With these authorities, the information asymmetry between ministers and coalition partners can be reduced, and coalition partners can scrutinize and amend proposals to prevent ministerial drift. Since the larger coalition partners are pivotal voters to ministers' proposals, they are able to utilize committees' negative power to delay legislation without fear of being excluded from the winning coalition.

Finally, I focus on countries' regime transition experience. Authoritarian incumbents have interests in choosing institutions of the newly created democracy that limit other actors' access to power. Only if politicians were less certain about the

future political composition of the legislature at the time of institutional design, and if the pre-existing authoritarian parties largely lost power through democratization, the resulting committee procedures are more inclusive. That is, committees are expected to have extensive positive power which allow individual members more opportunities to vote on bills.

1.3 Plan of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 presents my theoretical framework in detail. The chapter specifies the separation of the three dimensions of committee power and the conditions under which certain dimensions are more likely to be strengthened.

Chapter 3 details the legislative procedures that contribute to more or less committee strength with regard to the positive and negative agenda power, and the information capacity. It describes the construction of the research tool, the expert survey of legislative committee powers, and the implementation of the data collection. Based on expert surveys, I have collected an original dataset that empirically characterizes the role of committee systems in more than 70 countries around the world.

Chapter 4 explores whether committee procedure empirically cluster in the three dimensions as hypothesized. Confirmatory factor analysis suggests that committee powers indeed cluster on three distinct dimensions. The strength of committees on one dimension does not predict their scores on the other dimensions. One factor combines committees' early involvement in the law-making process and their authorities to consider and amend most draft bills. In legislatures scoring high on this factor, there tend to be no restrictions on multiple referrals and committee minority reports, and members are likely to have more committee assignments. Another factor mainly includes committees' authorities to freely decide which bills to be considered and when. The procedure that the floor has to consider committees' version in prece-

dence over the original bill also loads on this factor. The third factor comprises institutional instruments for committees to collect and transmit information, including the authority to demand documents and to summon government officials, and the restriction on amendments by the plenary after the committee stage. Committee systems scoring high on this factor have more staff support, and members tend to find serving in the same committee for consecutive terms is desirable.

Chapter 4 also tests the invariance of the three-factor framework across some background covariates. It also displays how national legislatures score on different dimensions of committee power. To evaluate the reliability of the data and the validity of the dimensionality framework, the chapter contrasts the factor scores with alternative measures of committee and general legislative capacity.

Chapter 5 empirically explores the hypotheses on the relationships between politicians' electoral incentives and committees' positive power. The results suggest that in countries where legislators more heavily rely on the provision of locally targeted goods to secure reelection, the electoral systems tend encourage intra-party competition, and party leaders have less control over committee memberships, committees are likely to have extensive positive power. In addition, the relationships between legislators' reelection strategy and committee power are conditional on party organization features. If legislators' career opportunities are controlled by party leaders, committee procedures are less likely to be designed to reflect legislators' reelection strategies.

Chapter 6 presents empirical tests of the hypotheses on the relationships between the composition of a government coalition and committee powers. Consistent with theoretical expectations, regression analysis suggests that committees tend to be stronger on all three dimensions of committee functions in countries where the government coalitions are composed of parties of relatively equal size. I also show that the relationship between the sizes of coalition partner parties and committees'

negative power is strengthened when parties' policy positions are polarized. Committees' negative power especially benefits larger coalition partners who have distinct positions, because they can use the negative power to increase the policy bias toward their side.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I explore how countries' transition experience is related to committee power. The chapter assumes that elections under authoritarianism serve an informational role. The empirical results suggest that if the preexisting authoritarianism had not held elections, and thus the relative power of political groups was less obvious at the time of institutional choice, or if the authoritarian legacy parties largely lost power after regime transition, committees tend to be strong with regard to their positive power. The regression analyses also show that when there tend to be great changes in legislative membership, either during or after democratic transition, committees are likely to have more information capacity.

Committee Power as a Multidimensional Concept

Committees have various functions. As Shepsle and Weingast (1987) have listed, committees are repositories of policy expertise, policy proposers, and gatekeepers that possess control over the agenda in their respective jurisdictions. All these mechanisms make committees influential in the democratic process. However, how can these different functions be classified? As committee powers vary along many dimensions, do committee systems tend to be consistently strong or weak on all these dimensions? Which aspects are more likely to be strengthened under given conditions? The literature has not reached a consensus. Existing theories for the strength of legislative committees are mostly based on particular functions of committee power, and do not specify how different conditions account for the development of different dimensions of committee power. For example, theories stressing that committees are established to help members trade favors and secure distributive benefits for their districts emphasize committees' function of providing opportunities for members to form durable logrolling coalitions and their ability to block legislation (Groseclose and King 2001, Weingast and Marshall 1988). Theories claiming committees as

the agent of majority parties focus on committees' power to amend or block bills (Cox and McCubbins 1993, Martin and Vanberg 2011), and the ability to gather information about policy issues (Martin and Vanberg 2011). Theories highlighting the collective gains from committee specialization emphasize the institutional incentives for members to collect and transmit information (Diermeier 1995, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990).

In this chapter, I outline a theory of multiple dimensions of committee power and the conditions under which particular dimensions tend to be developed. This chapter first identifies three main dimensions of committee power. After reviewing the incentive structure faced by legislators, the chapter examines how these three dimensions of committee procedures could benefit different legislative actors. Finally, it discusses three conditions under which particular dimensions tend to be developed to fulfil the needs of legislative actors.

2.1 Institutional Privilege of Committees

As the subunits of legislatures, committees are a review system that empowers key actors in the legislature to collect information and make decisions on legislation in the respective jurisdiction. Various committee procedures are established to perform these functions. These procedures can be classified into those that determine committees' positive and negative agenda-setting power, and those that authorize committees to investigate and gather information. Committees' positive and negative agenda power refers to committees' ability to determine which legislative versions are submitted to the floor and under what procedures. Committees' information capacity rests on the procedures and resources that allow committees to gather and transmit information about policy consequences. In this section, committee procedures with regard to these three main aspects are discussed.

Committees' positive agenda-power is defined as committees' ability to ensure the

placement of legislative versions preferred by them on the floor. Committees possess positive agenda-power if they have the right to initiate legislation. In addition, when committees are authorized to bring alternatives to the status quo up for a vote and decide whether to reject or amend the legislation in their jurisdictions, committees can ensure that the floor reviews legislative versions chosen by them. The positive power is enhanced if the floor is required to consider committee amendments in precedence over the original bill. With the positive power, committee members' preferences can be reflected in proposals submitted to the floor. When all proposals have to be referred to committees before they are voted down by the floor, committees can express their preferences on more bills and their positive agenda power is particularly extensive.

Committees' negative agenda power is defined as their power to delay or even block the progress of bills. Once legislative proposals are referred to committees, if committees are allowed to decide their own agenda freely and are not obliged to report back all bills within time constraints, they can prevent the appearance of bills on the floor. These procedures grant committees effective negative agenda power. In addition, when committees have the rights to rewrite a bill, and the plenary subsequently considers the version as reported by committees, committees can delay the progress of their less-preferred versions. Committees' negative power may be in conflict with their positive power. For example, if committees are obliged to submit reports for all referred measures, committees can express their preferences on more bills and ensure that the plenary reviews their preferred versions, but cannot effectively block the progress of the legislation. That is, committees have extensive positive agenda power, but lack negative agenda power.

As various researches have pointed out, the other main function of committee systems is achieving policy specialization within different jurisdictions (Baron 2000, Beniers and Swank 2004, Diermeier 1995, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and

Krehbiel 1989, Krishna and Morgan 2001, Prince and Overby 2005). The literature has emphasized the difficulty of knowing the consequences of bills *ex ante*. In addition, it has also stressed the informational asymmetry between the executive and the legislative branches. Government officials are expected to have more information access to know the precise effects of legislative proposals, available policy alternatives, and their feasibility. Committees are able to collect and scrutinize relevant information more closely than would be possible by the entire chamber. Committees' capacity of gathering information and understanding the potential outcomes of policy proposals enables them to effectively oversight the executive branch. To achieve the objective, committees have to be granted institutional incentives to independently collect information about topics related to bills and transmit information to the entire chamber.

2.2 Implications of Committee Procedures

How and why do committee systems vary with regard to these three aspects? Consistent with previous works on the choices of legislative organization (e.g. Baron and Ferejohn 1989a, Cox and McCubbins 2005, Diermeier and Myerson 1999, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Weingast and Marshall 1988), I assume that committee procedures are endogenous. Legislators set up the committee system to enhance their power and realize their interests. However, where do their interests lie? Do legislators act as agents of parties or behave in accordance with some primitive preferences irrespective of their party affiliations? Can legislators be postulated as individualistic or should parties be considered as the analytic units in explanations for committee procedures? Before examining how the three aspects of committee power serve the benefits of legislators, this section first discusses the prominent principals to whose demands legislators may respond.

As various researches (Carey 2009, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Cox and McCubbins

2005) have pointed out, party leaders are a key principal that control resources to influence legislators' behavior. Within legislatures, parties are essential components of legislative organization (Cox 2006), and most legislators are members of party groups. To varying degrees, party leaders control the allocations of legislative offices among rank-and-file members, legislative agenda, access to plenary time, staff, and perks. Outside legislative arenas, party leaders also have control over resources critical to legislators' political career prospects, such as the nomination for elections of various offices, candidates' positions on the party list, and their access to campaign finance. Through these mechanisms, legislators are pressured by party leaders to a certain extent.

In addition to party leaders, another key principal identified in the literature is the support constituency of legislators. Voters and party leaders may have divergent interests, and compete for the influence over legislators' behavior. Whether constituents' demands might predominate over the pressure from party leaders is conditional on the extent to which the resources controlled by voters are more valuable to legislators than those controlled by party leaders. The relative value of resources managed by the competing principals is further determined by the respective institutional environments faced by legislators. It has been pointed out that when electoral rules tend to encourage intraparty competition (Carey 2007), and when party leaders have less control over candidate nominations and the allocation of legislative resources (Sieberer 2006), legislators are less likely to behave in accordance with the party line.

As the literature has suggested, there are more than one principal that may shape legislators' interests. Certain institutional arrangements tend to encourage legislative individualism; while under some other conditions, collective and partisan representation is more likely to prevail. In the following three subsections, how committee procedures benefit legislative actors as self-interested legislators or as

cohesive voting blocs is discussed.

2.2.1 Effects of Committees' Positive Agenda Power

Committees' positive agenda power refers to their power to ensure floor consideration of legislative versions approved by committee members. This ability to make proposals to the floor benefits those who have voting power in a committee, including individualistic legislators and disciplined parties. Committees' positive agenda power rests on their ability to initiate, amend, rewrite, and cast votes on bills, and the requirement that the floor has to consider bills supported by committees in precedence over other versions. Their positive agenda power is more extensive if all draft bills have to be referred to committees prior to plenary votes or amendments.

In most legislatures, committee decision making is under majority rule and each individual member has equal voting power. Under these conditions, once a bill gets access to committee time, all members' preferences can potentially be expressed in the committee's collective decisions reported to the floor. With the non-unanimous decision rule, none of committee members control committee decisions individually. As various voting and bargaining models have suggested (e.g. Banks 2006, Baron and Ferejohn 1989a, Dal Bo 2007, Krehbiel and Wiseman 2012, Volden and Wiseman 2007), either for the allocations of distributive benefits or for public policy positions, if a group of voters have power to collectively make decisions on whether to support, reject, or amend a proposal, the resulting proposal has to satisfy at least a majority of voters' preferences, and make them better off than under the status quo or alternative proposals.

The extent to which members' preferences can be reflected in committee reports depends on the probabilities that these members are included in the winning coalition for a bill. Parties in coalition governments, whose support is supposed to be crucial to the passage of ministers' proposals, can thus utilize committees' decision-making

power to ensure their preferences are reflected in bills relating to each jurisdiction. If there is coordination through legislative parties, groups of members may have different voting power. Groups of members can be treated as unified actors if there are internal mechanisms that enforce members' cohesive voting behavior. As the literature on weighted voting (Banzhaf 1964, Shapley and Shubik 1954, Snyder, Ting, and Ansolabehere 2005) has pointed out, the probability of being pivotal to collective decisions is conditional on party sizes. Generally, the expected payoffs of larger voting blocs are higher. However, even though parties may have different voting power, any member/party with a chance to be included in a winning coalition to pass a committee decision can affect the collective decisions, and thus potentially be benefited from committees' proposing power.

Committees' proposing power increases the probabilities that committee members' preferences are recognized on the floor. Committee proposals may still be overturned on the floor. However, the prerogative of being proposers in their respective jurisdictions increases their likelihood of obtaining the advantaged position in winning coalition formation on the floor for a bill. Given the first-mover status, committees are able to craft bills that are more likely to win support on the floor, as well as prevent submitting legislation that make themselves worse off than the status quo. As the literature on legislative bargaining and collective decision-making has shown, even though amendments to committee versions may be offered and supported afterwards, compared to other actors in the legislature, committees as the proposers are still advantaged (Baron and Ferejohn 1989*a*, Breitmoser 2011, Krehbiel and Wiseman 2012, McCarty 2000, Volden and Wiseman 2007).

Through these mechanisms, committees' positive agenda power benefits individual members and parties who are likely to be included in a committee majority. Nevertheless, the decentralization of proposing power does not necessarily benefit the whole chamber. As Cox (2006) has pointed out, distributing the positive agenda

power to more legislators implies a larger set of bills that the floor has to decide upon. This leads to the possibility that each committee can impose external costs on others to push programs that satisfy special interests relevant to their jurisdictions. Spending will therefore be greater than if all proposals have to be screened by an agent who can internalize these external costs (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006). If parties can control their members' behavior in each committee, this tendency could be mitigated (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

2.2.2 Effects of Committees' Negative Agenda Power

Committees' negative agenda power is defined as their ability to delay and block the progress of bills. The negative power benefits actors in committees who are most able to decide which referred bills to be put on the committee agenda. This power is based on committees' authority to decide when and which bills to consider freely, their right to refuse to report back a bill, and the privilege from the floor action of recalling or relocating bills. With these procedures, committees are able to delay or even veto the placement of bills on the plenary agenda. Committees' negative power is reduced if other actors are granted the power to remove certain bills from the committee agenda or urge committees to produce reports for particular bills. Committees lack negative power if they are required to review all measures, and report them back to the floor within time constraints.

The previous subsection indicates that once a bills are put on the committee agenda, the voting power among committee members is equal. However, the procedures determining which referred bills have access to committee time may create inequality. When committees are required to report back all referred bills, all referred bills have more equal access to committee time, and members are allowed to express their preferences for all of them. Under this condition, committees have extensive positive agenda power, but do not have the negative power to obstruct the

legislation. When committees are allowed to decide their agenda freely, a committee majority can keep the status quo and delay until their demands are met. The negative agenda power prevents a committee being rolled on the floor and left worse off than it would have been had it kept the gate closed. In addition, this ability allows committees to only devote time to bills for which their positions are more likely to be improved. Combined with committees' positive power, the negative agenda power allows committees to more effectively control the set of bills considered and voted on the floor.

The ability to freely decide which bills to consider potentially creates inequality of recognition probabilities among referred bills. As the previous section mentions, bill proposers have higher payoffs than other members included in the winning coalitions, even when amendments to the initial proposals are allowed. Therefore, the power to put ones' preferred bills on the committee agenda and leave other bills unaddressed is a crucial source of power (Kalandrakis 2006). All member want to put the issues in which their interests are most likely to be realized on the committee agenda. If there is no groups of members that hold similar positions on most issues and can vote cohesively, all committee members *ex ante* have equal chances to be included in a coalition supporting a bill. Since no members is more likely to be included than any other in a winning coalition, the procedures that allow a committee majority to decide which proposals to deliberate first are not particularly beneficial. These conditions can be illustrated by the widely applied formal model on legislative bargaining developed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989*a*). In the model, a legislator is randomly selected to propose a division of a given budget. Other members then announce simultaneously the acceptance or rejection of the proposal. The proposal is implemented if and only if a majority of members accept it. If it is rejected, the process of appointing a new proposer and voting on the proposed allocation repeats.

Assume that there is no disciplined parties and members vote on proposals en-

tirely based on their individual expected payoffs. Since all members prefer more benefits to less, no members is more likely to be included than any other in the winning coalition for a given proposal. Before a bill proposer is selected, all members have the same expected payoffs from the bargaining process. Under this expectation, members prefer the procedure that all members can be recognized with equal probability to make a proposal. In addition, from an ex ante perspective, there is no particular orders of proposing players in bargaining that is preferred by a majority of members. The procedures that allow a committee majority to determine the agenda are not beneficial, since without parties, every member has an equal chance of being excluded from the majority coalition.

There are two conditions under which the procedure that allows committees to determine their own agenda is particularly preferred by a committee majority. One condition is when there are cohesive voting blocs; another is when members bargain over ideological policy positions and there are groups of members (parties) holding distinct positions. When parties can enforce members' cohesive voting behavior, each party can be treated as a unified actor in the bargaining process. Once a party member is selected as the proposer, all other members of the party will be included in the winning coalition. That is, members have different expected payoffs depending on the sizes of their groups. When a group of members can vote cohesively for bills across issues, they prefer the procedure that restricts proposing power to their group, so that they will be included in the winning coalition to get benefits. As Snyder et al. (2005) have pointed out, in the Baron-Ferejohn bargaining framework, when all parties have the same probability of being selected to make proposals, small parties are likely to be disproportionately benefited. In contrast, if parties' proposal probabilities are more closely approximated their voting weights, the chances that a party is a member of a winning coalition¹, their expected payoffs are more proportional to their voting

¹ Ansolabehere et al. (2005) have clarified that the relationship between parties' seat shares and

weights. It is expected that if parties within a committee can vote cohesively, larger parties tend to prefer the procedure that grants large parties more chances to be recognized to make a proposal to procedure that all parties can be recognized with equal probability. When committees are allowed to decide their own agenda under a majority rule, larger parties whose members are able to vote identically are more likely to put their preferred proposals on the committee agenda. However, small parties may prefer the procedures that require committees to review all referred bills, so that proposals initiated by them can also have access to committee time.

The other factor that may affect committee members' preferences over different agenda-setting procedures is their policy positions. Within the bargaining framework, members can be assumed to possess single-peaked spatial preferences with unique ideal points (Banks and Duggan 2000). Members with policy positions closer to the proposer are more likely to be included in a winning coalition. The resulting policies may deviate from the median position to the bill proposer's ideal position. The deviations are especially pronounced when members are impatient or when the bargaining process may be terminated before reaching an agreement due to the costs of time (Banks and Duggan 2000, Diermeier and Vlaicu 2011). Therefore, members have different expected payoffs depending on their ideal policy positions. As Diermeier and Vlaicu (2011) have argued, in the Baron-Ferejohn bargaining framework, if there is a group of members sharing similar positions on most issue dimensions, they have incentives to form an agenda-setting group and prefer the procedure that restricts proposal power to their own group to procedure that guarantees equal proposal power to all members. It is expected that when the size of this group is larger and its position is more distinct from other members on most issue dimensions, the procedures that require committees to review all referred measures are less likely to

their voting weights is not linear, but approximately logarithmic. Empirically, seat shares tend to overstate the voting weights of larger parties and understate the voting weights of smaller parties.

be established. When committees are allowed to decide their own agenda freely, these larger and cohesive groups are better able to put their proposals on the committee agenda. With this proposing power, they can push policy outcomes further to their side.

The analysis suggests that the existence of cohesive voting blocs in a committee and the types of bargaining targets have effects on legislators' preferences over different agenda-setting procedures. When there is no cohesive voting blocs in a committee, and members on average have equal chances to be included in a winning coalition across all issues, members are indifferent between the equal access and the majoritarian agenda-setting rules. The procedures that allow a committee majority to decide which bills to consider first are not particularly beneficial. Because when there is no parties' coordination, every member has an equal chance of being excluded from a majority coalition. In contrast, when there are disciplined parties within committees, legislators find it in their interests to form agenda-setting coalitions and share the proposing power only with members in their parties. Larger parties prefer procedures that allow committees to decide their own agenda freely so that bills supported by larger parties are more likely to get reviewed at the committee stage². The tendency is strengthened when these parties have consistently distinct policy positions on most issue dimensions. Committee minorities prefer procedures that guarantee all referred bills equal access to committee time so that their proposals can also be reviewed.

² Cotton (2012) provides alternative explanation for the conditions under which committee members prefer the procedure that the bill proposer is decided by a committee majority rather than randomly selected. Cotton argues that when a majority coalition has been established and members are patient, members of the coalition prefer procedure that allows all members to vote and decide who has the authority to propose a bill. The bill proposer has to share a larger portion of the budget with the winning coalition members to not only pass the proposal but also be again selected as the bill proposer. In contrast, those not included in the majority coalition prefer procedure that randomly selects a bill proposer, and all members can be recognized with equal probability. Before a majority coalition has been established, members are indifferent between the two different agenda-setting procedures.

In contrast to committees' positive agenda power, which benefits both individualistic members and disciplined parties who have positive probability to be included in a coalition supporting a committee report, committees' negative agenda power particularly benefit groups of committee members who can vote cohesively or share similar positions on most issues. Committees' authority to freely decide their own timetable allows these larger voting blocs to potentially restrict the access of bills proposed by other members/minorities to committee time. With this power, these groups can push legislation placed on the floor further to their side. Larger parties, and parties/members of an existing majority coalition are especially benefited by the negative power, since they have higher chances to put their desired proposals on the committee agenda by utilizing the agenda-setting authority.

Committees' negative agenda power does not necessarily serve the interests of the entire chamber. As the literature has pointed out, the decentralization of negative power implies a smaller set of bills submitted to the floor, which may lead to legislative gridlock (Cox 2006, Tsebelis 2002). The floor median would prefer procedures that allow floor members to raise motions to relocate or recall referred bills, or urge upon committees' immediate action, especially when the preferences of a committee majority and the floor median are divergent (Krehbiel and Meirowitz 2002).

2.2.3 Effects of Committees' Information Capacity

The third aspect of procedures that determines committee power is not directly related to committees' ability to make legislative decisions, but their ability to know payoffs associated with different decisions. Committees' information capacity rests on their institutional privileges to collect and transmit information. The consequences of many policy decisions are complicated and difficult to foresee. Since information is usually not free, individual legislators do not possess enough resources and expertise to make accurate decisions on all issues. With the authorities to demand documents

and hold hearings, and professional staff support, committee members are better able and have more incentives to invest in specialization.

It has been argued that committee procedures reflect a legislature's informational needs. Committees are established by the chamber as a whole to provide the expertise it needs to develop policies preferred by the chamber median (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989). Such policy expertise does not only serve individual committee members or majority parties, but would be potentially beneficial to all legislators. As the literature has pointed out, there are several mechanisms through which the acquired information is conveyed from committees to fellow legislators, including initiating legislation (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989, Krishna and Morgan 2001), holding hearings (Brasher 2006, Diermeier and Feddersen 2000), submitting policy reports or sending unofficial communications (Bianco 1997).

While committees may be created under the expectation of performing the service on behalf of the whole legislature, this is not necessarily the role they perform. Committee members may have incentives to reveal biased information due to the differences in policy preferences between them and the floor median. In addition, a committee majority is able to only devote time and resources to gather information for bills through which their interests are most likely to be realized. This tendency can be reduced by several procedural tools, such as the appropriate composition of committee members (Bianco 1997, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989), repeated interactions between committees and the floor (Diermeier 1995), and procedures that restrict floor amendments after the committee stage. These procedures provide committees incentives to act more in accordance with the chamber median's preferences. In general, committees' information capacity advances the provision of policy-relevant knowledge that potentially serves the entire chamber. However, the institutional privileges to collect information can be utilized by a committee majority

to pursue its own interests, especially when committee members consistently have divergent preferences from the chamber median.

There are several conditions under which information about policies is especially required. Based on the experience of the U.S. Congress, it has been pointed out that in periods of rapid social, economic, and political changes, policy outcomes are highly uncertain and committees tend to be granted institutional incentives to accommodate increasingly complex policy-making responsibilities (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Polsby 1968). In addition, the demands for information are usually not equal across legislators. There are other institutions that may serve legislators' needs for information. The executive branches have more information about the policy outcomes and the availability of alternative policies. It is expected that legislators from the same party with cabinet ministers have more access to relevant information. In contrast, legislators of non-governing parties and with less experience have higher demands for policy information provided by legislative committees.

2.2.4 Dimensionality of Committee Power

The previous three sections review the three aspects of committee procedures and discuss how they serve legislative actors as self-interested legislators or as cohesive voting blocs. Committees' positive and negative agenda power allow them to directly shape the contents of legislation, while their information capacity helps them to learn the exact payoffs associated with different versions of legislation.

Committees' positive agenda power serves the needs of both individualistic members and cohesive parties who have a chance to be part of a committee's winning coalition. It is because when a proposal has been put on the committee agenda, every member has equal voting power. Committees' negative agenda power especially serve larger and disciplined parties who have distinct policy positions, since these parties are better able to utilize the agenda-setting authority to push commit-

tee decisions to their side. When parties have less control over committee members and no members are more likely to be included in a winning coalition than others, committee procedures that allow members to be involved in more voting games are a way to increase individual members' chances of having their preferences reflected in committee reports. Procedures that guarantee all referred bills equal access to committee time thus increase minorities and individual members' expected payoffs. Procedures that allow committees to decide their own agenda and refuse to report a referred bill do not necessarily improve individual member's welfare, since these procedures do not increase their chances of being included in a winning coalition. Committees' information capacity potentially benefits all actors in a legislature.

It is important to recognize that all these three aspects of committee power can be utilized by the legislative majority party to push legislation to their benefit (Cox and McCubbins 1993, Cox and McCubbins 2005). What the arguments suggest is that in addition to the organized legislative majority coalition, committees' positive agenda power also allows individual members to have chances to express preferences on bills, while their information capacity could benefit all legislative actors.

These three aspects provide different functions and legislative actors with different interests. This suggests a separation between committees' positive and negative agenda-setting powers, and their information capacity. It then leads to the question of how these distinct mechanisms of influence are correlated to each other. Previous research tended to treat them as one-dimensional phenomena or focus solely on one dimension of them. However, since these different functions are designed to serve the needs of different actors, individualistic legislators and/or cohesive parties with distinct policy positions, and these actors' preferences may be in conflict, committees should not be consistently strong or weak with regard to all mechanisms. In addition, since the distributions of powers among these actors vary across countries, partly due to the arrangement of other institutions, committees in different countries should

display varying combinations of strength and weakness on these three. It is expected that committees' information capacity, positive and negative agenda-setting powers constitute empirically distinct dimensions. Two hypotheses are proposed:

Hypothesis 1: Powers of legislative committees cluster empirically in more than one distinct dimension.

Hypothesis 2: These dimensions correspond to committees' functions with regard to 1) power to ensure the placement of their preferred legislative versions on the floor; 2) power delay or block the progress of bills; and 3) institutional instruments to collect and transmit information.

2.3 Conditions for Strong Committees

The previous sections review three different aspects of committee procedures and explore whether they serve the needs of legislative actors as individualistic members or disciplined parties. Under what conditions are these different dimensions of committee power especially developed? How does other institutional environment shape the relative power and incentives of these different legislative actors and thus create needs for different committee procedures?

In the following subsections, three conditions conducive to strong committees with regard to different dimensions are discussed. They include when legislators more heavily rely on distributive benefits to be reelected, when there tends to be multi-party government, and when there tends to be great changes in the composition of the legislature.

2.3.1 Legislators' Electoral Incentives

One of the main explanations for the existence of the committee system in the U.S. Congress is the *distributive* theory. Stressing that committees are established to help members trade favors and secure distributive benefits for their districts, the theory builds on the assumption that legislative institutions reflect preferences of individual members and transaction costs of pursuing their goals (Shepsle and Weingast 1994, Weingast and Marshall 1988). Based on the *distributive* theory, legislators are less controlled by party leaders, but are primarily motivated by the desire to secure their reelection. Faced with the need of cultivating personal votes, one way to pursue the reelection goals is advancing the interests of their constituents by bringing locally targeted goods to their home districts.

Since each locally special interest is a minority, each needs to form a coalition with other interests, which generates the needs of exchange and cooperation. Members may support the interests of other members in return for others' endorsements of her or his own preferences. However, relying on temporary coalitions to pass bills can create a variety of problems (Groseclose and King 2001, Weingast and Marshall 1988). For example, once a group of legislators' preferred policy has been implemented, nothing prevents them from reneging their commitments of supporting a bill that other members desire. In addition, anticipating being reneged, legislators may decide not to make the agreement of forming a coalition in the first place. Committee systems constitute a solution to the commitment problem. Under a committee system, instead of exchanging votes in support of bills, members exchange legislative authority within particular policy areas. Through institutionalizing exchanges of policy influence, committees provide protection against opportunistic behavior. Committees are created to decentralize legislative authority, and help district-oriented legislators deliver particularistic spending projects to their constituents.

The distributive theory has pointed out that to serve members' needs of securing distributive benefits, committees have to provide opportunities for members to form durable logrolling coalitions. Each committee should be associated with a specific policy area over which it has jurisdiction, so that logrolling coalitions formed based on the committee system are more durable, and credible commitments on exchanges can be made. In addition, committee assignments are expected to be a self-selection process, so that legislators are able to form coalitions for policy areas which they care most about (Shepsle and Weingast 1994, Weingast and Marshall 1988). In addition, committees should have the power to receive and support/oppose referred bills within their jurisdiction. Otherwise, there is no benefit can be traded via the committee system.

The implication of the distributive theory is that candidate-centered electoral systems and politicians' demands for distributive benefits should result in legislatures with strong committees (Jenkins 1998, Katz and Sala 1996). There have been several research finding support for the theoretical implication outside of the U.S. context. Stratman and Baur (2002), looking at the German Bundestag, have found that committee assignments of legislators elected from first-past-the-post districts and proportional representative party lists are systematically different. FPTP legislators are more likely to serve in committees through which funds can be channeled to their home districts. Testing the distributive theory against cross-sectional data of parliamentary systems, Martin (2011) has found that in countries where electoral systems encourage intra-party competition and where legislatures have more budget authority, committees tend to have more power to amend bills and compel executive officials to attend hearings. Based on the data of Taiwanese legislators, Batto (2005) has focused on the effects of politicians' different reelection strategies under the same electoral system, and has found that legislators who spend heavily during their election campaign serve significantly more time on committees with the most

opportunities to yield rents.

These studies suggest that as a way to decentralize legislative authority, committees, especially those that can help channel funds to districts, are attractive to legislators who seek personal votes and those who rely on the distribution of targeted benefits to get elected. What is less clear in the studies is among various procedures that determine committees' power, which of them are most likely to meet the interests of legislators who are district-oriented and those who demand for particularistic benefits. To serve these legislators' needs, committees must enjoy some policy making privileges, such as the power to support/oppose referred bills and the power to amend/rewrite them, so that their preferences can be reflected in legislative outputs.

However, do these members prefer procedures that guarantees each referred bill equal access to committee time or procedures that allow a committee majority to control the committee's agenda? I argue that due to two features of committees composed of legislators who seek personal votes, the lower voting unity within parties and a common preference for higher levels of distributive benefits shared by members, members do not particularly prefer procedures that allow a committee majority to decide when and which bills to consider.

As the distributive theory has suggested, since members seek personal votes, party leaders have less control over the behavior of committee members. Members are less prone to vote cohesively as a party unit. In addition, members bargain over allocations of pork to legislative districts rather than ideological policy positions. Members have a common desire for high levels of benefits from bills within their committee's jurisdiction.

As the previous section suggests, when there is no cohesive voting blocs across issues and when members share a common preferences for more to less benefits, *ex ante* no member is more likely to be included in a winning coalition supporting a committee decision. Therefore, procedures that allow a committee majority to decide which

bills to review first is not particularly beneficial. In contrast, committees' positive agenda power provides each member opportunities to incorporate their preferences in legislative versions submitted to the floor. Once a bill is put on the committee agenda, each member has equal voting power. Committees' ability to vote against and amend bills ensures that the bills placed on the floor have to satisfy at least a majority of members' preferences for distributive benefits, and make them better off than under the status quo or alternative proposals. It increases the likelihood that members' preferences are recognized on the floor. Under the condition that no member is certain they will be in the winning coalition for most bills with higher probabilities than others, committee procedures that allow members to be involved in more voting games can increase individual members' chances of getting perks. Procedures that allow committees to have full access to all bills and have power to make binding decisions on the bills thus serve legislators who seek particularistic goods and personal votes. In general, these legislators prefer committee systems that have extensive positive agenda-setting power, the power to make decisions on most draft bills before plenary deliberation; but committees' negative agenda-setting power, the power to refuse to review a referred bill, does not meet their needs.

Committees tend to be strong with regard to their positive power when members more heavily rely on local goods provision as a reelection strategy, when the electoral systems encourage more candidate-centered patterns of competition, and when parties have less control over members' behavior. Committees' power to decide their own agenda and choose not to consider certain proposals is not expected to increase with members' tendency to rely on particularistic benefits, since the negative agenda power does not increase these members' chances of being included in a winning coalition and hence does not improve their welfare. There is expected to be a positive relationship between committees' positive agenda power and members' tendency to rely on distributive benefits, and parties' lack of control over committee

members. However, there should be no significant positive relationships between committees' negative agenda power and members' tendency to rely on distributive benefits. Based on the idea, a hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 3: If 1) legislators more heavily rely on the provision of locally targeted goods to secure reelection, and 2) party leaders have less control over committee members' behavior, committees are more likely to be strong with regard to the positive agenda-setting power.

The power of committee systems reflects individual legislators' electoral incentives, which are also shaped by parties' nomination procedures and how parties allocate campaign resources. It is thus hypothesized that the positive effects of politicians' tendency to rely on locally targeted goods on committees' positive agenda power are strengthened or weakened, depending on party organization. When party leaders control candidate nomination procedures and legislators' career prospects are restricted, features of committee systems are less likely to reflect legislators' electoral incentives. As Jones et al. (2002) have pointed out, in Argentina, where local party branches dominate the renomination process, legislators are not substantially aided in their career progression by their performance in the Congress, and thus have little incentives to develop strong legislative institutions. It is expected that the positive relationships between legislators' demands for distributive benefits and committees' positive power is attenuated if parties have centralized candidate nomination procedures.

Parties' organizational extensiveness may have similar contingent effects. There are many institutional mechanisms by which legislators can channel benefits to their districts, and party organization is one of them. When parties have extensive organization that penetrates into most districts, the local offices can offer some form of

extra-legislative constituency service. If legislators can distribute benefits to their constituents through party local offices, they may less heavily rely on legislative organization to fulfill their electorate's demands. It is expected that the relationship between legislators' electoral incentives and committees' positive power is weakened if parties have extensive local organization to distribute benefits. A hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 4: If 1) parties have more centralized candidate nomination procedures, or 2) parties have more extensive organization, the effects of legislators' electoral incentives on committees' positive power are weakened .

2.3.2 Multiparty Government

As the literature has pointed out, committees may also be established to serve the needs of parties (Cox and McCubbins 1993, Groseclose and King 2001). Contrary to theories emphasizing preferences and costs of individual legislators, the research views parties as a solution to various collective action problems in legislatures. Parties are able to seize legislative authority and design legislative organization in order to achieve its goals. If the functions of committees meet parties' needs, and assignments to committees are under party control, powerful committees could exist side-by-side with disciplined parties (Kim and Loewenberg 2005). To reduce agency loss from ministerial drift, coalition governments constitute a condition under which governing parties find it in their interest to maintain strong committees to monitor ministers from coalition partners and ensure the implementation of coalition policies (Carroll and Cox 2012, Kim and Loewenberg 2005, Martin and Vanberg 2011, Martin and Depauw 2011).

Decision-making within a coalition government has been conceived as a principal-agent relationship (Andeweg 2000, Strøm 2000). The cabinet delegates the power

of implementing coalitional policies to individual ministers. However, due to policy differences between coalition partner parties, ministers have incentives to deviate from the coalition agreement and push the implementation of policies further to the ideal positions of ministers' parties. The tendency is even exacerbated as a result of information asymmetry between ministers and other coalition parties. With the resources of the executive branch, ministers can more easily acquire information about policy consequences and the availability of policy alternatives. Ministers can exploit the informational advantage and send biased signals to defend their preferred policies (Martin and Vanberg 2011). In addition, the determination of budgets for different ministers approximate a common pool problem, and coalition governments may lead to excessive spending since there is no centralized enforcement mechanism (Hallerberg 2000). All these suggest that to solve the problem of delegation, coalition parties have incentives to establish institutional instruments to monitor ministers from other parties and enforce the implementation of coalitional policies.

The literature has pointed out several ways by which coalition partners may monitor one another. First, junior ministerial positions can be used to hold each other's ministers accountable (Thies 2001). Second, coalition partners may directly utilize the legislative process to delay and scrutinize ministerial proposals (Martin and Vanberg 2004). Third, scholars have increasingly recognized committee systems as a solution to the delegation problem faced by coalition partner parties. Martin and Depauw (2009) have found that across parliamentary systems, strong committees tend to exist in multiparty coalition systems. Kim and Loewenberg (2005) have pointed out that in the German Bundestag, committee chairs are distributed in a way that makes it possible for parties to "shadow" their coalition partners in the executive branch. The similar pattern has also been found in Lithuania (Clark and Jurgeleviciute 2008). Carroll and Cox (2012) have further investigated this relationship and shown that ministers are more likely to be "shadowed" by committee

chairs from their partner parties in countries where committees are more powerful and the policy disagreement between the minister's party and its partners is greater. Martin and Vanberg (2011) have examined the effects of committees, and found that in legislatures where committees are more powerful, government bills are more significantly scrutinized and amended.

These studies suggest that coalition governing parties do rely on committees to enforce coalition agreements on policies. What has not been systematically tested in the literature is among various procedures that determine committees' power, which of them are most likely to serve governing parties' interests for monitoring one another. Carroll and Cox (2012) have emphasized committees' function in delaying ministerial proposals. With the function, committees allow coalition parties to review legislation that may deviate from coalition agreements. Martin and Vanberg (2011) have stressed that committees should have the power to gather information about policy outcomes and alternatives and the power to amend ministerial proposals.

As the previous section suggests, committees' information capacity potentially benefits all actors in the legislature, including coalition partner parties who have less information access than ministers. Committees' positive agenda power allows committee members to incorporate their preferences in proposals submitted to the floor. The positive power enables coalition governing parties to rewrite ministerial proposals and make sure that legislation complies with coalition agreements.

Coalition governments also constitute a condition under which committees' negative agenda power tends to be preferred. As the previous section argues, committees' negative agenda power particularly serve cohesive voting blocs who have distinct policy positions and will be included in the winning coalition for most bills. When committees are granted the power to decide their own agenda rather than required to review all bills, legislation proposed by the governing coalition is more likely to be put on the committee agenda than legislation that may benefit parties excluded

from the coalition. Coalition partners are pivotal voters to bills proposed by ministers, especially when the coalition partners control larger seat shares. In order to make sure that the resulting policies are closer to the median position of the coalition than to the median of the whole chamber, governing parties prefer to sharing agenda control with one another to sharing it with oppositions. Since these partner parties will not be excluded from the agenda-setting coalition, they can utilize committees' negative agenda power to delay legislation and prevent bills distant from coalition agreements from reaching the floor.

Based on these arguments, to serve as counterweights of cabinet ministers, committees should form a review system through which all ministerial bills have to proceed. Committees must have the power to vote against, amend, and delay referred bills. In addition, committees have to be granted more rights to extract information from ministers. That is, committees are expected to have stronger informational and legislative power, which includes both positive and negative agenda setting power, when a country tends to have coalition governments. To explore these relationships, a hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 5: If countries have higher rates of multi-party government, committees tend to be stronger in all three dimensions of committee power.

To test whether committees' negative agenda power particularly serves cohesive voting blocs, another hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 6: If party leaders have more control over committee members' behavior, committees tend to have stronger negative agenda power.

The previous section also suggests that the negative agenda power is particularly beneficial when parties have distinct positions on most issues. With the ability to

control committee agenda, larger parties can restrict oppositions' proposing power. The negative power is thus especially required when larger parties tend to have policy positions distant from other members. It is hypothesized that the positive effects of the propensity for multiparty governments on committees' negative agenda power are strengthened or weakened, depending on parties' policy positions. It is expected that when policy positions among parties are more polarized, coalition partner parties have more incentives to invest in committees' negative power as a tool to push policies to their side. A hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 7: If parties' policy positions are more polarized, the effects of a propensity for multi-party governments on committees' negative agenda power are strengthened .

2.3.3 Changes in Legislative Composition

This section discusses the effects of changes in legislative personnel on committee power. It first focuses on the circumstances when politicians are less certain about the political composition of the legislature and then on when there tends to be great changes in the composition of the legislature.

To examine how politicians' uncertainty about parties' fortunes in legislative elections has effects on the development of different dimensions of committee power, it is worth exploring the condition of regime transition. The literature on institutional design of new democracies has pointed out several factors that account for variation in institutional choices. It has been argued that if electoral favorite is not evident at the time of institutional choice, the resulting institutions should be more inclusive and grant more rights to minorities. In contrast, if the relative power of political actors is known at the time of bargaining, the resulting institutions are likely to be designed to ratify the existing advantage. When actors who have bargaining power

over institutions anticipate losing popularity through democratization, the resulting institutions should also allow more checks and balance (Carroll and Nalepa 2010, Frye 1997, Przeworski 1991). These arguments have not been systematically tested against the internal organization of legislatures.

Elections under authoritarianism, while not totally free and fair, serve an informational role. The results of multi- or one-party elections help regime incumbents to identify their bases of support, opposition strongholds, and the competence of their local party officials (Blaydes 2008, Brownlee 2007, Magaloni 2006). It is expected when there had been elections under preexisting authoritarian regimes, relative power of political groups was more evident at the time of institutional choices, and committees were less likely to be designed to provide minorities with equal opportunities to affect policies. If the relative power of potential participants and issue cleavages were less clear, committee procedures are expected to be more inclusive.

To provide committee minorities with more opportunities to exert influence, committees should have extensive positive power. When most proposals have to be referred to committees before floor consideration, and when committee members have the power to vote against and rewrite the referred bills, members' preferences can be incorporated into reports placed on the floor. Minorities' proposing power is further enhanced if they are able submit minority reports without the agreement of a committee majority, and if legislators can have more committee assignments. These procedures allow individual members and minorities to have more chances to be included in the winning coalition for a bill. Committees' negative agenda power is less inclusive, and tends to benefit already established majorities. Based on this idea, a hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 8: If the preexisting authoritarian regimes did not hold elections, committees tend to provide individual members with more positive agenda-setting

power.

When the relative power of political actors is known at the time of bargaining, and authoritarian incumbents anticipate losing popularity through democratization, the resulting institutions should also be more inclusive. Assumed to be one of the actors that had bargaining power at the time of institutional choice, authoritarian incumbents preferred committee systems that allow more checks and balance if they anticipated their power to be largely diminished under newly created democracies. A hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 9: If the authoritarian incumbents anticipated losing popularity through democratization, committees tend to provide individual members with more positive agenda-setting power.

The frequency of changes in the composition of the legislature may also have impacts on committee power. When only a small percentage of membership of one legislative term is reelected to the next turn, committees are less likely to maintain a stable membership. The instability of legislative membership may constitute a condition under which instruments that foster committee specialization are especially required. New legislators are less familiar with legislative process and it is more costly for them to acquire expertise. As there tends to be large influx of new legislators, the information asymmetry between executive and legislative branches is exacerbated. Committees may be granted more instruments to reduce the costs of information collection, since committees are the primary devices through which specialized knowledge and expertise can be acquired and applied to policy-making. It is expected that when the legislative turnover tends to be great, it is in legislators' interests to have committee systems that facilitate information collection and reduce policy uncertainty.

Diermeier (1995) has provided alternative explanation for the relationship between legislative stability and committee power. Diermeier has argued that the longer legislative terms facilitate the development of floor deference to committees' decisions, which sustains committee specialization even in the absence of restrictive amendment procedures. Explicit restrictive amendment procedures could serve as a focal point that encourages this coordination. It is expected that when legislative terms are short and the norms of deference have not been established, restrictive amendment procedures and other instruments that foster committee specialization are likely to be established to meet the demand for information. As described in the previous section, these instruments include committee authorities to conduct investigation, demand documents, and compel attendance to hearings. Based on these arguments, a hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 10: If there tend to be great changes in legislative membership, committees are granted more instruments to gather and transmit information.

Measuring Committee Power

A broad array of indicators of committee powers is needed to test the hypotheses on their clustering with regard to the three theoretically derived mechanisms of influence. Political scientists have collected information about the powers of many formal political institutions. Fish and Kroenig's (2009) pioneering effort in measuring various dimensions of legislative powers around the globe has largely broadened our knowledge of institutional arrangements of legislative branches. The data collection project on legislative oversight tools supported by the World Bank (Stapenhurst et al. 2008) has more specifically provided indicators about how a legislature keeps an eye on the activities of the executive. However, information about the features of internal organization and procedures of legislatures has not been thoroughly covered in these cross-national data sets. Martin and Depauw (2009), Mattson and Strøm (1996), and Yläoutinen and Hallerberg (2008) have made great efforts to measure several aspects of committee systems. Based on country specialists' responses to questionnaires, they have shown that there is a great variety of committee powers and procedures across countries. In addition, these institutional features have significant influence on the nature and extent of legislative control over the executive. However, these works have

only focused on Western or Eastern European parliamentary democracies. There is still no single dataset addressing internal legislative organization across the world in a consistent manner. To more thoroughly examine the powers of legislative committees across different institutional and contextual settings, I assemble an original data set on structures, procedures and functions of committees in democratic legislatures around the world.

The data collection endeavor is not the first attempt to measure the powers of legislative committees, but it covers more aspects of committee procedures and includes a larger number of countries than previous studies. In this chapter, I first discuss the method used to measure committee power, then present indicators of the three theoretically derived mechanisms of committee influence specified in Chapter 2 and the coding procedures of these indicators, and then explain how experts and countries included in the expert survey were identified. This chapter finally evaluates the reliability of expert ratings and shows the distributions of some indicators across national legislatures.

3.1 Committee Power Survey

As the previous data collection projects on legislative institutions have suggested (e.g. Fish and Kroenig 2009, Martin and Depauw 2009, Mattson and Strøm 1996), country experts are often the most reliable and efficient information source to classify such a complex institution. There are various procedures governing legislative committees, and many of the procedures are contained in a diverse set of documents. The documents for many countries are either not easily accessible or would require translation. In addition, in many cases, a great deal of country-specific knowledge is required to know what documents to look for in the first place. Furthermore, several institutional features that are also relevant to committees' influence are not always encoded in law. Such indicators include the extent to which committees

are supported by professional staff, how parties control committee assignments, and whether legislators are inclined to serve in the same committees for consecutive terms. To include these variables and to solve the problem of the inaccessibility of some legal documents, I conducted a cross-national expert survey to collect information on various dimensions of committee power.

I designed an expert survey to gather information about the procedures and structure of permanent, policy-oriented committees in the lower house of legislature where citizens are represented approximately equally. To explore whether a legislature has an institutionalized committee system to deal with legislation, the survey only focuses on permanent (standing) committees, and ignores those appointed to perform a special function for a temporary time, and those established to deal with the administration or to organize the work of legislatures. The survey is also restricted to committees as subunits of the legislature, and ignores procedures such as a “Committee of the Whole.”

The questionnaire of the expert survey consists of three parts. The first part covers questions on the composition of standing legislative committees, such as how committee seats are allocated among parties, who make assignments to legislative standing committees, and whether legislators find it desirable to serve in the same committee for consecutive terms. The second part concerns how committees are involved in the law-making process. Questions of this part included whether bills can bypass the consideration of committees, whether there is any floor action before bills are referred to committees, whether there are restrictions on multiple referrals, whether committees are obliged to report all referred bills within a time constraint, and whether committees can amend referred bills and introduce legislation. For this part, experts were also asked to assess whether committees have the capacity to compel executive to attend meetings and submit documents, and whether the plenary body can amend bills after the committee stage. The third part is on committee

resources, which asked experts the number of staff a committee has to help with committee procedures and the extent to which these staff provide administrative support or conduct research.

For the second part of the questionnaire, experts were asked to answer the questions based on formally codified rules. I realize that indicators based on codified rules are not able to fully capture how committees operate in a legislature. Powers of legislative committees are determined by both formal and informal rules. As the research on the U.S. Congress has indicated, procedural arrangements governing legislative organization range from informal practices to codified standing rules (Evans 1999). Informal rules have been defined as socially shared rules, which are not written down in official documents with legal standing (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). The importance of informal rules and the interactions between informal and formal rules vary across legislatures. As Helmke and Levitsky (2004) have argued, some informal rules enhance the efficiency of formal rules, some work as substitutes of formal rules, while others directly contradict formal institutions.

However, there are several reasons for which the current inquiry focuses on rules encoded in law, particularly for indicators of committees' role in the law-making process. First, even though formal institutions cannot solely determine how committees operate in practice, they still have extensive effects in shaping actors' behavior and available choices. As the literature has pointed out, formal rules contribute to the generation of shared expectations among actors, which help sustain cooperative outcomes (Carey 2000, Diermeier 1995). It is worthwhile to collect data documenting formal committee rules, which offers the possibility of further research on various topics. Second, measures of committee power that incorporate both formal procedures and informal practices require more subjective judgements by experts, and would be less stable. As the potential measurement instability and uncertainty rise, a far larger panel of experts is required to collect information for each indicator. Finally,

the exploration of conditions for different committee procedures assumes that institutions reflect the outcomes of struggle among political actors. It is expected that compared to formal institutions, informal rules are more closely correlated to societal characteristics that lead to particular institutional choices. Formal institutions may lag behind informal arrangements in adjusting to changing incentives of political actors. Therefore, using indicators of formal committee power poses a harder test for the hypotheses on conditions for different types of committee procedures.

3.2 Indicators of Committee Powers

This section specifies survey items measuring the three dimensions of committee power. Indicators described in this section, their coding procedures, and the descriptive statistics are listed in Table 3.1.

3.2.1 Indicators of Committees' Positive Power and Members' Access to Committee Affairs

Committees' positive agenda power refers to their ability to ensure the placement of legislative versions preferred by them on the floor. Committees' positive agenda power rests on their ability to initiate, vote against, amend, and rewrite bills, and the requirement that the floor has to consider bills supported by committees in precedence over other versions. Their positive agenda power is more extensive if all draft bills have to be referred to committees prior to plenary votes or amendments, so that committees can express their preferences for most measures placed to the floor. In addition to items that characterize committees' ability to propose legislation and amendments to the floor, this section includes four items on procedures that allow individual members to have more access to committee affairs to utilize committees' proposing power, including the procedures of multiple committee assignments, multiple referrals, and minority reports. With these procedures, individual members and

committee minorities have more chances to be included in committee voting games and propose their preference to the floor.

1. Do standing legislative committees have authority to amend bills? If so, which version of the bill is subsequently presented for vote to the plenary?

With the right of choosing either to support, oppose, or amend draft proposals, a proposal has to reflect the preferences of at least a majority of committee members in order to be presented to the floor. No matter the bills are about distributing particularistic goods or bargaining over policy positions, individual members and parties thus can exert influence over legislation through the committee stage. As research based on bargaining models has pointed out (Baron and Ferejohn 1989*b*, Krehbiel and Wiseman 2012, Rubinstein 1982), if voters of a bill are allowed to make a substitute proposal once the initial bill has been rejected, the voters have higher payoffs: they get larger shares of benefits when bargaining over distributive goods, and the resulting policy is closer to the committee median when bargaining over a single-dimensional policy space. Mattson and Strom (1996) have pointed out that the right to redraft bills is principally a committee function, since plenary assemblies are less able to elaborate on legislative details due to their size.

There are several variations in committees' amending procedures that determine committees' positive agenda power. When committee amendments are automatically incorporated into legislation and are considered by the floor in precedence over the original bill, committees can ensure that the floor reviews legislative versions chosen by them. In some legislatures, such as those of Czech Republic, Latvia, and Ukraine, committees' suggestions are considered side by side with the original bills by the floor. In some other countries, committees are not allowed to amend bills initiate by the executive branches. For example, in France, for certain policy areas, such as

social security financing bills, the plenary has to consider proposals submitted by the executive. Under these conditions, committees' ability to make proposals to the floor is relatively limited.

To reflect these variations, in addition to the two polar categories that distinguish between legislatures in which committees cannot amend bills or can only make suggestions and those where the plenary body considers proposals as amended by committees, two intermediate categories are also specified. The indicator is coded as '1' when committees may amend bills, but the plenary considers original bills if committee amendments are not accepted by the executive¹. '2' refers to that committees may amend bills, and committee amendments are considered side by side with original bills by the plenary body. Experts were asked to rate the committee procedures based on formal rules. In the sample, in around half of the national legislatures, the floor reviews proposals as amended by committees.

2. Do standing legislative committees have the right to introduce bills on the floor?

The ability to introduce bills is another way for committees to make proposals to the floor. Similar to the amending power, with the authority to initiate or reorganize legislation, committees can ensure floor consideration of bills approved by them.

In addition to the two polar categories that distinguish between legislatures in which bills can be introduced under the name of a committee and those where committees cannot introduce, consolidate, or split bills, the intermediate category refers to committees that can consolidate and split bills but cannot initiate new proposals.

3. Do all drafted bills have to be referred to committees for consideration in order to become laws?

¹ If the procedures only apply to bills in certain policy areas, the indicator is coded as 1.5.

The ability of committees to receive bill proposals affects the extent to which committee members can express their preferences on bills. If only a small portion of bills are referred to committees, committees do not have extensive influence over legislation, even though they may have sufficient amending power. When more proposals are submitted to committees, members have more opportunities to incorporate their preferences into bills placed on the floor.

In the survey, experts were asked whether all drafts have to be referred to committees for consideration in order to become laws and the conditions under which the committee stage can be bypassed. One extreme is the UK's House of Commons, bills are not referred to standing committees. The indicator is coded as '1' if bills are referred to committees only when a floor majority so decide, such as in the parliaments of Australia, India, and Ireland. '2' refers to conditions when bills of certain policy areas are not referred to committees, or when executive ministers can decide whether to bypass the committee stage. For example, in New Zealand, appropriation bills are not referred to committees. '3' means that a floor majority may determine to bypass a measure's referral to standing committees or refer bills to ad hoc committees. Around one fifth of the national legislatures in the sample belong to this category. '4' means that a floor supermajority or consensus among legislative party leaders is required to bypass the committee process. The indicator is coded as '5' if all proposals have to be referred to committees for consideration.

4. Before bills are referred to committees, is there any floor action by the entire body of the legislature?

Another procedure that determines committees' positive agenda power is whether the committee stage takes place prior to floor deliberations. In the parliaments of Canada and Ireland, the floor can vote down or amend a proposal before committees have an opportunity to review it. Under this condition, bills must pass through the

plenary veto gates before they can reach committees, which largely restrict the scope of policies on which committees can exert influence. If all bills are submitted to committees prior to floor action, members can have more access to bills without the approval of the plenary majority.

The indicator is coded as ‘3’ if the floor cannot take any action prior to the committee stage, or can have debates on bills, but the debates are generally not considered binding at the committee stage. It is coded as ‘2’ if the floor may take any one of the following three actions: taking votes on bills, amending bills, or having debates, which are generally considered binding at the committee stage, on bills. It is coded as ‘1’ if the floor may take any two of the three actions, and as ‘0’ if the floor may do all of them. Committee systems in around seventy percent of the legislatures are assigned a score of 3.

5. Are committee minorities allowed to submit minority report to the plenary?

As Chapter 2 specifies, the extent to which individual members’ preferences can be reflected in committee reports depends on the probabilities that these members are included in the winning coalition for a bill. There are several procedures that provide individual legislators’ with more chances to incorporate their preferences into committee reports submitted to the floor. One of the procedures is minority reports. Where minority reports are allowed, members of a committee minority are also able to place their preferred legislative versions to the floor, and have more incentives to spend time on committee affairs (Mattson and Strøm 1996). For this indicator, the intermediate category refers to when minorities can submit reports only under certain conditions, such as with the consent of a committee majority or the chair. A committee system receives the maximum score for this indicator if minorities can submit reports without any restriction.

6. On average, on how many committee does a legislator serve?

If legislators are allowed to have more committee assignments, they have higher probabilities to be included in one committee's winning coalition for a bill, and thus their personal goals are more likely to be accommodated. Every additional committee assignment may offer a new set of issues that the members can address (Schiller 1995). Jenkins (1998) has explained, the creation of more new committees in the nineteenth-century American House was a direct response to legislators' demands for more opportunities to serve constituents.

The information about the average number of committee assignments per legislator was not collected from the expert survey. I calculate the indicator by dividing the overall number of committee seats by the total number of legislators in the current national legislature. Legislators' average committee assignments vary greatly across countries. In around twenty percent of the legislatures included in the sample, only a portion of all legislators are assigned to standing legislative committees. In countries such as Argentina and the Philippines, each legislator on average serves on more than four committees.

7. Are there restrictions on referral of bills to multiple committees?

Similar to multiple committee assignments, multiple referral may also have the effects of allowing individual members to have more chances to express their preferences for a variety of bill proposals. Once a bill is submitted to more than one committee, either jointly or sequentially, a legislative version has to satisfy more members to be proposed to the floor. In addition, as the size of the winning coalition for a bill increases, the preferences of individual members and parties also become less influential to the collective decisions (Alter 2002, Bawn 1996, Young 1996).

For this indicator, committee systems are distinguished between where multiple referrals are not allowed, where multiple referrals are allowed but rarely occur, and

where multiple referrals are common. Legislatures included in the sample distribute relatively evenly across the three categories.

8. Do committee meetings have to be scheduled at different times from plenary meetings of the chamber?

The last item is about the procedural aspect of committee consideration. If committee and plenary meetings are scheduled at the same time and members have to choose between them, members may be less inclined to focus on committee assignments. This scheduling problem will be even more severe when legislators have more committee assignments. The regulation that committee and plenary meetings have to be scheduled at different times is likely to allow members more access to committee affairs.

The indicator of unique meeting time is coded as ‘0’ if they may be scheduled at the same time, and ‘2’ if they have to be scheduled at different times. The intermediate category refers to the condition when there is no clear regulation, but almost all plenary and committee meetings are scheduled at different times.

3.2.2 Indicators of Committees’ Negative Power

Committees’ negative agenda power is defined as their ability to block the progress of bills. This power is based on committees’ authority to decide when and which bills to consider freely, their right to refuse to report back a bill, and the privilege from the floor action of recalling or relocating bills. With these procedures, committees are able to delay or even veto the placement of bills on the plenary agenda. Committees’ negative power is reduced if other actors are granted the power to remove certain bills from the committee agenda or urge committees to produce reports for particular bills. The following items were included in the expert survey to measure committees’ negative power.

9. Are committees obliged to consider and report all referred bills back to floor?

Once bills reach committees, who are allowed to determine when and which referred bills to be reviewed? The two extremes of the procedural variation are when committees are required to report back all referred bills within time constraints, and when committees can decide their own agenda freely. When committees are obliged to report all referred legislation, bills tabled before a committee constitute its agenda. Procedures between the two extremes include rules that allow floor members to raise motions to bypass the committee stage, relocate bills, or expedite committee review process. When committees have the autonomy to set their own agenda freely, it can be guaranteed that only proposals preferred by a committee majority are considered. Bills proposed by a minority are less likely to be presented and discussed. In addition, committees can refuse to report bills that are not preferred by a committee majority. This prevents the floor from considering them, which gives the committee majority effective veto power. In contrast, when committees are required to consider all referred legislation, bills have more equal access to committee time.

In the survey, experts were asked whether committees are obliged to report all referred bills back to floor. The responses are coded as ‘0’ if committees have to report all referred bills. It is coded as ‘1’ if committees are obliged to report bills submitted by the executive branch. ‘2’ refers to the condition when a floor majority can decide to pass by, relocate, or recall measures tabled in committee; while ‘3’ refers to if such decisions have to be approved by a supermajority. The indicator is coded as ‘4’ if committees are free to determine their own agenda, and the plenary body does not have rights of recall. In around half of the national legislatures included in the sample, committees are obliged to report all referred bills to the floor.

10. Are standing legislative committees obliged to report referred bills

within a time constraint?

Another procedure that determines committees' negative power is whether committees have to submit reports within time limits. When there is no time constraint on committee reports, committees can effectively delay the progress of bills.

The two polar categories distinguish between legislatures where there is no time constraint on committee reports, and where the time constraints are less than one legislative session on reports for all referred bills. The intermediate category refers to conditions when time constraints can be imposed on some bills by a floor majority or other presiding officers. Legislatures in the sample distribute relatively evenly across the three categories.

11. Who formally controls a committee's agenda?

This item more specifically measures the extent to which committee members can freely determine what proposals to consider and when. In the survey, experts were asked about the actors who are granted power to make the following agenda-setting decisions: calling committee meetings, deciding what referred bills shall be considered and when, and deciding whether or not to hold hearings and when. For each of the decisions, a score of '2' is assigned if it is determined entirely by committee members and chairs; a score of '1' is assigned if both committee members or chairs and other actors, such as a floor majority, speakers of the legislature, or executive branch officials, are granted power to exert influence on the agenda-setting decision; and '0' refers to when the decision is exclusively made by these actors outside of committees. The indicator is created by summing a committee system's score of each of the three agenda-setting decisions.

In addition to these three indicators, committees' authority to amend bills (the first item) also affects their negative agenda power. When committees are able to rewrite a bill, and the plenary subsequently considers the version as reported by

committees, committees can block the progress of their less-preferred versions.

3.2.3 Indicators of Committees' Information Capacity

As Chapter 2 lays out, one of the main functions of committees is providing incentives for members to collect and transmit information. The consequences of many policy decisions are complicated and difficult to foresee. Since information is usually not free, individual legislators do not possess enough resources and expertise to make accurate decisions on all issues. Indicators on committees' information capacity hence should measure the extent to which committees are granted institutional privileges that allow members to be better able and have more incentives to invest in policy specialization. These include whether committees are able to demand documents and compel the attendance of government officials, whether committees have sufficient resources, and whether members find it desirable to serve in the same committee in consecutive terms.

As committees become better informed, there tends to be an informational asymmetry between committee members and other legislators. With the institutional privileges and resources, committee members have more information about policy issues in their respective jurisdictions than their fellow legislators. There are several processes through which committees transmit information to the floor, such as bill proposals (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989, Krishna and Morgan 2001), debates and hearings (Austen-Smith 1990, Brasher 2006, Diermeier and Feddersen 2000), or unofficial communications (Bianco 1997). Indicators on committees' information capacity should also measure whether there are incentives to induce committees to share unbiased information to other members. The following items were included in the questionnaire to characterize committees' information capacity in different legislatures.

12. Do standing legislative committees have rights to demand or compel documents from government?

To scrutinize and construct legislation effectively, committees have to be able to independently collect information about topics related to bills. The power to demand documents from government officials is crucial for committees to obtain information and expertise. This question aims to capture whether committees are able to ask government officials to supply information without the consent of a floor majority or executive ministers. When committees can only demand but not compel the supply of documents, their informational right is restricted.

In the survey, experts were provided with multiple alternatives and were asked to choose one that best describes the institutional features of committees in their country's legislature. The indicator is coded on a 0–3 scale, where '0' refers to when committees cannot demand documents from government officials, and '3' means that committees can compel government officials to supply documents. It is coded as '1' if committees can only demand but not compel government officials to supply documents. '2' refers to when committees can demand documents from government, but they may compel government officials to supply documents only under certain conditions, such as with the consent of the plenary body or the presiding officers, or if certain government ministers are granted power to refuse such demands. Legislatures are also classified as this category if committees can only compel documents through their "investigation subcommittees," and the establishment of such subcommittees is upon the consent of the floor. In the sample, committees in seventy percent of the national legislatures are classified as *being able to compel documents* or *being able to compel documents under certain conditions*.

13. Do standing legislative committees have rights to invite or compel executive branch officials to attend a committee meeting and supply oral

testimony?

The power to summon the attendance of witnesses is also crucial for committees to gather information. This question also aims to assess the extent to which committees are granted power to ask government officials to supply information. If committees can only invite but not compel government officials to attend hearings, their information capacity is relatively limited. The classification of this indicator is similar to the indicator on committees' right to demand documents.

14. How many staff does a committee have and do these staff provide administrative support, help draft legislation, or conduct research?

To be better able to collect information, it is also important to have professional staff support. Committee resources vary greatly across countries. The costs of specialization are reduced if committees have staff with professional training who can help them prepare legislative documents and conduct research. The standing committees of the U.S. Congress stand at one extreme with extensive professional staff who could help conduct research and draft legislation. In some other countries, several committees have to share a single secretary mainly providing administrative support. The indicator should measure both the number of staff personnel and the functions they can provide to assist committee members.

The indicator of committees' staff support is constructed based on several items. Experts were asked to supply the number of shared staff (including clerical and professional employees), on average, that one committee has to help with committee procedures. In addition to shared staff, experts were also asked about the number of personal staff, on average, that one legislator has, in his or her position as a committee member. For these two categories of staff, experts were asked to assess the extent to which they provide the functions of administrative support, legislative document preparation, and research. For each of these three functions, committee

staff were evaluated on a three-point scale, on which *yes* is coded as ‘2’, *limited* is coded as ‘1’, and *no* is coded as ‘0’.

To construct an aggregate indicator, I add committee staff’s scores for these three function, and multiply the total scores by the number of staff personnel. For each national legislature, I take average scores that experts assigned to each of these items, since committees’ staff support is a more subjective indicator, and disagreement between experts can hardly be reconciled. The descriptive statistics of this indicator suggests that legislatures vary greatly with regard to committees’ staff support. At one extreme, each committee has less than one staff person, and the staff provide very limited assistance. At the other extreme, each committees has more than sixty staff, and the staff provide sufficient support with regard to administration, legislation preparation, and research.

15. How desirable is it for legislators to serve in consecutive terms in the same committees?

In terms of the composition of committees, if members serve longer terms in the same committees, the costs of committee specialization in a policy area are lower. Research based on the experience of the U.S. Congress has argued that if committees have reasonably stable membership, legislative expertise in a particular policy area is more likely to develop (Katz and Sala 1996).

It is more difficult to compute an indicator of committee retention rates in the cross sectional dataset. In the survey, experts were asked to assess whether legislators find it desirable to serve in consecutive terms in the same committees. The indicator captures the extent to which legislators find it attractive to build up competence in a particular policy area covered by a committee. Experts’ answers were coded on a 0–3 scale, in which ‘0’ means that on average, it is not desirable, while ‘3’ refers to members’ great desirability to serve in the same committees. It is also a more

subjective indicator, and I take the averages of expert scores for each committee system.

16. Can the plenary body subsequently amend bills after the committee stage?

When the floor tends to comply with committees' decisions, either by appropriate composition of committee members (Bianco 1997, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989), through formal regulations that restrict floor amendments after the committee stage (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989) or through repeated interactions that lead to credible commitment (Diermeier 1995), committees have more incentives to engage in specialization and transmit non-biased information. In the survey, I focus on whether committees' decisions are protected by restrictive amendment procedures.

Experts were asked according to formal rules, whether the plenary body can subsequently amend bills after the committee stage and if there is any rule restricting such amendments. In the sample, in around seventy percent of the national legislatures, the plenary can amend committee decisions freely. The indicator is coded as '1' when the plenary cannot subsequently amend committee decisions in certain policy areas. '2' refers to that a floor majority can decide whether to grant a closed rule on a bill. The U.S. Congress, where the Rules Committee can disallow any floor amendment to a proposal, is also classified into this category. It is coded as '3' if the plenary body may amend bills, but all these amendments shall be sent back to committees for reconsideration, such as in Brazil, Lithuania, and Sweden. It is coded as '4' if the floor cannot amend bills after the committee stage.

3.2.4 Other Indicators

The survey also included three items that measure whether the policy areas of committees correspond to the jurisdictions of executive departments and whether the memberships of committees are proportional to the relative strength of legislative parties. These items may capture the extent to which committee organization is institutionalized and reflects policy needs and political composition in a political system.

The other item measures the extent to which party leaders exert control over committee assignments. Experts were asked to assess how committee memberships are determined. This variable is coded on a three-point scale, where ‘1’ indicates that committee assignments are based on individual initiative and non-partisan criteria, and ‘3’ indicates that party leaders discretionarily determine committee assignments. To construct a country level measure, the averages of parties’ scores in each country, weighted by the vote share of each party in the most recent two elections are computed. This indicator is included in the analysis on the relationships between parties’ control over committee members and committees’ positive and negative power. All these four indicators were composed by taking the averages of expert assessments.

Table 3.1: Indicators of committee power

Indicators and coding	Obs.	Mean	Sd.	Min–Max
Whether the plenary considers bills as amended by committees	75	2.32	.91	0–3
0= committees cannot amend bills; 1= plenary considers original bills if committee amendments are not accepted by executive; 2= plenary considers committee amendments side by side with original bills; 3= plenary considers bills as amended by committees				
Whether committees have the right to introduce bills	75	.90	.88	0–2
0= committees cannot split, consolidate, or introduce bills; 1= committees can only split or consolidate bills;				
Continued on next page				

Table 3.1 – continued from previous page

Indicators and coding	Obs.	Mean	Sd.	Min–Max
2= committees can introduce bills				
All bills have to be referred to standing committees to become laws	75	4	1.43	0–5
0= bills are not referred to committees; 1= bills are referred to committees if approved by the House; 2= bills of certain policy areas are not referred to committees; 3= plenary majority can decide not to refer bills to committees; 4= super majority can decide not to refer bills to committees; 5= all bills have to be referred to standing committees				
Plenary action before the committee stage	75	2.57	.75	0–3
0= taking votes, amending, and having binding debates on bills; 1= two of the actions; 2= one of the actions; 3= no plenary action or only non-binding debates				
Whether committees can submit minority reports	75	1.13	.93	0–2
0= no; 1= with some restriction; 2= yes				
The average number of committee assignments per legislator	75	1.77	1.27	.36–8.39
number of all committee seats/ number of parliamentary seats				
Whether there is a restriction on multiple referrals	75	1.02	.80	0–2
0= yes; 1= no, but multiple referrals are rare; 2= no, multiple referrals are common				
Whether committee time is unique	75	1.41	.77	0–2
0= committee and plenary meetings may be at the same time; 1= no such regulation, but almost all are at different times; 2= they have to be scheduled at different times				
Whether committees have to report back all referred bills	75	1.22	1.62	0–4
0= all bills have to be reported back; 1= bills submitted by the executive have to be reported; 2= plenary majority can pass by, recall, or relocate bills; 3= super majority can pass by, recall, or relocate bills; 4= committees determine their own agenda freely;				
Whether there is a time constraint on committee reports	75	.89	.87	0–2
Continued on next page				

Table 3.1 – continued from previous page

Indicators and coding	Obs.	Mean	Sd.	Min–Max
0= time limits on all bills; 1= time limits on some bills; 2= no time limits				
Who controls a committee's agenda	75	5	1.07	2–6
0= actors other than committee members or chairs; 1= committee members or chairs along with other actors; 2= committee members or chairs; Summing the scores with regard to calling committee meetings, deciding what referred bills shall be considered and when, and deciding whether or not to hold hearings and when				
Whether committees can demand documents from government	75	2.28	.93	0–3
0= committees cannot demand documents from gov.; 1= committees can demand but not compel gov. to supply documents; 2= committees can compel gov. to supply documents under some conditions; 3= committees can compel gov. to supply documents				
Whether committees can compel government officials' attendance	75	2.34	.89	1–3
0= committees cannot invite the attendance of officials; 1= committees can invite but not compel their attendance 2= committees can compel their attendance under some conditions; 3= committees can compel the attendance of officials				
Number of committee staff and their functions	70	35.07	53.46	2.5–408
Number of committee staff members × Sum of their scores with regard to providing administrative support (0–2), helping draft legislation (0–2), and conducting research (0–2)				
Whether it is desirable for legislators to serve in consecutive terms in the same committee	68	2.22	.59	0–3
0= not at all; 3= greatly desirable				
Whether committees can grant a closed rule	75	.78	1.35	0–4
0= the plenary can amend bills freely; 1= closed rules for bills of certain policy areas; 2= closed rules are granted when the plenary majority so decides; 3= all plenary amendments have to be recommitted; 4= closed rules for all bills				
Whether the policy areas of committees are clearly stated	75	2.77	.40	1–3
Continued on next page				

Table 3.1 – continued from previous page

Indicators and coding	Obs.	Mean	Sd.	Min–Max
0= not clearly stated; 3= mostly clearly stated				
Whether the policy areas of committees correspond to the jurisdictions of executive departments	75	2.44	.79	0–3
0= not at all; 3= mostly				
Whether committee seats are allocated proportionally to the relative size of parties	75	.88	.32	0–1
0= no; 1= yes				
Who makes assignments to standing legislative committees	67	2.06	.50	1–3
1= based on individual initiative and non-partisan criteria;				
2= party leaders assign memberships, with the consideration of members' preferences;				
3= party leaders discretionarily determine committee assignments;				

3.3 Data Collection and the Reliability of Expert Ratings

This section provides a description on the implementation of the data collection. In the sample, countries are selected to reflect polities where there are free and fair elections and the composition of the national legislature reflects the results of electoral competition. All the 75 countries meet the criteria of having experienced at least two consecutive lower chamber elections before 2009 when the country's Polity score was 4 or higher. Based on the construction of the Polity scale, a polity score of 4 or higher ensures that elections are reasonably free and fair and the authority of chief executives is constrained to a certain degree (Jagers and Gurr 1995). In addition, only countries that have at least two million inhabitants as of 2008 are included². It has been argued that small legislatures encourage consensus and informality, and are less likely to sustain committee systems for specialized

² Mauritius meets all the criteria but is not included in the sample, since standing committees in its legislature mainly deal with the administration and do not have legislative functions

division of labor (Baldwin 2012). All countries included in the analysis are listed in Table 3.2. This sample covers a sufficient variety of political systems, in terms of executive-legislative relations, electoral rules, and experience with democracy, to enable the characterization of internal legislative organization across countries.

For each country, panels of 5-20 experts were asked to fill out the questionnaire on procedures, powers, and structures of legislative committees via e-mail. Experts chose either to answer the questionnaire online or with Word document. The experts consisted of scholars whose research concern the internal organization of national legislatures; parliamentary staff, especially committee secretaries and library and information sector staff; and representatives of non-governmental international organizations that have had projects aiming to enhance the capacity of national legislatures. The surveys were conducted during the period from April to August 2012. Experts were asked to answer questions based on the current legal and institutional features of standing committees in the national legislature.

Response rates varied across countries. For each country, initially five experts were identified and contacted. Some of those I contacted declined and some of them kindly suggested contact with colleagues. In these cases, my search for and contact with experts continued. I secured at least one response per country for 72 countries³. Table 3.2 lists the number of responses collected for each country. For 35 countries included in the sample, more than one responses were obtained. The average numbers of responses per country are lower across Latin American and African countries. Totally 117 completed questionnaires were received. 59 percent of them were answered by academic scholars, another 29 percent were filled by parliamentary staff, and the other 12 percent were provided by NGO representatives. Among all

³ For New Zealand, Taiwan, and the United States, I coded the indicators in the second part of the questionnaire bases on legislative standing rules and relevant literature. Parliamentary staff helped fill in an abridged version of the questionnaire only including questions of the first and the third parts, those that are not addressed in formal rules.

the countries for which I contacted experts, I failed to get any response for Mongolia and Nicaragua.

Table 3.2: Numbers of responses of the committee power expert survey (by countries and regions)

Country	Scholar	Staff	NGO	All
Australia	1	1		2
Austria	4	1		5
Belgium		2		2
Canada	1			1
Denmark	1			1
Finland	2	1		3
France	1			1
Germany	2	1		3
Greece		1		1
Ireland	1	1		2
Italy	3			3
Netherlands		1		1
New Zealand				0
Norway	1	1		2
Portugal	1	1		2
Spain		1		1
Sweden	3			3
Switzerland	2			2
UK	1			1
USA				0
Albania	1			1
Bulgaria		1	1	2
Croatia	1			1
Czech Rep.	1			1
Estonia		1	1	2
Georgia			1	1
Hungary	1	1		2
Latvia		2		2
Lithuania		2		2
Macedonia		1		1
Moldova			1	1
Poland	1	1		2
Romania	1			1
Serbia	1	1		2
Slovakia		1		1
Slovenia	1	1		2

Continued on next page

Table 3.2 – continued from previous page

Country	Scholar	Staff	NGO	All
Ukraine	1		1	2
Argentina	1	1		2
Bolivia			1	1
Brazil	1	1		1
Chile	1			1
Colombia	2			2
Costa Rica		1		1
Dominican Rep.	2			2
Ecuador	1			1
El Salvador			1	1
Guatemala	1			1
Honduras	1		1	2
Jamaica		1		1
Mexico	2			2
Panama	1	1		2
Paraguay	1			1
Peru			1	1
Uruguay	1			1
Venezuela			1	1
Benin	1			1
Botswana	1		1	2
Ghana			2	2
Mozambique	1			1
Namibia			1	1
Nigeria	2			2
S. Africa		1		1
Senegal	1			1
Zambia	1			1
Bangladesh	1		1	2
India	2			2
Indonesia		1		1
Israel	2			2
Japan	3	1		4
Kenya		1		1
Philippines		1		1
ROK	3			3
Taiwan				0
Turkey	2			2

I evaluate inter-rater agreement for countries where more than one responses were received. To explore the extent to which experts agree among themselves, Table

Table 3.3: Inter-rater agreement of the committee power expert survey

Indicator	Avg. within country sd.	Across country sd.	Within country 90% PI
Floor considers bills as amended by committees	0.16	0.91	± 0.45
Committees have the right to introduce bills	0.22	0.88	± 0.64
All bills are referred to committees	0.07	1.43	± 0.20
No plenary action before committee stage	0.19	0.75	± 0.56
Minority reports	0.13	0.93	± 0.39
Multiple referrals	0.27	0.8	± 0.77
Committee time is unique	0.23	0.77	± 0.66
Committees do not have to report all referred bills	0.23	1.62	± 0.65
No time constraint on committee reports	0.14	0.87	± 0.41
Agenda control	0.49	1.07	± 1.41
Committees can demand documents from government	0.23	0.93	± 0.67
Committees can compel government officials attendance	0.20	0.89	± 0.59
Committees can grant a closed rule	0.26	1.35	± 0.76
Number and functions of committee staff	3.33	53.46	± 9.67
Serving in the same committee is desirable	0.17	0.59	± 0.50

3.3 reports the average within-country standard deviation of each indicator among countries that more than one experts provided ratings⁴. Countries for which only one completed questionnaire was received are excluded from the calculation. The lower the standard deviation of expert ratings for each indicator, on average, the more consensus exists among experts over the classification of a committee system. This table provides a simple assessment of inter-rater reliability by comparing the within-country and across-country variability of each indicator.

Except for the function of committee staff and whether it is desirable for members to serve in consecutive terms in the same committee, experts were asked to rate all other indicators on the table based on formal rules rather than subjective judgement. It is expected that the discrepancies among experts for these formal institution

⁴ The information about the average number of committee assignments per legislator was not collected from the expert survey, and thus is not listed on the table.

measures are small. The table suggests that the within-country standard deviations are generally low, compared to the cross-country standard deviations of the same indicators. Among the indicators of committees' positive power, the procedure governing multiple referrals was rated less reliably than the other indicators, although its within-country standard deviation is still much smaller than the cross-country standard deviation.

Among the indicators of committees' negative power, the average level of disagreement on the aggregate measure of committees' agenda control is especially high. This measure was created by summing a committee system's scores on three agenda-setting decisions. When experts disagree over one of the items, they tend to also disagree over the other two. Consequently, the discrepancies among experts are aggravated by aggregation of the three scores. The average levels of disagreement on measures of committees' information capacity are all relatively low. The comparison of standard deviations suggests that experts also tend to agree in their ratings on the more subjective indicators, the capability of committee staff and the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee.

The evaluation of inter-rater agreement based on the comparison between within-country and across-country standard deviations shows that the similarity among expert ratings for a committee system is high, compared to the variation across countries. This general tendency of inter-rater consistency suggests that the small sample size of the survey for each country is acceptable. Since experts tend to assign similar ratings to the same procedure of a committee system, it is less important to have a large sample of experts.

For the 35 countries that more than one complete questionnaires were received, I sought to reconcile the disagreement between experts shown in Table 3.3. Except for the measures of the capability of committee staff and the desirability of serving in the same committee, conflicting survey responses were resolved based on formal

documents. The most current version of formal legislative rules, including constitutions, standing procedures, resolutions and other relevant documents for individual countries, were used to supplement information from expert surveys. For the two above-mentioned subjective indicators, the indicators of legislative organization institutionalization (the extent to which committees' policy areas are clearly stated and correspond to the jurisdictions of executive departments), and parties' control over committee assignments, I took averages of expert responses.

For the countries where only one response was received, I calculate the 90% prediction interval to estimate if two more responses had been collected for each of these countries, how the expert ratings would distribute around the country mean. The 90% prediction interval of each indicator is listed in the last column of Table 3.3. These prediction intervals are calculated in terms of the observed within-country standard deviations listed in the first column, and assume that the expert ratings for these countries are in a t-distribution⁵. The estimation is based on a conservative assumption that experts were randomly selected for these countries, and may assign very different ratings. The table shows that the prediction intervals are still smaller than the cross-country variation. However, it also suggests that if the conservative assumption is true, for countries where only one response was received, there might be a one score difference between the current ratings and the ratings if a larger sample had been obtained for some indicators, such as multiple referrals, agenda control, and closed rules. The ratings for indicators of committees' amending power, bill referral procedures, minority reports, time constraints on committee reports are more stable.

⁵ Specifically, the prediction interval is calculated as country mean \pm within country sd. $\times t_{0.05,2}$, in which $t_{0.05,2} = 2.92$.

3.4 Distributions of Key Indicators

This section displays the distributions of several indicators of committee power based on the expert survey. All the data points on the following four figures are jittered slightly to improve visibility of overlapping points. The figures aim to show the general distribution patterns of the key measures, and explore whether the country scores are consistent with previous assessments of strong and weak committee systems. More detailed discussions of relationships between indicators and cross-validation with other datasets are presented in the next chapter.




FIGURE 3.1: Committees' amending power and plenary action before committee stage

Figure 3.1 shows how committee systems score on two indicators of committees' positive power. As the previous section points out, if committees can amend bills before they are reframed or voted down on the floor, and if the floor subsequently

considers bills as amended by committees, committees are able to ensure the placement of legislative versions preferred by them on the floor. The figure suggests that the majority of committee systems included in the sample have high scores on both measures. The committees in the UK House of Commons and the parliaments of other countries with Westminster systems were rated low on one or both of these indicators. The U.S. Congress and the German Bundestag were both classified in the highest category for the two committee procedures. These country scores are roughly consistent with expectations. In addition, committees in most post-communist and Latin American countries score high on both indicators.




FIGURE 3.2: Multiple referrals and average committee assignments per legislator

Figure 3.2 displays the distributions of multiple referrals and average committee assignments per legislator. These indicators both capture the extent to which individual members have access to committee affairs. The figure shows a positive relationship between the two indicators. Countries distribute relatively evenly across

constraints on the reports in many of these countries. Across the Western European parliaments, the country scores displayed in the figure are generally consistent with the classification specified by Döring (1996): the government has less control over the committee timetable in Denmark and Germany, but has more control in France and Southern Europe. Three clear exceptions of the consistent patterns between the two measures are Finland, Sweden, and the UK. While the divergent scores for the UK House of Commons are due to ratings for different types of committees, either the ad hoc or the standing committees; the discrepancies in scores for Finland and Sweden may reflect that the relative power of the parliament has changed in contrasting directions in these two countries during the past decade (Strøm and Bergman 2011).




FIGURE 3.4: Committees' power to compel evidence and staff support

Figure 3.4 displays the distributions of committees' power to compel government officials to attend hearings and their staff support. They are measures of committees' information capacity. The figure suggests that in majority of the countries

included in the sample, committees have the authority to compel government officials' attendance. The scores of committees' staff support are skewed to the right, and natural log transformation is taken. Most African legislatures were scored below the average for this indicator; while committee systems in the advanced democracies were generally rated around or above the average, with Austria and Spain as exceptions. Consistent with expectation, the U.S. Congress was classified as an outlier with regard to professional staff for its committees.

Dimensionality of Committee Power

As Chapter 2 specifies, committees' information capacity, positive, and negative agenda power serve the needs of different actors, including individual legislators, cohesive voting blocs, and the entire chamber. In addition, since these actors' preferences may be in conflict, committees should not be consistently strong or weak with regard to all mechanisms. It is expected that committees' information capacity, positive and negative agenda-setting powers constitute empirically distinct dimensions. With the data discussed in Chapter 3, the hypotheses about the separation of the three dimensions of committee power can be tested. In this chapter, I first use confirmatory factor analyses to examine the data for the dimensionality framework and conduct tests of measurement invariance across several background variables. Then the chapter discusses how national legislatures score on different dimensions of committee power. Finally, to evaluate the reliability of the data and the validity of the dimensionality framework, I compare the factor scores with alternative measures of committee and general legislative capacity.

4.1 The Underlying Dimensions of Committee Power

Hypotheses specified in Chapter 2 argue that committees' information capacity potentially benefits all legislators who want to have more information about policy consequences; the positive agenda power provides committee members with opportunities to express preferences for measures placed to the floor; while the negative agenda power tends to benefit organized voting blocs in committees and allow them to block the progress of certain bills. Based on these arguments, indicators that empirically measure one of these three dimensions should covary to a certain degree, because they all reflect the variance of committees' strength with regard to the dimension. In contrast, intercorrelation between indicators of different dimensions is expected to be lower. This section empirically tests the hypotheses on patterns of covariation among indicators of committee power.

To verify the number of underlying dimensions of various indicators of committee power and the patterns of indicator-dimension relationships, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is conducted. CFA identifies latent factors that account for the observed relationships among a set of indicators. It evaluates the prespecified patterns of indicator-dimension relationships in terms of how well they reproduce the correlations observed in the sample data. That is, CFA provides statistical tests to assess whether the theoretical assumptions about the number of underlying dimensions and the patterns of indicator-dimension relationships are empirically supported. In addition, CFA allows one to examine the stability of the dimensionality model across countries of different development levels and other potentially influential covariates.

Before moving to a confirmatory model to verify the hypotheses, to more thoroughly explore the variances and covariances among indicators of committee power, I first conduct "exploratory factor analysis (EFA) within the CFA framework" (Brown 2006, Jöreskog 1969). In this strategy, only the number of underlying factors and an

anchor indicator for each factor whose cross-loadings are fixed to zero are prespecified. As Brown (2006) has indicated, this approach represents an intermediate step between EFA and CFA. It is less restrictive than CFA, since the indicator-dimension relationships are not fixed, except for the anchor indicators. It also provides more information than EFA model, such as the statistical significance of item loadings.

Most of the indicators of committee power are coded as ordinal variables. Two indicators, the number and functions of committee staff and average committee assignments per legislator, are continuous variables. Since the distributions of these two variables are skewed to the right, natural log transformation is taken to generate more symmetrical distributions. To accommodate this mixed ordinal and continuous data, robust weighted least squares (WLS) estimation using polychoric correlations are computed (Olsson 1979). WLS estimation adjusts standard errors and model test statistics to reduce bias due to the conventional maximum likelihood estimation assumption that observed indicators are measured on a continuous normal scale (Flora and Curran 2004, Schmitt 2011).

Table 4.1 shows the results of EFA within the CFA framework of the 17 indicators of committee procedures. In the model, it is specified that there are three distinct dimensions of committee power. In addition, three anchor items are selected, which include whether there is plenary action before the committee stage, whether committees are obliged to report all referred bills back to the floor, and whether committees can compel executive branch officials to attend hearings. That is, these three indicators are assumed to load on only one factor. The loadings of other non-anchor indicators are freely estimated on each factor. More specifically, within each factor generated by the EFA within CFA approach, the patterns of associations between each of these three anchor indicators and all other indicators are specified. In addition, the correlations between these three anchor indicators are captured by relationships between factors. These three anchor points are chosen because

Table 4.1: Parameter estimates of the dimensionality of committee powers (EFA within the CFA framework)

Indicator	Factor		
	Positive power	Negative power	Information
No plenary action before committee stage	.779 (.11)***	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
All bills are referred to committees	.760 (.10)***	-.048 (.16)	.102 (.16)
Minority reports	.406 (.14)***	.133 (.18)	.167 (.17)
Multiple referrals	.531 (.11)***	.012 (.16)	.084 (.16)
(log) Committee assignments per legislator	.357 (.11)***	.079 (.13)	-.126 (.15)
Committee time is unique	.370 (.12)**	.190 (.17)	.123 (.14)
Floor considers bills as amended by committees	.451 (.14)***	.339 (.15)**	.192 (.18)
Committees do not have to report all referred bills	.000 (.00)	.792 (.12)***	.000 (.00)
No time constraint on committee reports	.012 (.13)	.890 (.13)***	-.132 (.16)
Agenda control	.234 (.15)	.500 (.10)***	.026 (.15)
(log) Number and functions of committee staff	.179 (.13)	.322 (.14)**	.343 (.12)***
Committees can compel executive branch officials' attendance	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.797 (.09)***
Committees can demand documents from government	.042 (.15)	-.063 (.21)	1.032 (.13)***
Committees have the right to introduce bills	.161 (.15)	-.355 (.20)*	.669 (.14)***
Committees can grant a closed rule	.248 (.14)	-.056 (.20)	.643 (.14)***
Serving in consecutive terms in the same committee is desirable	.172 (.12)	.027 (.14)	.240 (.11)**
Correlation Matrix of Factors			
	Positive power	Negative power	Information
Positive power	1.00		
Negative power	-.200 (.21)	1.00	
Information capacity	-.185 (.25)	.290 (.22)	1.00

Note: Parameters were estimated with *Mplus*. N=75. Multiple imputations were used for the indicators of the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee (N=68) and committee staff (N=69). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. $\chi^2=60.43$ ($p = 0.83$). RMSEA = .000 (90% CI: .000/.041). CFI= 1.00.

as specified in Chapter 3, these three procedures have crucial implications for the three dimensions of committee power. If proposals are referred to committees before they are reframed or voted down on the floor, committees are able to express their preferences on more bills; if committees are not required to report all bills back, they

can effectively block the progress of legislation; if committees can compel government officials to attend hearings and supply information, their capacity to independently gather information is enhanced. The EFA within CFA framework with these three indicators as the anchor items allows the exploration of how each of these three indicators are correlated to other indicators and jointly constitute the three dimensions of committee power.

As the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) (Steiger 1990) and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) (Bentler 1990) indicate, the three-factor model fits the data quite well. The table reports the estimates of the linear relationship between the observable indicators and the three latent variables, and the estimated coefficients of correlations between the three latent variables. Except for the indicator of whether members find it desirable to serve in the same committees, all other 16 items have primary factor loadings above .30. The estimated correlations between any two of the three dimensions are not significant.

There are seven indicators that significantly load on the first factor. The first factor combines committees' early involvement in the law-making process, their authorities to consider and amend most draft bills, and submit minority reports. In legislatures scoring high on this factor, there tend to be no restrictions on multiple referrals; members are likely to have more committee assignments; and committee and plenary meetings tend to be scheduled at different times. Consistent with theoretical expectations, rules that determine committees' power to make decisions and place their preferred legislation to the floor constitute one distinct dimension. In addition, procedures that allow individual members more access to committee affairs also load on the same factor. These indicators do not significantly covary with other indicators that are expected to measure committees' negative power and information capacity. Multiple referrals and large numbers of committee assignments per legislator have been considered unfavorable to the "property rights" of each committee in the re-

search based on the experience of the U.S. Congress (Weingast and Marshall 1988). However, as Table 4.1 shows, these two items significantly share variances with other indicators of committees' positive agenda power. In addition, the exclusion of these two items does not change the three-factor structure. These patterns suggest that across countries, committees' authorities to place decisions to the floor tend to increase with individual legislators' opportunities for committee participation rather than with committees' monopoly right within their jurisdictions.

The second factor relates mainly to committees' negative power to block the progress of legislation, including their authorities to freely decide which bills to be considered and when. Committee systems scoring high on this factor also tend to have stronger amending power. These patterns are also consistent with theoretical expectations and suggest that there is one single factor accounting for the variation of various procedures that determine committees' negative power across legislatures. The indicator of committees' staff support also loads significantly on this factor. More specifically, committees' staff support correlates more substantially to two of the indicators of committees' negative power, including committees' amending power ($r = .37$) and no time constraints on committee reports ($r = .39$). These relationships may suggest that professional staff support not only contributes to committees' information capacity, but also strengthens committees' ability to delay and revise their less-preferred legislative versions.

The third factor comprises institutional instruments for committees to collect and transmit information, including the authority to demand documents and to summon government officials, and the restriction on amendments by the plenary after the committee stage. Committee systems scoring high on this factor have more staff support, and members tend to find serving in the same committee for consecutive terms is desirable. These patterns support the hypothesis that procedures about committees' ability to gather information and share their policy expertise with the

floor constitute a distinct dimension of influence.

What is different from the theoretical expectation is the indicator of committees' authorities to introduce bills loads significantly on this factor, but does not load on the factor of committees' positive power. Committees' rights to introduce bills considerably correlate to their authorities to demand documents ($r = .56$) and compel government officials' attendance ($r = .38$), and to restrictive amending processes ($r = .38$). It is not very clear why committees' proposing rights are less correlated with measures of committees' positive power, but substantially covary with their information capacity. It may suggest proposing bills is an effective mechanism of information transmission¹. Further studies will be required to examine the implications of committees' power to initiating legislation.

Following the hypotheses specified in Chapter 2 and the findings from the EFA within CFA model, I perform a CFA whose structure is presented in Figure 4.1. Except for the indicators of committees' amending power and staff support, all other cross-loadings are fixed to zero. The model allows the verification that when most indicators are prespecified as being accounted for by one single factor, their primary loadings are still significant and the three-factor structure fits the data well. Different from the EFA within CFA model, the CFA approach clearly specifies the item-factor relationships, and helps generate factor scores, for which most indicators are assumed to load on one single factor. Table 4.2 reports the linear relationships between the 17 measures of committee power and three factors and a set of goodness of fit indicators.

Based on the goodness of fit indicators, the CFA model fits the data quite well. All loadings of the prespecified item-factor relationships are significant. Consistent with the results of the EFA within CFA model, the factor of committees' positive

¹ Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989) have assumed that making bill proposals has the effects of sending a costly signal about the policy consequences. The empirical patterns revealed by the factor analysis seem to be consistent with the assumption. However, a more detailed exploration is required to determine how different information transmission mechanisms have different signally effects.




FIGURE 4.1: Path diagram of the three-factor model

power comprises their early involvement in the legislative process, authorities to receive and amend almost all bills, and procedures that allow multiple committee assignments, multiple referrals, and the submission of minority reports. Furthermore, indicators of committees' ability to freely determine their agenda and revise bills share common variance, and constitute the dimension of committees' negative power. Finally, the factor of committees' information capacity is composed of their

Table 4.2: Parameter estimates of the dimensionality of committee powers (CFA)

Parameter	Standardized WLS estimate		
λ_{11}	.739	(.13)	***
λ_{12}	.787	(.10)	***
λ_{13}	.380	(.14)	***
λ_{14}	.511	(.10)	***
λ_{15}	.332	(.10)	***
λ_{16}	.368	(.13)	***
λ_{17}	.395	(.12)	***
λ_{21}	.405	(.13)	***
λ_{22}	.788	(.13)	***
λ_{23}	.803	(.12)	***
λ_{24}	.486	(.09)	***
λ_{25}	.372	(.13)	***
λ_{31}	.311	(.11)	***
λ_{32}	.817	(.10)	***
λ_{33}	.978	(.09)	***
λ_{34}	.536	(.11)	***
λ_{35}	.635	(.11)	***
λ_{36}	.251	(.11)	**
Correlation Matrix of Factors			
	Positive power	Negative power	Information
Positive power	1.00	—	—
Negative power	-.011 (.15)	1.00	—
Information capacity	.128 (.14)	.171 (.14)	1.00

Note: Parameters were estimated with *Mplus*. N=75. Multiple imputations were used for the indicators of the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee (N=68) and committee staff (N=69). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. $\chi^2=84.66$ ($p = 0.79$). RMSEA= .000 (90% CI: .000/.043). CFI= 1.00.

abilities to demand documents, compel attendance to hearings, initiate bills, restrict subsequent amendments, and their professional staff support.

The three-factor model includes two cross-loading items. The indicator of committees' amending power loads on both the first and the second factors; while the indicator of committees' staff support loads on both the second and the third factors. Compared to a model excluding the cross-loading items or a model forcing these items to load on a single factor, the current model fits the data significantly more closely². Two of the items, the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in

² The χ^2 of a CFA model in which the indicator of committees' amending power is forced to only

the same committee and the staff support of committees, contain missing values, and multiple imputations are used to estimate the missing cases. Excluding the two items does not change this three-factor structure. In addition, factor scores generated from the current model and those from the reduced models are highly correlated at $r = .95 \sim .99$. These suggest the three-factor model is quite stable.

Three additional items, whether the policy areas of committees are clearly specified, whether those policy areas correspond to the jurisdictions of executive departments, and whether the allocation of committee seats is proportional to the seat shares of parties, comprise a separate factor, if they are also included in the analysis³. This factor seems to capture the extent of the institutionalization of a committee system. Since this factor is not correlated with the three main factors of committee powers, and their factor loadings are less significant, the three indicators are not included in the subsequent analyses. The less significance of the factor loadings may be mainly due to the lack of variation of these three indicators. In the sample, 88% and 66% of the national legislatures were scored above 2.5 on the 0–3 scale of the indicators of committees' policy areas and their correspondence with ministers, respectively. In 88% of the national legislatures, committee seats are allocated proportionally to the relative size of parties.

The results of the EFA within CFA and the CFA models provide unambiguous support for the first two hypotheses raised in Chapter 2. The performance of the three-factor framework verifies the multidimensional nature of committee power expected in hypothesis 1. There is no single factor that accounts for the variances of all different committee procedures. In addition, these three factors correspond to the

load on the first factor is 96.750 ($df = 97$). $\chi^2 = 90.993$ ($df = 97$) when the indicator of staff support only loads on the second factor, while $\chi^2 = 92.385$ ($df = 97$) if it only loads on the third factor. The χ^2 difference test suggests that the current model provides a significantly better fit to the data than these alternative models

³ The factor loadings of these three indicators are .888 (.29), .358 (.16), and .348 (.15), respectively.

theoretically derived mechanisms and thus support hypothesis 2. Across legislatures, committees are not consistently strong or weak with regard to all three dimensions of influence. Almost all indicators load significantly on only one factor; these factors capture clearly distinct dimensions of committee power.

Utilizing the capacity of CFA approach of incorporating covariates, I also evaluate the equivalence of the CFA parameters across covariates that represent countries' levels of development, democratic quality, and executive-legislative relations. Some indicators of committee power may function differently in different countries. For example, regardless of the level of the underlying dimension of committees' information capacity, legislatures in higher income countries with well functioning institutions are more likely to be supported by effective administrative services. That is, irrespective of the demands for committees to collect and transmit information, committees systems in higher income countries tend to be scored higher for the indicator of professional staff support. In addition, countries' legislative-executive relations may also affect the equivalence of the CFA parameters. Decision-making under presidentialism is considered to be more decentralized; while the role of parliaments and their committees in drafting legislation appears to be more limited in parliamentary systems (Strøm 2000). It is likely that regardless of the levels of committees' positive power and information capacity, committees in presidential systems tend to be granted the right to initiate legislation.

To verify whether certain indicators function differently in countries with different contextual variables, I conduct CFA with covariates (Brown 2006, Muthén 1989). This approach tests if certain covariates have significant effects on indicators once the latent factors are held constant, by regressing the indicators onto covariates that represent various features of countries. A significant effect of the covariate on an indicator means that countries with different levels of the covariate are scored differently for the indicator, even when the latent factors are held constant. The models

also examine if the three-dimensional framework still holds when the covariates are controlled.

The results are shown in Table B.1, B.2, and B.3 in Appendix B. Countries' economic development levels, democratic quality, and executive-legislative relations are included as covariates to test the invariance of the three-factor model. The estimated parameters and the goodness of fit indicators suggest that the three-factor model still fits the data well. None of the covariates alter the factor structure and the patterns of item-factor loadings established in Table 4.1. The only difference from the original model is that, as Table B.1 shows, when countries' log transformed per capita GDP is included as the covariate, the loading of the indicator of committees' staff support on committees' negative power becomes insignificant. As expected, countries' income levels have substantial effects on committees' staff support. At any given level of committees' negative power and information capacity, legislatures in higher income countries tend to have more professional staff to help with committee affairs. Once the effects of countries' income levels on indicators are accounted for, the covariance between committees' staff support and other indicators of committees' negative power is diminished; while its factor loading on committees' information capacity is still significant. These results suggest that the significant covariation between committees' staff support and negative power found in the original model mainly results from the association between higher income countries and more sufficient staff resources.

With the approach of CFA, hypotheses on the dimensionality of committee power are verified in this section. The results suggest that various committee procedures cluster into three dimensions. The dimension of committees' positive power combines their ability to receive and amend bills at an earlier stage of legislative process and procedures that allow individual legislators more access to committee affairs. The dimension of committees' negative power is constituted of their authorities to freely

decide which bills to consider and when. The dimension of committees' information capacity is composed of their staff resources and their authorities to demand documents, compel attendance, introduce bills, and restrict subsequent amendments. The equivalence of the three-dimensional structure across covariates that represent countries' income levels, democratic quality, and executive-legislative relations is also tested. The separation of these three dimensions still holds with the inclusion of the covariates. Committees' staff support is highly associated with countries' levels of developments, and its loading on the dimension of negative power is diminished with the inclusion of the covariates. Other indicator-factor relations established in the original model are not affected by different levels of the covariates.

4.2 The Distributions and Correlations of Factor Scores

How do national legislatures score on these three dimensions of committee power? Do committee systems tend to combine any set of the mechanisms? This section discusses how the factor scores of the three dimensions distribute and correlate across the sample.

Chapter 2 argues that committees' positive and negative power both benefit cohesive voting blocs. Committees' positive and negative power may be both developed and serve the interests of disciplined parties. However, the negative agenda power is less beneficial to individualistic members. It implies that there may be the combination of "high scores on the dimension of positive power and low scores on the dimension of negative power", but it is less likely to find committee systems that have significant negative power but limited positive power. Figure 4.2 displays committee systems' strength on these two dimensions, based on factor scores generated from a three-dimensional CFA model⁴. The figure shows that with some exception,

⁴ The CFA model follows the path diagram presented in Figure 4.1, but the indicator of committees' staff support is forced to only load on the factor of their information capacity to reflect the

particularly those with Westminster traditions, most countries with above-average scores on negative agenda power have at least middle-level scores on the dimension of positive power. The committee system in the UK's House of Commons is one clear exception. Its scores are calculated based on features of the select committees (standing committees without law-making authorities) but not the general committees (ad hoc committees created for each draft bill). The general committees may be scored very low on the dimension of negative power but higher on the dimension of positive power. The select committees are classified as having more negative power. However, since no bills are referred to select committees, it only means they have the authority to determine their agenda freely but have no power to block legislation.

Figure 4.3 locates all the 75 countries' legislative committees on the three dimensions. The figure divides the countries into eight categories based on their scores on the three factors. As parameters estimated in Table 4.1 and 4.2 suggest, all the pairwise correlations between the factor scores are small. These patterns suggest there are no significant substitutes between any two of the dimensions. The categories of the combination of "high scores on two of the dimensions but a low score on the other one" are more crowded; while the categories of "low scores on two of the dimensions but a high score on the other one" include fewer cases. Committee systems that are scored as "high on all three dimensions" are also rare. These patterns suggest committee systems are less likely to be consistently strong with regard to all three dimensions.

Figure 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 display the distributions of each of the three dimensions of committee power. Figure 4.4 suggests that committee systems in nearly all post-communist countries are classified as having extensive positive power. They provide members with more opportunities to be involved in the law-making process. The

results of measurement invariance tests discussed in the previous section. The model is reported in Table B.4 in Appendix B




FIGURE 4.2: Powers of legislative committees (factor scores generated from a CFA)

similar tendency has also been identified in previous research (Martin and Depauw 2009, Yläoutinen and Hallerberg 2008). The authors have found that on average, committees in post-communist countries tend to have more institutional instruments than committees in Western European countries. Martin and Depauw have explained that the fall of communism in these countries provided them an opportunity to reinvigorate their legislatures, and the influence of US-based agencies and scholars may have shaped the reorganizations.

Figure 4.4 also shows that with the exception of France and Senegal, all countries scored below -0.5 on the dimension with regard to committees' positive power were once part of the British Empire, which is consistent with the Westminster tradition of weak committees.




FIGURE 4.3: Powers of legislative committees (factor scores generated from a CFA; vertical lines indicating the first quartile, median, and third quartile)

Most sub-Saharan African countries locate in the upper two panels of Figure 4.3, where committees are weak in both positive and negative power. Figure 4.5 shows that committee systems in the sub-Saharan African countries with more democratic experience, such as Botswana, Mozambique, Benin, and South Africa, tend to have




FIGURE 4.4: Committees' positive agenda power (factor scores generated from a CFA; vertical lines indicating the first quartile, median, and third quartile)

more authorities to determine their own agenda.

The institutional arrangements of committees are more heterogeneous across countries in Asia. Committees in countries of British colonial origin, Bangladesh




FIGURE 4.5: Committees' negative agenda power (factor scores generated from a CFA; vertical lines indicating the first quartile, median, and third quartile)

and India, score below average on all three dimensions; while committees in the more affluent countries, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, are classified as having stronger negative power and information capacity, as Figure 4.5 and 4.6 suggest. The




FIGURE 4.6: Committees' information capacity (factor scores generated from a CFA; vertical lines indicating the first quartile, median, and third quartile)

Philippine Congress, whose institutional design was largely influenced by the U.S. colonial experience (Wilson 1999), has the committee system that reaches higher-than-average values on all dimensions.

Advanced capitalist countries spread across all categories, except the “high on everything” one. In addition to committees of the French parliament, which was meant to be weak (Huber 1996), those in the parliaments of Southern Europe also have lower scores on some of the dimensions. The committee system of the U.S. Congress, which has been considered as a model of strong committees, is classified as having an average level of positive power, and scores fairly high on the dimensions of negative power and information capacity. The Western European countries that have been argued as having strong parliaments, including Austria, Denmark, and Germany, also score above average in committees’ negative power.

More analyses are shown in the subsequent chapters to explore reasons accounting for the variations in these three dimensions across countries.

4.3 Cross-Validation

Section 4.1 shows the tests of the reliability of the three-dimensional structure across covariates. This section further evaluates the validity of the factor scores by contrasting them with alternative measures of committee and general legislative capacity.

One of the alternative measures based on similar indicators of committee power is the index developed by Martin and Depauw (2009). This index covers 12 dummy indicators of committee procedures in 31 parliamentary countries. The indicators include whether committees are jurisdictional to ministerial portfolios, whether bills are considered by committees prior to the plenary stage, whether committee time is unique, who control committee agenda, whether the floor consider bills as amended by committees, and whether committees are allowed to demand documents and compel ministerial attendance. All of these items are also included in my dataset, and most of them load on the factor of committees’ positive power, while some load on the information capacity factor. The coefficients of the correlations between the index and the three factors are shown in Table 4.3, which suggests that this index is highly

correlated with committees' positive power, and is correlated with their information capacity to a lesser extent. The relation between this index and the factor scores of committees' positive power is displayed in the left panel of Figure 4.7. The figure shows that, except for the cases of Greece and Ireland, the location of committee systems with regard to their positive power generated by the CFA solution matches closely the index by Martin and Depauw.

Table 4.3: Coefficients of correlations between alternative measures and the three factors

	Positive power	Negative power	Information capacity	Overlapping cases
Committee power index (Martin & Depauw 2009)	0.61	0.15	0.26	28
“Drafting authority” factor (Mattson & Strøm 1996)	0.61	-0.12	-0.01	16
“Agenda control” factor (Mattson & Strøm 1996)	0.44	-0.28	0.01	16
Legislative policy strength (Martin & Vanberg 2011)	0.84	-0.04	-0.11	15
<i>Rank</i> of “control structure” (Harfst & Schnapp 2003)	-0.57	-0.15	-0.10	21
<i>Rank</i> of “personnel resources” (Harfst & Schnapp 2003)	0.07	-0.31	-0.47	21
<i>Rank</i> of “information rights” (Harfst & Schnapp 2003)	-0.06	-0.40	-0.30	21
Power of the purse (Wehner 2006)	0.39	0.37	0.27	35
PPI (Fish & Kroenig 2009)	0.08	0.06	-0.14	75
PPI: influence over executive	-0.17	-0.05	-0.16	75
PPI: institutional autonomy	0.15	0.09	-0.05	75
PPI: specified power	0.46	0.03	-0.07	75
PPI: institutional capacity	-0.23	0.18	-0.07	75

Note: $p < 0.05$ are in bold.

Another measures based on similar indicators are the two factor scores developed by Mattson and Strøm (1996). These two factors are generated from 5 items that measure the strength of committee systems in 16 Western European countries. The “drafting authority” factor comprises committees' power to initiate and rewrite bills, and their authorities to demand documents. This factor is also highly associated with

minority reports to the floor and committee deliberation prior to the major floor debate. The items associated with this factor mainly load on the positive power dimension based on my CFA solution. As expected, Table 4.3 suggests that these two factor scores are highly correlated. The right panel of Figure 4.7 displays that except for the UK House of Commons, for which Mattson and Strøm’s measures are based on the procedures of both the ad-hoc and standing committees, these two scales are generally consistent. The other factor, named as committees’ “agenda control,” includes committees’ capacity to control their timetable and compel witness. This factor is also highly associated with the number of specialized standing committees and committee stage prior to the major floor debate. These items load on all three dimensions of my CFA model. Table 4.3 suggests that this factor is more correlated with committees’ positive power.




FIGURE 4.7: Comparison between the factor scores of committees’ positive power and indices by Martin & Depauw and by Mattson & Strøm

Martin and Vanberg (2011) have developed an index of legislative policing strength based on factor analysis of eight indicators for 16 Western European parliaments. The index measures the extent to which legislative institutions enable coalition parties to

gain informational expertise and change ministerial proposals. The index combines six features of a committee system, including the number and size of committees, the correspondence between committee and ministerial jurisdictions, binding plenary debate before the committee stage, committees' amending power, and committees' authority to compel documents and witnesses; and two plenary procedures, urgency and guillotine procedures, that allow ministers to restrict legislative debates and amendments. It is expected that the index is correlated with the dimensions of committees' positive power and information capacity, given its constituent indicators. Table 4.3 shows that this index is closely associated with the factor of committees' positive power, but does not covary with the factor scores of information capacity. The lack of correlation between this index and committees' information capacity may be due to that in Martin and Vanberg's factor analysis used to generate the index of legislative policing strength, the factor loading of the item of committees' authority to compel is smaller than other items (2011, p. 49).

Harfst and Schnapp (2003) have developed three indices to explore whether legislatures have means to oversight the executives in 21 advanced capitalist democracies. The "control structure" index measures the internal structural differentiation of legislatures. This index is based on the number of committees, the parallelism of the jurisdiction of committees and ministries, and the average committee assignments per member. The "personnel resources" index is based on the number of parliamentary staff, the number of committee staff, the number of parliamentary library staff, and the budget and responsibility of the library. The "information rights" index comprises committees' authorities to demand documents and summon officials, the time that a legislature has at its proposal to prepare and review the state budget, and the existence of audit offices and ombudspersons. Only the ranks but not the original scores of the 21 countries on the three indices are available. Table 4.3 suggests that the "control structure" index is highly correlated with the factor of committees'

positive power; while the “personnel resources” index is more closely correlated to the other two factors. The “information rights” index is correlated with committees’ negative power and information capacity to a lesser extent. These patterns are generally consistent with expectations, given the constituent items of the three indices.

Wehner (2006) has constructed an index to assess legislatures’ capacity to scrutinize budgets. The index is based on expert survey conducted in 36 countries. It captures six aspects of legislatures’ institutional instruments, including the extent to which the legislature can amend the budget, the consequences if the budget is not approved, the extent to which the executive can reallocate, withhold, or reserve funds without legislative consent, whether the legislature has a budget office with professional staff, whether the budget is referred to committees, and the time the legislature has to review the budget. Most of the items do not directly measure committees’ ability. However, it is expected that the index covaries with committee power to some extent. Legislatures’ ability to amend budgets and the involvement of committees in the process are likely to be reflected in procedures that determine committees’ positive power. Whether legislatures have sufficient time to review budgets may depend on how effectively committees involved in the process can control their agenda. In addition, legislatures supported by an independent budget office are likely to also have more sufficient staff resources to help with committee affairs. Table 4.3 shows the relations and suggests that this index substantially correlated with committees’ positive and negative power, and correlated with committees’ information capacity to a lesser degree. These patterns are consistent with expectations.

The relations between the three dimensions and the Parliamentary Power Index (PPI) developed by Fish and Kroenig (2009) are also explored. PPI is constructed based on 32 dummy indicators assessing legislature’ influence over the executive, its institutional autonomy, the specified powers it possesses, and its institutional

capacity. The aspect of legislatures' influence over executives reflects legislatures' authorities to appoint, remove, and investigate executive officials. Legislatures' institutional autonomy measures whether legislatures are independently elected and immune from dissolution, and whether the executives lack decree, gatekeeping, and veto power. Legislatures' specified power includes their power to amend constitutions, ratify treaties, and appoint several offices. Legislatures' institutional capacity measures legislative session duration and staff support. As Table 4.3 shows, committees' positive power is correlated to legislatures' specified power. None of other components of PPI is significantly correlated with the three dimensions of committee power. Similar patterns with regard to the relation between general parliamentary power and committees' institutional instruments have been identified by Sieberer (2011). Based on the data of 15 Western European parliaments, Sieberer has found that committees' authorities to initiate and amend bills do not covary with parliamentary power to appoint cabinet members.

In general, the comparison with alternative indices that measure committee powers and legislative authorities to scrutinize executive decisions, especially with those based on similar indicators, mostly supports the validity of my measures for European and other advanced industrial democracies. In addition, the coefficients of correlations between the alternative measures and each of the three dimensions seem to suggest that the three-factor structure is more thoroughly capturing some elements that each of these alternative measures is missing. The correlations between measures of general legislative power and these three factors are most not significant. In the subsequent chapters, more exploration on the relationships between committees' power and the general capabilities of a legislature is shown.

Politicians' Electoral Incentives and Committee Power

This chapter displays empirical tests of the hypothesis that when legislators tend to demand for particularistic goods distribution and when parties have less control over committee members, committees are likely to have strong positive agenda power, and the hypothesis that the relationships between legislators' accountability strategies and committee power are conditional on features of party organization.

5.1 Introduction

The exploration builds on the assumption that legislators are goal oriented, and one of their main goals is to gain reelection. The design of internal legislative organization, such as committee procedures, is shaped by legislators' electoral needs. To be reelected, legislators have to expend effort on competing for nomination and cultivating votes. As Chapter 2 argues, party leaders and constituency voters, as competing principals for influence over legislators' behavior, both control resources critical to legislators' political career prospects. The extent to which one of them more heavily shapes legislators' reelection incentives and then affects the design of committee

procedures is determined by other institutional environments faced by legislators.

This chapter examines three mechanisms that shape legislators' reelection incentives. The first one is electoral rules. Carey and Shugart (1995) have suggested that electoral systems affect legislators' relative responsiveness to party leaders and to alternative interests in the electorate. Legislators elected from closed party lists have less incentives to respond to individual constituents and establish direct link with the electorate. Politicians under electoral systems that encourage candidates to compete against members of their own parties have more incentives to cultivate personal votes. The needs for personal votes may urge legislators to secure particularistic benefits to their constituents. Committee systems provide opportunities for members to differentiate themselves with regard to constituent interests and claim credit in their home districts.

In addition to testing the arguments postulating that candidate-centered electoral rules promote the provision of locally targeted goods and thus affect committee power, this chapter also directly examines the relationship between one special type of local goods provision, clientelism, and the design of committee procedures. Clientelism is defined as the delivery of targeted goods and services by politicians to voters in exchange for their vote. Different from other types of district-focused benefits, such as pork barrel projects or extra-legislative service for individual constituents, clientelism especially refers to the explicit practice of contingent exchange, whereby benefits are provided only to those who uphold their promise to vote for the candidates that have offered them (Kitschelt 2000). In single country studies, it has been found that politicians may use legislative committees to engage in clientelist relations with their supporters (Batto 2005, Ciftci, Forrest, and Tekin 2008). The argument on the effects of politicians' needs in providing clientelistic benefits on committee power is more systematically tested in this chapter.

The other mechanism shaping legislators' incentives is the extent to which party

leaders control resources valuable to legislators within legislatures. It is expected that when committee assignments tend to reflect a self-selection process, legislators are more likely to use committees to achieve their individualistic goals. In contrast, when party leaders have more control over legislators' access to committee positions, committees are more likely to serve parties' collective needs.

As Chapter 2 argues, as a way to decentralize legislative authority, committee systems provide opportunities for members to express preferences and affect legislative outputs. To serve individualistic legislators' needs, committees should have the power to vote on and amend bills, and place their preferred versions on the floor. That is, when the electoral systems encourage more candidate-centered patterns of competition, and when parties have less control over members' behavior, committees tend to have extensive positive agenda power. However, committees' negative power, the authority to freely decide their own agenda, is less relevant, because without party leaders' coordination, the agenda-setting authority does not increase individual members' probabilities of being included in a winning coalition.

5.2 Measuring Electoral Incentives

To test these hypotheses, factor scores generated from the analysis reported in Table B.4 are used as the dependent variables. The "positive agenda-setting power" factor mainly combines committees' early involvement in the law-making process and their authorities to consider and amend most draft bills. The indicators of minority reports, multiple referrals, large numbers of committee assignments, and the uniqueness of committee time also load on this factor. The "negative agenda-setting power" factor mainly include committees' authorities to freely decide which bills to be considered and when. Committees' amending power is also a component of this factor but is weighted less. The factor of committees' "information capacity" combine their authorities to demand documents, compel attendance, initiate legislation,

and grant closed rules after the committee stage. Committees' staff support and the desirability of serving in the same committees for consecutive terms also load on this factor.

All the independent variables are lagged by at least one year. If time-series data is available, the variables are annual averages over the 2000s and 1990s.

Electoral systems. The measure of the extent to which legislators are district-oriented is indicators of personalized electoral systems, including district magnitudes, the ballot structure in terms of whether there is vote pooling among all candidates on the same partisan list, and the interaction term of these two. These indicators are from the data set collected by Johnson and Wallack (2006). In the analysis, the natural log of district size is used. The indicator of ballot structure is coded on a three-point scale, where '2' indicates no vote pooling and '0' indicates full pooling among all candidates within parties.

The reliance on particularistic benefits. The measure of the extent to which legislators rely on the distribution of particularistic goods as a strategy for reelection is taken from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (Kitschelt et al. 2009). The indicator of clientelism is constructed based on experts' assessment of the effort each party in a country makes in offering five types of benefits to specific individuals or small groups of citizens in exchange of their votes. The five types of benefits include consumer goods, preferential access to social policy, employment in public sector, government contracts, and influence over the application of government regulations. The answers to the five items were coded on a 1-4 scale, in which '1' refers to a negligible effort or no effort at all, while '4' means parties devote major effort to provide the benefit in question. To construct a country level measure of clientelism, the averages of parties' scores in each country, weighted by the vote share of each party in the most recent two elections before 2009, are computed.

Parties' control over committee members. The indicator of parties' control

over committee assignments is from my expert survey. Experts were asked to assess how committee memberships are determined. This variable is coded on a three-point scale, where 0 indicates that committee assignments are based on individual initiative and non-partisan criteria, and 2 indicates that party leaders discretionarily determine committee assignments. To construct country level measures of these three variables, the averages of parties' scores in each country, weighted by the vote share of each party in the most recent two elections are computed.

Interaction variables. The measures of the extensiveness and centralization of party organization are also from the Democratic Accountability project. To measure the extensiveness of party organization, experts were asked to assess whether parties maintain permanent local offices. The variable is coded on a four-point scale from 1 (no local offices) to 4 (maintaining permanent local offices in most districts). The indicator of the extent of party centralization is based on experts' judgements on how parties select candidates in national legislative elections. The measure is also coded on a 1-4 scale, in which 1 refers to that candidates are chosen by local level actors, while 4 means that candidates are chosen by national party leaders. To construct country level measures, the averages of parties' scores in each country, weighted by the vote share of each party in the most recent two elections before 2009, are computed.

Control variables. Several indicators of institutional features are included in the analysis. The literature has pointed out that legislatures have little incentive to invest in internal organization if the presidents are too powerful (Khmelko, Wise, and Brown 2010, Kopecký 2004, Nijzink, Mozaffar, and Azevedo 2006). To capture the presidential power, an aggregate measure is constructed. All countries with parliamentary systems are coded as 0 for this variable. For countries with presidential or semi-presidential systems, this variable is constructed by summing the reversed values of eight indicators collected in Fish and Kroenig's (2009) dataset. They in-

clude four indicators of executives' legislative powers: whether the executive has veto and decree powers, whether the executive has reserved policy areas, and whether the executive can withhold funds appropriated by the legislature. The other four indicators of presidents' executive powers includes whether the legislature can impeach the president, whether the cabinet is appointed by the president without legislative approval needed, whether the legislatures cannot vote no confidence, and whether the president can dissolve the legislature¹. The sum of the four indicators of executives' legislative powers is highly correlated to the sum of the indicators of their executive power at $r = .88$. They are then combined as one index. Higher values on the index indicate the president has more legislative and executive power.

Countries' GDP per capita is included to capture their levels of development. It has been argued that legislatures in countries with higher income levels tend to have

¹ The recoding procedures are the following:

Executives' veto power: 1= cannot be overridden by the legislature or requires a 2/3 legislative majority to be overridden; 2= requires a absolute majority but less than 2/3; 3= requires a simple majority.

Executives' decree powers: 1= no decree powers; 2= decree powers subject to legislative approval; 3= unrestricted decree powers.

Executives' reserved policy areas: 1= no reserved areas; 2= reserved areas only related to taxation and government spending; 3= many reserved issue areas including spending.

Executives' power to impound funds: 1= the executive cannot withhold funds appropriated by the legislature; 2= the executive can cut expenditures if actual revenues are lower; 3= the executive can impound funds.

Legislative impeachment: 1= the legislature cannot impeach the president or replace the prime minister; 2= legislative impeachment is upon the approval of other agencies; 3= the impeachment can be initiated by the legislature single-handedly.

Legislative approval for cabinet appointment: 1= the legislature must approve both the prime ministers and the cabinet; 2= the legislature must approve the prime ministers or the cabinet; 3= legislative approval is not needed.

Confidence vote: 1= the legislature can vote no confidence freely; 2= the legislature can only censure individual ministers but not the whole cabinet; 3= the legislature cannot vote no confidence.

Executives' power to dissolve legislatures: 1= the legislature are immune from dissolution; 2= the executive can only dissolve legislatures under certain conditions; 3= the executive can dissolve legislatures without restrictions.

a greater number of oversight tools (Barkan 2009, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2004). The overall bureaucratic quality and administrative performance of a country is also likely to be correlated with the legislature's resources. Countries' democratic quality, as measured on the Polity IV scale, is included in the analysis. It has been argued that legislatures can be strengthened only when the institutional tools used by authoritarian rulers have been eliminated and the constitutional environment has stabilized (Pérez-Liñán 2005, Remington 2007). A dummy variable indicating whether the country was colonized by the British, which was collected by Hadenius and Teorell (2005), is included to account for the effects of the Westminster tradition.

Descriptive statistics for all the independent variables are listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix A.

5.3 Empirical Results

Table 5.1 shows the results of models estimating the effects of legislators' electoral incentives on committees' positive agenda-setting power. They provide unambiguous evidence in support of hypotheses 3. In countries where legislators heavily rely on particularistic goods distribution as a reelection strategy and where party leaders have less control over committee assignments, committees tend to have strong positive power.

The first model in Table 5.1 shows that when legislative candidates compete in large districts in which there is no vote pooling among all candidates on the same partisan list, that is, when the electoral systems encourage intra-party competition, committees are more likely to have the authority of receiving and amending most bills in the early legislative process. Figure 5.1, which displays the relations between electoral rules and committees' positive power estimated with the first model, clearly shows the different effects of district magnitudes and ballot structure. If the votes citizens cast for a party list are redistributed among all candidates on the same list

Table 5.1: Politicians' electoral incentives and committees' positive agenda power (OLS regression)

DV	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Positive agenda power			
ln District magnitudes	-0.0430 [0.0666]		-0.0116 [0.0662]	-0.0221 [0.0666]
No pooling	-0.470*** [0.154]		-0.377** [0.155]	-0.357** [0.151]
ln District magnitudes X No pooling	0.175** [0.0684]		0.136** [0.0640]	0.124* [0.0678]
Clientelism		0.0730*** [0.0253]	0.0563** [0.0252]	0.0544** [0.0242]
Parties' control over assignments				-0.346*** [0.116]
Presidential power	0.00721 [0.0100]	-0.000474 [0.0101]	0.00332 [0.00990]	-0.00596 [0.00983]
Polity	-0.0508 [0.0370]	-0.0400 [0.0381]	-0.0489 [0.0359]	-0.00427 [0.0386]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.0144 [0.0860]	0.0917 [0.101]	0.119 [0.0958]	-0.00253 [0.0970]
British colonialism	-0.138 [0.262]	-0.733*** [0.207]	-0.184 [0.255]	-0.244 [0.256]
_cons	0.447 [0.793]	-1.411 [1.100]	-1.313 [1.102]	0.320 [1.112]
N	75	75	75	67
adj. R-sq	0.290	0.234	0.330	0.394
ll	-47.46	-51.39	-44.72	-34.37

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

(full-pooling system), district size does not have much effects on committees' positive power. In contrast, the effects of district magnitudes on committee procedures are significant among countries with no-pooling systems. With no-pooling systems, votes cast for a candidate are not distributed to those on the same list. That is, candidates do not benefit from the support for other candidates of the same party. Under this condition, it is expected that the increase of district size intensifies the personal contest among candidates. It has to be noted that single-member district, first-past-the-post system is also classified as a no-pooling system. SMD system has been considered as more likely to encourage the establishment of individual candidates'

personal reputation than closed-list proportional representation elections, and thus may result in the enhancement of committees' "property rights" (Katz and Sala 1996). However, the model suggests that on average, committees in countries with SMD systems are not stronger in terms of their positive power than those in countries with closed-list PR rules. It is legislators' needs to compete with and differentiate themselves from other co-partisan candidates that especially lead to the development of committee procedures allowing individual members more opportunities to vote on bills.




FIGURE 5.1: Estimated relationship between electoral rules and committees' positive agenda power

Figure 5.2 displays the bivariate correlation between parties' tendency to rely on clientelism and committees' positive power, and suggests a positive relationship between them. The second model in Table 5.1 further examines the relationship

Table 5.2: Politicians' electoral incentives and committees' negative agenda power and information capacity (OLS regression)

DV	(1) Negative agenda power	(2) Negative agenda power	(3) Information capacity	(4) Information capacity
ln District magnitudes	-0.0162 [0.0882]	0.00120 [0.0889]	0.0609 [0.0953]	0.0425 [0.105]
No pooling	0.0124 [0.207]	0.0293 [0.202]	0.139 [0.223]	0.149 [0.239]
ln District magnitudes X No pooling	0.0399 [0.0940]	0.0848 [0.0954]	0.00600 [0.102]	0.0364 [0.113]
Clientelism	-0.0444 [0.0335]	-0.0469 [0.0322]	-0.000993 [0.0362]	-0.000453 [0.0381]
Parties' control over assignments		0.347** [0.154]		-0.0337 [0.183]
Presidential power	0.0160 [0.0132]	0.0139 [0.0131]	0.0116 [0.0142]	0.00500 [0.0155]
Polity	0.0470 [0.0478]	0.0344 [0.0515]	-0.0217 [0.0517]	0.0157 [0.0608]
ln GDP per capita PPP	-0.0205 [0.128]	-0.0543 [0.129]	0.0117 [0.138]	-0.114 [0.153]
British colonialism	-0.272 [0.340]	-0.403 [0.342]	-0.149 [0.367]	-0.134 [0.404]
_cons	0.312 [1.467]	0.141 [1.484]	-0.267 [1.584]	0.759 [1.754]
N	75	67	75	67
adj. R-sq	0.025	0.079	-0.065	-0.070
ll	-66.21	-53.67	-71.96	-64.90

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

control over the member assignment process, party members tend to vote cohesively, and members are less likely to utilize committees to achieve their individualistic goals. Committees' positive power allows individual members to also have chances to affect legislative outcomes. It is expected that when party leaders have less control over members' behavior, committees are likely to have extensive positive agenda-setting power. In contrast, committees' negative power, which effectively gives a committee majority a veto over referred bills, is less preferred when the composition of a committee is fragmented. The results of model 4 in Table 5.1 and the second model in 5.2 are consistent with the expectations.

Table 5.3: Politicians' accountability strategies, party organization, and committees' positive agenda power (OLS regression)

DV	(1)	(2)
	Positive agenda power	
Clientelism	0.304*** [0.0769]	0.436*** [0.136]
Parties organizational centralization	1.036*** [0.314]	
Parties organizational extensiveness		1.489*** [0.560]
Clientelism X Centralization	-0.0852*** [0.0261]	
Clientelism X Extensiveness		-0.110*** [0.0402]
Presidential power	-0.00436 [0.00996]	-0.00202 [0.00999]
Polity	-0.0647 [0.0389]	-0.0419 [0.0370]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.0721 [0.0953]	0.0993 [0.0988]
British colonialism	-0.859*** [0.205]	-0.698*** [0.200]
_cons	-3.689*** [1.260]	-6.395*** [2.129]
N	75	75
adj. R-sq	0.324	0.290
ll	-45.61	-47.44
Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01		

Other models in Table 5.2 examine the relations between politicians' electoral incentives and other two dimensions of committee power. The results suggest that politicians' clientelistic tendency and personalized electoral systems are not significantly associated with committee strength with regard to veto power and information capacity. This pattern also provides support for the arguments that different dimensions of committee power respond to different demands, and thus are not consistently strong or weak.

To test whether the effects of legislators' accountability strategies on committee power are conditional on parties' organizational features, models in Table 5.3 include

indicators of these conditions, as well as the interaction terms between measures of clientelistic effort and party organization. The results of these two models provide evidence in support of hypotheses 4. These two models show the pattern that the more heavily parties rely on particularistic goods distribution, the stronger positive agenda power the committees have is attenuated if parties have centralized candidate nomination procedures or have extensive local organization. Figure 5.3 display the relationships between these indicators estimated with the models. The left panel of the figure shows the relation between clientelistic tendency and committees' positive power across countries where parties apply different ways to nominate candidates for national legislative elections. Among countries where the nomination process is entirely controlled by national party leaders (the indicator of centralization = 4), committees' positive power does not increase with the extent to which parties rely on clientelism. If local level actors are also included in the nomination process (centralization = 2), clientelistic effort is significantly associated with committee strength with regard to their positive power.

The right panel displays the similar pattern, and suggests that the positive correlation between politicians' reliance on clientelism and committees' positive power is significant only among countries where parties tend to lack local branches. It is expected that extra-legislative benefits can be delivered through parties' local offices. Legislators who are able to rely on parties' local networks to distribute targeted service and claim credit may have less incentives to invest in committee work. These interactive effects suggest that when legislators' career opportunities are controlled by party leaders and when parties have extensive local organization to distribute benefits, committee systems are less likely to be designed to reflect legislators' reelection strategies.




FIGURE 5.3: Estimated relationships between clientelism, party organization, and committees' positive agenda power

Multiparty Government and Committee Power

This chapter displays empirical tests of the hypothesis that when there is a higher propensity for multiparty governments, committees are likely to be strong with regard to all three dimensions, and explores whether different compositions of coalition memberships are associated with the development of different dimensions of committee power.

6.1 Introduction

The exploration is based on the assumption that faced with the potential problems of delegation resulted from multiparty governments, coalition parties are interested in establishing a review system to check the behavior of ministers from their partner parties. Committee systems, through which ministers' proposals can be scrutinized more closely than on the floor, thus are likely to be granted more institutional instruments in countries with higher rates of multiparty governments.

The compositions of coalition memberships are also expected to have effects on committee strength with regard to all three dimensions. In countries where the governing coalition is dominated by one party, the committee systems may be less

powerful than those in countries where the government is composed of parties with relatively equal share of seats. As the research on how coalition parties choose to use junior ministers to keep tabs on ministers from their partners has mentioned (Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011), all parties have an incentive to maximize the degree to which their partners are subject to oversight, but to minimize the degree to which their own partners are monitored. On average, the largest government parties who have substantially more coalition seats than all other partners are less interested in institutionalizing a monitoring mechanism. When the largest government parties tend to be smaller, committees are more likely to be granted instruments for coalition parties to monitor partners.

To enable coalition partners to monitor each other, committees should have the power to receive and amend bill proposals, and have the power to collect information about policies. That is, all three dimensions of committee functions allow coalition partners to be better able to monitor their agents. As Chapter 2 argues, the three dimensions of committee power benefit legislative actors as self-interested legislators or as cohesive voting blocs in different ways. It is expected that depending on the composition of coalition memberships and parties' policy positions, different dimensions of committee power are particularly developed. Committees' positive agenda power provides opportunities for all members to receive and amend bills at an early stage of legislation. Minority parties in coalition governments can also benefit from the positive power.

Committees' negative agenda power serves large and cohesive parties who have higher probabilities to be included in a winning coalition for committee decisions, especially when these parties have distinct policy positions from other members. With the negative agenda power, coalition parties are able to block legislation that is not in line with the coalition contract. Coalition partners are pivotal voters to ministers' proposals, particularly when they control more seats. The authority to

decide which bills to review first allows the larger coalition parties to delay legislation without fear of being excluded from the winning coalition. It is expected that when government parties tend to be confronted with other powerful partners, that is, when the difference between coalition partners' relative seat shares is smaller, committees' negative agenda power is likely to be stronger. This relationship is strengthened if parties more likely to be included in a winning coalition have distinct policy positions. Consistent with the argument that committees' negative power especially benefits large and cohesive voting blocs, it is also expected that when party leaders have more control over legislators' access to committee positions, committees are more likely to be granted the negative power.

This chapter also tests the relationships between Committees' information capacity and government types. Coalition partners have less information access than ministers. Committees' ability to compel executive officials to supply documents and attend hearings allows members to have more information about policy outcomes, and thus potentially benefit all coalition parties. It is expected that in countries with higher rates of multiparty governments, committees tend to have more institutional instruments to obtain information. As Chapter 2 points out, larger parties are better able to utilize committees' information capacity. They may reveal biased information, or may only devote resources to gather information for bills through which their interests are most likely to be realized. It is also likely that committees' information capacity tends to be enhanced in countries where government parties are usually confronted with other powerful partners within coalitions.

6.2 Measuring Multiparty Government

To test these hypotheses, the three factor scores generated in Chapter 4, committees' positive and negative agenda power and their information capacity, are used as the dependent variables. All the independent variables are lagged by at least one year.

If time-series data is available, the variables are annual averages over the 2000s and 1990s.

Multiparty government. Several indicators on the composition of a government coalition are included in the analyses. The indicator of *rate of coalition government* is the percentage of coalition governments during the period of 1990–2009. The information for the variable is from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Keefer 2009). A government is coded as a coalition if more than one parties are represented in the cabinet. Based on the coding rules of DPI, in the case of presidential system, in addition to those represented in the government, parties that are supportive of the president on substantial issues are also classified as coalition partners. The aggregate measure of *rate of coalition government* is intended to capture a general tendency toward coalition or one-party government.

To examine the effects of power relationships among coalition parties in the legislature, the indicator of *government fractionalization* is also included. This indicator measures the probability that two randomly picked legislators from among the government parties will be of different parties. The indicator is especially high if a coalition is composed of many small parties. The indicators of *largest government party / government seats* and *2nd largest government party / government seats* are the seats held by the largest and the second largest government parties as a percentage of total number of seats held by all government parties, respectively. In presidential systems, the party of the president is classified as the largest government party. The other independent variable, *2nd largest / largest government party*, is the number of seats held by the second largest government party as a percentage of the largest government party's seats. All these variables are intended to capture the extend to which government parties are confronted with powerful coalition partners.

In addition to indicators on the composition of government coalitions, the variable of *opposition fractionalization* is also included. It measures the probability that two

randomly chosen legislators belonging to the parties in the opposition will be of different parties. It captures the extent to which opposition parties are in a position to form a credible alternative, and whether they could also benefit from powerful committees. The information for these variables are from DPI. Annual averages between 1990 and 2009 are computed.

Policy distance. The indicator of the policy distance between the main parties is also derived from DPI. It measures the maximum difference between the left-right-center orientation of the chief executive's party and the placement of other government parties and the largest opposition party. This variable ranges between 0 and 2, where 2 refers to divergent positions on the left-right scale between any two of these main parties. Annual averages from 1990 to 2009 are also computed.

Control variables. Consistent with analyses in Chapter 5, indicators of the presidential power, countries' per capita GDP, democratic quality, and British colonial origin are also included as control variables. For models with committees' positive agenda power as the dependent variable, the indicator of the extent to which parties make clientelistic effort to obtain votes is also controlled.

For models with committees' informational control as the dependent variable, a measure of parties' electoral volatility is included. As Chapter 2 argues, when there tends to be large influx of new legislators, the information asymmetry between executive and legislative branches is exacerbated. The instability of legislative membership may constitute a condition under which instruments that foster committee specialization are particularly developed. It is expected that when legislative terms are short, restrictive amendment procedures and other instruments that foster committee specialization are likely to be established to meet the demand for information. The information about the average terms of individual legislators across countries is difficult to collect. The variable of parties' electoral volatility is included to approximately capture the legislative terms of parties. *Extra-system electoral volatility*

measures the vote share won by newly created parties in national legislative elections. It captures the extent to which the vote share of established parties declines and is grabbed by new contenders, and thus the change and stability of parties' membership in a legislature. The average volatility for all post-1945 elections since the inauguration of the most recent democratic regime is computed. The information for 50 countries is from Mainwaring, España and Gervasoni's work (2009), and I have computed the indicator for other 25 countries, based on the data collected by African Election Database, Latin American Election Results with Party Ideology Scores (Baker and Greene 2011), and ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2012).

Descriptive statistics for all the independent variables are listed in Table A.1 in Appendix A.

6.3 Empirical Results

Table 6.1 shows the results of models estimating the effects of government types and characteristics of coalitions on committees positive agenda-setting power. The models suggest that it is not the general propensity for multiparty governments, but particular compositions of the government coalitions, that leads to committee strength with regard to positive power.

Figure 6.1 provides some evidence supporting the positive association between government fragmentation and committees' positive power. The second model in Table 6.1 further confirms this relationship and suggests that in countries where the coalition governments are composed of ministers from several smaller parties, the committee systems are more likely to be granted the authority of receiving and amending most bills in the early legislative process. The third model includes the number of seats held by the second largest government party as a percentage of the largest government party's seats, and shows that when they tend to have equal sizes, committees are stronger in terms of their positive power. Models in Table B.5 in

Appendix B include the number of seats of the two largest government parties as percentages of total seats held by all government parties as independent variables. They show consistent patterns. In general, when the largest government parties are smaller, and when the second largest coalition parties have more legislative seats, committees are granted more positive power.




FIGURE 6.1: Government fragmentation and committees' positive power

These models suggest that when there is no dominant party in the government coalition, and when the larger government parties are confronted with powerful coalition partners, the committee systems tend to be established to allow the collective leadership to review and amend most proposals early in the legislative process. The fourth model in Table 6.1 tests whether the effects of government types on committee power are strengthened if parties tend to have divergent policy positions. However, the coefficient of the interaction term is not significant. The results suggest that the

Table 6.1: Multi-party governments and committees' positive agenda power (OLS regression)

DV	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Positive agenda power			
Coalition government	0.196 [0.173]			
Government fractionalization		0.624** [0.294]		
2nd largest / Largest gov party			0.637*** [0.197]	0.761** [0.333]
Policy difference				0.161 [0.125]
2nd largest / Largest gov party X Policy difference				-0.180 [0.295]
Opposition fractionalization	-0.208 [0.304]	-0.372 [0.308]	-0.419 [0.286]	-0.467 [0.288]
Clientelism	0.0736*** [0.0255]	0.0761*** [0.0250]	0.0754*** [0.0240]	0.0801*** [0.0245]
Presidential power	0.00196 [0.0104]	0.00451 [0.0102]	0.00334 [0.00963]	0.00293 [0.00965]
Polity	-0.0428 [0.0385]	-0.0377 [0.0376]	-0.0407 [0.0361]	-0.0469 [0.0369]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.0891 [0.102]	0.106 [0.0995]	0.112 [0.0956]	0.111 [0.0969]
British colonialism	-0.730*** [0.210]	-0.628*** [0.212]	-0.575*** [0.203]	-0.514** [0.210]
_cons	-1.413 [1.128]	-1.645 [1.110]	-1.637 [1.062]	-1.730 [1.068]
N	75	75	75	75
adj. R-sq	0.227	0.262	0.319	0.318
ll	-50.62	-48.90	-45.88	-44.80

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

effects of the composition of coalition governments are not conditional on the policy disagreement among the main parties.

Models in Table 6.2 examine the relations between government types and committees' negative power. Similar to the model with committees' positive power as the dependent variable, the general propensity for multiparty governments is not significantly associated with committee strength in terms of the negative power. In contrast, the positive correlation between government fragmentation and commit-

tees' negative power is not significant.




FIGURE 6.2: The relative sizes of the two largest coalition parties and committees' negative power

Figure 6.2 displays the bivariate correlation between the relative power of the second largest coalition party and committees' negative power. The positive association between them is not very clear. This relationship becomes significant, as the third model in Table 6.2 shows, when other relevant independent variables are controlled. The comparison between the second and the third model suggests that only when the coalition partners tend to be equally powerful, committees are more likely to have the authority to delay and block legislation. These patterns are in accordance with the arguments specified in Chapter 2, that committees' negative agenda power particularly benefits larger parties who have higher probabilities to be included in a winning coalition for committees' collective decisions. When one of the partner

parties is powerful and its vote is more likely to be pivotal to the coalition's decision, the negative agenda power allows it to delay ministers' proposals, without fear of being left out of the winning coalition.

Table 6.2: Multi-party governments and committees' negative agenda power (OLS regression)

DV	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Negative agenda power				
Coalition government	0.0211 [0.211]				
Government fractionalization		0.365 [0.365]			
2nd largest / Largest gov party			0.683*** [0.243]	-0.163 [0.396]	0.731*** [0.247]
Policy difference				-0.302** [0.148]	
2nd largest / Largest gov party X Policy difference				0.938*** [0.350]	
Opposition fractionalization	-0.494 [0.371]	-0.651* [0.384]	-0.842** [0.352]	-0.781** [0.342]	-0.733** [0.354]
Parties' control over assignments					0.311** [0.143]
Presidential power	0.0125 [0.0125]	0.0154 [0.0125]	0.0168 [0.0116]	0.0164 [0.0112]	0.0172 [0.0117]
Polity	0.0398 [0.0471]	0.0420 [0.0468]	0.0406 [0.0446]	0.0640 [0.0439]	0.0185 [0.0488]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.0785 [0.108]	0.0831 [0.107]	0.0948 [0.102]	0.0445 [0.102]	0.108 [0.110]
British colonialism	-0.252 [0.254]	-0.190 [0.260]	-0.0790 [0.249]	-0.236 [0.248]	-0.200 [0.266]
_cons	-0.863 [0.977]	-0.966 [0.975]	-1.071 [0.927]	-0.600 [0.922]	-1.687 [1.025]
N	75	75	75	75	67
adj. R-sq	0.048	0.062	0.147	0.208	0.174
ll	-66.44	-65.90	-62.32	-58.45	-51.18

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The coefficients of opposition party fragmentation and party leaders' control over committee assignments are also consistent with the argument. When opposition parties are fragmented and the probabilities for them to form a credible alternative and be included in a winning coalition for committee decisions are low, committees'

negative power is likely to be weak. If party members are able to vote cohesively on committee decisions, committees tend to be granted the authority to decide their own agenda freely.

To examine whether the effects of government types on committees' negative power are conditional on policy disagreement between the main parties, the fourth model in Table 6.2 included the indicator of parties' policy differences as well as the interaction term. The results suggest that the association between coalition government representing two equally powerful parties and committees' negative power is strengthened if the main parties have divergent positions on the left-right scale. Committees are especially strong in their negative power if the second largest party in the coalition is relatively powerful and the ideological polarization among parties is high. Figure 6.3 displays the relationships between these indicators estimated with the model. Among countries where the main parties have similar positions on the left-right scale (policy differences = 0), committees' negative power does not increase with the relative sizes between the second largest and the largest government parties. When any two among the government parties and the largest opposition party have distinct ideological positions, coalition governments involving two powerful partners confronting each other are associated with committee strength with regard to their negative power. Substantively, when policy disagreement is at its maximum, committees' negative power increases by 0.17 if the relative size of the second largest government party increases by 10%, holding all other independent variables as constant.

Models in Table 6.3 show the relations between multiparty governments and committees' information capacity. Similar to models with committees' negative power as the dependent variable, the first and the second models suggest that the frequency of coalition governments and the level of government fragmentation are not significantly associated with committees' information capacity. If the two largest




FIGURE 6.3: Estimated relationships between coalition governments, parties' policy positions, and committees' negative agenda power

government parties tend to have equal seat shares, and if the oppositions is less fragmented, committees are more likely to have institutional instruments that encourage members to collect and transfer information. Different from the models estimating committees' negative power, the fourth model shows that the relationship between the composition of a governing coalition and committees' information capacity is not conditional on parties' policy positions. The results suggest that as larger parties are better able to utilize committee procedures, and a committee majority may only devote time to gather information for bills that they are most interested in or reveal biased information, committees' information capacity is particularly developed when the challenging parties within and outside a governing coalition are powerful.

The analyses test hypotheses on the relations between government types and

Table 6.3: Multi-party governments and committees' information capacity (OLS regression)

DV	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Information capacity			
Coalition government	0.111 [0.211]			
Government fractionalization		0.135 [0.385]		
2nd largest / Largest gov party			0.515** [0.256]	0.428 [0.414]
Policy difference				-0.229 [0.152]
2nd largest / Largest gov party X Policy difference				0.178 [0.365]
Opposition fractionalization	-1.019*** [0.380]	-1.007** [0.393]	-1.211*** [0.368]	-1.107*** [0.371]
Extra-system volatility	0.0288*** [0.00873]	0.0285*** [0.00872]	0.0287*** [0.00847]	0.0265*** [0.00875]
Presidential power	0.0163 [0.0128]	0.0161 [0.0131]	0.0191 [0.0123]	0.0191 [0.0122]
Polity	0.00581 [0.0478]	0.00718 [0.0480]	0.00787 [0.0466]	0.0142 [0.0482]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.101 [0.105]	0.104 [0.106]	0.110 [0.103]	0.136 [0.104]
British colonialism	0.0914 [0.208]	0.109 [0.223]	0.223 [0.214]	0.179 [0.214]
_cons	-1.049 [0.979]	-1.056 [0.984]	-1.167 [0.953]	-1.318 [0.952]
N	75	75	75	75
adj. R-sq	0.121	0.119	0.167	0.179
ll	-65.35	-65.43	-63.31	-61.62

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

the three dimensions of committee power. Overall, the results suggest that countries' general tendency for multiparty or single party governments is not sufficient to distinguish between strong and weak committees. It is not the frequency of multiparty governments, but the particular composition of a governing coalition that is associated with committee strength with regard to the three different dimensions. Coalition partner parties have incentives to monitor ministers through a committee system. Committees' positive power enables all coalition partners to have opportu-

nities to review and amend most ministerial proposals. Compared to their positive power, committees' negative and information capacity especially benefit large groups. Their negative power allow larger coalition partners to delay and block ministerial proposals, without fear of being excluded from the winning coalition. Large parties are able to use the information collection procedures more effectively. Empirical results show that, consistent with the expectations, when there are more than one parties represented in the government and the largest governing party is smaller, committees are likely to have more positive power. However, the fragmentation of government coalitions is not the sufficient condition for committee strength with regard to the negative power and information capacity. Only when the government parties confront equally powerful coalition partners, and a more cohesive opposition, committees are more likely to have strong negative power and information capacity. The negative correlation between opposition fragmentation and committees' positive power is not significant, since this dimension of power also allows minorities access to legislative process.

Figure 6.4 shows the estimated relations between the relative sizes of the two largest government parties and committee power. All three dimensions of committee power increase as the size of the second largest coalition party becomes comparable to the largest one. The positive correlation is especially strong for committees' negative power, and is less pronounced for their information capacity. In countries with a coalition government in which the legislative seats held by the second largest party amount to half of those held by the largest party, the committee systems are scored 0.35 higher on the negative power dimension than committees systems in countries with a single party government.

Figure 6.5 further specifies the different effects of the sizes of the the largest and the second largest government parties. As the estimated relations suggest¹, all

¹ The values of the three dimensions of committee power are estimated with model 1 and 2 in




FIGURE 6.4: Estimated relationships between the relative sizes of coalition parties and committee power

three dimensions of committee power decrease with the size of the largest government party, but increase with the size of the second largest party. Across the three dimensions, the correlation between committee power and the size of the second largest party is two times stronger than that with the size of the largest government party, holding other covariates as constant. Similar to what suggested by Figure 6.4, the composition of government coalitions explains less variances in committees' information capacity than in their positive and negative power.

The empirical results also suggest that, different from the explanations for committees' positive power and information capacity, the association between the relative sizes of coalition partner parties and committees' negative power is conditional on

Table B.5 (positive power), B.6 (negative power), and B.7 (information capacity) in the appendix.




FIGURE 6.5: Estimated relationships between the composition of coalition governments and committee power

parties' policy positions. The patterns are consistent with expectations, that when parties who are more likely to be included in a winning coalition have distinct positions from others, the negative power is especially beneficial for them, since they are able to utilize the power to push committee decisions further to their side. Further tests are still required to verify the arguments. The measure of policy disagreement between main parties is based on parties' general left-right orientations. There are other policy dimensions on which parties may be divided. In addition, the levels of policy disagreement may vary across committees with different jurisdictions. Further analyses on whether committees with different levels of disagreement may have different informal procedures to decide which bills to consider first could more thoroughly examine the arguments.

Among the control variables, the coefficients of the indicators of clientelism and extra-system electoral volatility are significant and consistent with theoretical expectations. Similar to what Figure 4.2 shows, committees tend to be granted strong

positive power in countries without the Westminster tradition. Other contextual variables do not significantly explain the variance in committee power.

The exiting literature on the relations between multiparty governments and committee procedures has focused on parliamentary systems. The analyses in the chapter, though including the indicator on presidential power, does not distinguish the sample between presidential and parliamentary systems, but assume that collective leadership under presidentialism may also utilize committee systems to monitor coalition partners. Models in Table B.8 and Table B.9 in Appendix B include the interaction terms between the relative sizes of the two largest government parties and the dummy variable of presidentialism² (1 = presidential systems, 0 = mixed or parliamentary systems based on the classification by Golder (2005)), and the interaction between the relative sizes of the two largest government parties and presidential power. The results of the models suggest that the correlation between the composition of government coalitions and committee power is not conditional on a particular type of executive-legislative relationships. In presidentialism, cabinet ministers are formally accountable only to the presidents, and the delegation relations between legislators, the cabinet, and individual ministers are less clear. The coalition formation process tends to be unilaterally initiated by the presidents. In addition, the allocation of portfolios to a party does not necessarily guarantee the party's decision making power within the cabinet. Although the analyses suggest that multiparty governments in presidentialism are also associated with strong committees, further studies are required to examine whether coalition parties in presidentialism utilize committee systems to monitor their partners in the same way as coalition parties do in parliamentary systems.

² Consistent with patterns found previously (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004), multiparty governments are less frequent under presidentialism in my sample. In countries with parliamentary systems, coalitions exist in 73 percent of the country-year observations in the sample. In presidential countries, coalition governments exist in 45 percent of the country-year observations.

Uncertainty and Changes in Legislative Composition and Committee Power

This chapter displays the relations between changes in legislative personnel and committee power. It empirically tests the hypothesis that if politicians were less certain about the future political composition of the legislature at the time of institutional design, and if the pre-existing authoritarian parties largely lost power through democratization, the resulting legislative procedures are expected to grant committees more positive power. It also tests the hypothesis that when there tend to be great changes in legislative membership, committees are granted more instruments to collect and transmit information.

7.1 Introduction

The exploration on how uncertainty about the political composition of the legislature has impact on committee procedures is focused on countries' experience of democratic transition. Legislative institutions in new democracy present an opportunity to study how politicians choose institutions under varying degree of uncertainty.

The literature on institutional design in new democracies has examined the choices of electoral rules (e.g. Benoit and Schiemann 2001, Negretto 2006, Remington and Smith 1996) and executive-legislative relations (e.g. Cheibub 2007, Easter 1997, Frye 1997, Shugart 1998). Among the factors that have been identified to account for the variation in institutional choices, this chapter focuses on the relative bargaining power and levels of uncertainty of politicians during regime transition, both of which were to some extent shaped by a country's authoritarian experience. It has been argued that if electoral favorite is less obvious at the time of institutional choice, the resulting institutions are expected to be more inclusive and grant more rights to minorities. If the relative power of political actors is known at the time of bargaining, and the actors who have bargaining power over institutions anticipate losing popularity through democratization, the resulting institutions are also expected to be more inclusive (Carroll and Nalepa 2010, Frye 1997, Przeworski 1991).

This chapter aims to test these arguments against legislative committee procedures, and focuses on authoritarian elections as a mechanism that affects politicians' levels of uncertainty. Elections under authoritarianism, while not totally free and fair, still provide some information about the relative power of political groups (Blaydes 2008, Brownlee 2007, Magaloni 2006). It is expected that when the pre-existing authoritarian regimes had held elections, especially when the elections had allowed more competition, parties were more certain about their relative power. Consequently, committees were less likely to be designed to provide minorities with equal opportunities to affect policies. If the relative power of potential participants were less clear, committee procedures are expected to be more inclusive. To provide committee minorities with more opportunities to exert influence, committees should have extensive positive power. With the positive power, most proposals have to be submitted to committees at an early stage of legislation, and all committee members have opportunities to make decisions on them. In addition, as Chapter 4 suggests,

several procedures that allow individual legislators more access to committee affairs, such as minority reports, multiple committee assignments, and multiple referrals, also load on the the dimension of committees' positive power. It is expected that in countries where the preexisting authoritarian regimes did not hold elections, committees are likely to be stronger in terms of the positive power. However, committees' negative power, the authority to freely decide their own agenda, is less relevant, because the negative power does not increase minorities' probabilities of being included in a winning coalition for committee decisions.

When politicians had some idea about their expected electoral return in democracies at the time of institutional design, and authoritarian incumbents anticipated greatly losing power in democracies, the committee procedures are also expected to be more inclusive. That is, committees are likely to be granted more positive power. This argument is based on the assumption that authoritarian incumbents are important actors during the transition phase, and have interests in choosing institutions that limit other actors' access to power (Easter 1997). Authoritarian incumbents prefer more inclusive committee procedures only when they anticipate there will be great changes in the political composition of the legislatures, and their power will be largely diminished.

It has to be noted that different from electoral rules and executive-legislative arrangements, which are usually defined in the constitutions and chosen during or right after the process of regime transition, procedures of legislative organization tend to be determined in the later stage of transition. In addition, committees are likely to be reinforced in the process of legislative institutionalization, which may be long after the inauguration of the first democratic government (Carey, Formanek, and Karpowicz 1999, Khmelko 2011, Norton and Leston-Bandeira 2003). My dataset does not document when a particular committee rule was codified. The following analyses assume that the current committee procedures in new democracies still

reflect politicians' relative power and levels of uncertainty during regime transition to certain degrees. The analyses also take into account the effects of the number of years since regime change to explore whether the relations between committee power and countries' transition experience are conditional on how long a democracy has been established.

Great changes in the composition of legislatures may also have effects on committees' information capacity. Newly elected legislators are less familiar with legislative process and it is more costly for them to acquire expertise. The information asymmetry between executive and legislative branches is thus exacerbated. When there tends to be a large influx of new legislators, legislators may find it in their interests to establish a committee system that reduces the costs of information collection¹. This chapter examines the relations, and expects that in countries where the legislative turnover rates are high, either during or after democratic transition, committees are likely to be granted more instruments to collect and transmit information.

7.2 Measuring Uncertainty and Changes in Legislative Composition

To test these hypotheses, the three factor scores generated in Chapter 4, committees' positive and negative agenda power and their information capacity, are used as the dependent variables. All the independent variables are lagged by at least one year.

Authoritarian elections. In the analyses, it is assumed that if the preexisting authoritarian regimes had held elections, and the elections had allowed more competition, politicians had a better idea about their expected electoral return in democracies at the time of institutional design. The indicator of elections under

¹ Diermeier (1995) has provided alternative explanation for the relationship between legislative membership stability and committee procedures: the longer legislative terms facilitate the development of floor deference to committees' decisions, which sustains committee specialization even in the absence of restrictive. When there tends to be a large influx of new legislators, the norm of floor deference, and thus committee specialization, is less likely to be sustained. This argument may also suggest that committee procedures that facilitate policy specialization are especially required when there tend to be great changes in the composition of legislatures

authoritarianism is from the dataset assembled by Hadenius and Teorell (2007). Authoritarian regimes that did not hold elections are coded as ‘0’; those held elections and all parties but one was forbidden from taking part are coded as ‘1’. ‘2’ refers to authoritarian regimes that held elections in which candidates independent from the ruling party were able to participate, and the vote share of the largest party was greater than 67 percent. ‘3’ refers to authoritarian regimes that held multiparty elections and the the vote share of the largest party was smaller than 67 percent. Annual average between 1972 and the year before democratization is calculated for each country. Countries had experienced authoritarianism after 1972 and were classified as democracy in 2010 by Hadenius and Teorell are included in the analyses. A higher value of this indicator means that the preexisting authoritarianism had more experience with (limited) competitive elections, and the relative power of political groups is expected to be more evident at the time of regime transition.

Authoritarian legacy parties. The indicator of authoritarian incumbents’ expected electoral return is measured as the vote share of the authoritarian legacy parties in the first national legislative election since the country has become democracy (scored equal or greater than 6 on the polity scale). Only the most recent transition experience is taken into account. *Authoritarian legacy parties* are defined as parties that had the largest vote share before regime transition based on Hadenius and Teorell’s dataset. If the authoritarian ruling parties were abolished or did not participate in elections after transition, their vote shares are coded as zero. Countries had experienced one-party or multi-party authoritarianism after 1972 and were classified as democracy in 2010 by Hadenius and Teorell are included in the analyses. Table A.2 in Appendix A lists names of the authoritarian legacy parties and transition year of each country included. These authoritarian legacy parties’ vote share in the first democratic national legislative elections as a percentage of their vote share in the last national legislative elections under authoritarianism are also calculated.

Their average vote shares between the first and the most recent democratic national legislative elections before 2009 are also included. To measure the extent to which the authoritarian legacy parties were faced with other challenging parties, the levels of fragmentation of other non-authoritarian parties in the first democratic elections are calculated.

Electoral volatility. As described in Chapter 6, the information about the average terms of individual legislators across countries is difficult to collect. The variable of parties' electoral volatility is included to approximately capture the legislative terms of parties. As previous research has pointed out, parties' electoral volatility and legislative turnover rates are highly correlated with each other (Heinsohn and Freitag 2012, Matland and Studlar 2004). In addition to *extra-system electoral volatility*, which measures the vote share won by newly created parties in national legislative elections, the analyses also include *within-system electoral volatility*. Within-system volatility measures the extent to which votes are transferred from one to another established parties based on the Pedersen index (Pedersen 1979). For both indexes, the average volatility for all post-1945 elections since the inauguration of the most recent democratic regime is computed. The information for 50 countries is from Mainwaring, España and Gervasoni's work (2009), and I have computed the indicators for other 25 countries.

Control variables. Consistent with analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the control variables include the presidential power, countries' per capita GDP, democratic quality, British colonial origin, and clientelistic effort for models with committees' positive agenda power as the dependent variable. The variable of *age of democracy*, which measures the number of years since the most recent democratic transition, is also included in the models.

Descriptive statistics for all the independent variables are listed in Table A.1 in Appendix A.

7.3 Empirical Results

Figure 7.1 displays that there is a negative association between authoritarian elections and committees' positive agenda-setting power.




FIGURE 7.1: Authoritarian elections and committees' positive power

The relationships are further examined with models shown in Table 7.1. They provide evidence in support of hypothesis 8. In countries where the preexisting authoritarian regime held elections that allowed limited multiparty competition, the committees are less likely to have strong positive power. The age of democracy is not significantly correlated to committee strength with regard to the positive power. Models in Table B.10 use two alternative measures of authoritarian regime types. They show consistent patterns. In general, if the preexisting authoritarianism held elections, and if non-governmental parties were allowed to participate in the elections,

the committees are less likely to be granted the authority of receiving and amending most bills in early stage of legislative process.

Table 7.1: Authoritarian elections and committees' positive agenda power (OLS regression)

DV	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Positive power		
Authoritarian elections	-0.188** [0.0728]	-0.171** [0.0809]	-0.116 [0.231]
Age of democracy	-0.000855 [0.00750]	0.00222 [0.00852]	0.00438 [0.0178]
Authoritarian elections X Age of democracy			-0.00297 [0.00913]
Clientelism	0.105*** [0.0301]	0.102*** [0.0328]	0.105*** [0.0304]
Presidential power	-0.00686 [0.00881]	-0.00712 [0.0115]	-0.00736 [0.00904]
Polity	-0.0445 [0.0349]	-0.0468 [0.0370]	-0.0456 [0.0355]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.129 [0.0812]	0.0797 [0.0981]	0.131 [0.0825]
British colonialism	-0.534*** [0.191]	-0.396 [0.241]	-0.518** [0.199]
Latin America		0.000126 [0.198]	
Africa		-0.248 [0.279]	
Asia/ Mideast		-0.145 [0.222]	
_cons	-1.764* [0.910]	-1.312 [1.087]	-1.903* [1.015]
N	48	48	48
adj. R-sq	0.354	0.325	0.340
ll	-14.55	-13.74	-14.49

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Variance inflation factors (VIF), the measure of multicollinearity, of all independent variables are below 3, except for the interaction term and regional dummies.

The second model in Table 7.1 includes the dummy variables of different regions (post-communist countries as the reference category), to capture the existence of democratic waves and institutional spillovers. The association between more closed authoritarianism and committees' positive power is still significant. The third model

includes the interaction term between authoritarian elections and the age of democracy. The model suggests that the relationship between committees' positive power and authoritarian elections does not vary as a function of the age of democracy.

Models in Table 7.2 examine the relations between authoritarian elections and other two dimensions of committee power. The results suggest that authoritarian regime types are not significantly associated with committee strength with regard to their veto power and information capacity.

Table 7.2: Authoritarian elections and committees' negative agenda power and information capacity (OLS regression)

DV	(1) Negative power	(2) Negative power	(3) Information capacity	(4) Information capacity
Authoritarian elections	0.112 [0.123]	-0.343 [0.396]	0.136 [0.126]	0.409 [0.412]
Age of democracy	0.0175 [0.0131]	-0.0162 [0.0307]	0.00290 [0.0134]	0.0230 [0.0318]
Authoritarian elections X Age of democracy		0.0190 [0.0157]		-0.0114 [0.0163]
Extra-system volatility			0.0296*** [0.0102]	0.0303*** [0.0103]
Presidential power	0.0120 [0.0149]	0.0153 [0.0150]	0.00538 [0.0156]	0.00365 [0.0159]
Polity	0.00915 [0.0612]	0.0162 [0.0611]	0.0410 [0.0681]	0.0385 [0.0686]
ln GDP per capita PPP	-0.0521 [0.136]	-0.0697 [0.136]	0.0136 [0.139]	0.0242 [0.141]
British colonialism	-0.260 [0.327]	-0.366 [0.337]	0.0963 [0.346]	0.165 [0.362]
_cons	-0.254 [1.204]	0.654 [1.413]	-1.190 [1.298]	-1.759 [1.541]
N	48	48	48	48
adj. R-sq	-0.042	-0.031	0.051	0.038
ll	-42.06	-41.19	-42.46	-42.16
Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01				

Models in Table 7.3 estimate the effects of the size of authoritarian legacy parties on committees' positive agenda power. The results are consistent with hypothesis 9. If the authoritarian legacy parties still retained power after regime change, the




FIGURE 7.2: Authoritarian legacy parties and committees' positive power

committee system is less likely to allow members opportunities to vote on bills. The bivariate correlation between them is shown in Figure 7.2. The second model includes the level of fragmentation of all other non-authoritarian parties², and suggests that if authoritarian legacy parties were faced with a more cohesive opposition at the transition phase, committees are likely to be strong with regard to their positive power. The first model in Table B.11 in Appendix B suggest that these relationships are still substantial when the regional dummies are controlled. The third model takes into account the conditional effect of the age of democracy. However, the model shows that the relationship between authoritarian parties' electoral return in the first democratic election and committees' positive power is not conditional on countries'

² This indicator does not distinguished between parties in opposition to authoritarianism during transition and those allied with or split from authoritarian incumbents. The indicator approximately captures the extent to which other political actors were able to challenge the legacy parties.

Table 7.3: Authoritarian legacy parties and committees' positive agenda power (OLS regression)

DV	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Positive power			
ALP in the first democratic election	-0.522** [0.238]	-0.940*** [0.249]	-1.213** [0.466]	
Age of democracy	-0.00283 [0.00894]	-0.00870 [0.00874]	-0.0131 [0.0109]	-0.00957 [0.00976]
Non-ALP party fragmentation		-0.988*** [0.324]	-1.032*** [0.332]	-0.585* [0.322]
ALP in the first democratic election X Age of democracy			0.0131 [0.0189]	
ALP in the first democratic election / ALP in the last authoritarian election				-0.355** [0.147]
Clientelism	0.108*** [0.0363]	0.0773** [0.0342]	0.0770** [0.0344]	0.0906** [0.0378]
Presidential power	-0.0126 [0.0111]	-0.0123 [0.0102]	-0.0128 [0.0103]	-0.0110 [0.0114]
Polity	-0.0482 [0.0374]	-0.0309 [0.0340]	-0.0286 [0.0344]	-0.0402 [0.0374]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.114 [0.0936]	0.114 [0.0836]	0.105 [0.0852]	0.156* [0.0920]
British colonialism	-0.478** [0.204]	-0.463** [0.183]	-0.471** [0.184]	-0.488** [0.204]
_cons	-1.753 [1.065]	-0.670 [1.023]	-0.479 [1.068]	-1.464 [1.104]
N	41	40	40	40
adj. R-sq	0.358	0.499	0.491	0.386
ll	-11.88	-6.321	-6.001	-10.40

Standard errors in brackets; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors (VIF), the measure of multicollinearity, of all independent variables are below 3, except for the interaction term.

experience with democracy. The result seems to suggest that even though there may be changes on legislative procedures years after regime transition, committee procedures still reflect the power of authoritarian incumbents during regime change to a certain extent.

Models in Table 7.4 estimate the relations between the power of authoritarian legacy parties and committees' negative power, and suggest that the association between these two variables is not significantly different from zero.

Table 7.4: Authoritarian legacy parties and committees' negative agenda power (OLS regression)

DV	(1)	(2)
	Negative power	
ALP in the first democratic election	0.268	
	[0.506]	
ALP in the first democratic election / ALP in the last authoritarian election		0.126
		[0.269]
Non-ALP party fragmentation	0.314	0.225
	[0.625]	[0.565]
Age of democracy	0.0285	0.0292
	[0.0174]	[0.0176]
Presidential power	0.0146	0.0135
	[0.0194]	[0.0198]
Polity	-0.00950	-0.00834
	[0.0677]	[0.0676]
ln GDP per capita PPP	-0.0567	-0.0660
	[0.162]	[0.161]
British colonialism	-0.308	-0.306
	[0.367]	[0.369]
_cons	-0.332	-0.200
	[1.464]	[1.421]
N	40	40
adj. R-sq	-0.085	-0.087
ll	-35.34	-35.38
Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01		

Table 7.5 includes models that examine the effects of the size of authoritarian legacy parties with committees' information capacity as the dependent variable. Similar to the models with committees' positive power as the dependent variable, the results show that if authoritarian incumbents did not substantially lose power in democratic elections, the committees are less likely to be granted the instruments to gather and transmit information. The coefficients are slightly different from the explanation for committees' positive power: what is especially associated with committees' information capacity is not the performance of authoritarian legacy parties in the first democratic elections, but the change in their vote shares before and after regime transition.

Table 7.5: Authoritarian legacy parties and committees' information capacity (OLS regression)

DV	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Information capacity		
ALP in the first democratic election	-0.794*	-0.940*	-1.415*	
	[0.406]	[0.494]	[0.817]	
Age of democracy	0.0245	0.0254	0.0151	0.0216
	[0.0147]	[0.0162]	[0.0182]	[0.0161]
Non-ALP party fragmentation		-0.215		
		[0.584]		
ALP in the first democratic election X Age of democracy			0.0305 [0.0348]	
ALP in the first democratic election / ALP in the last authoritarian election				-0.557** [0.255]
Extra-system volatility	0.0293**	0.0275**	0.0270**	0.0276**
	[0.0113]	[0.0119]	[0.0116]	[0.0115]
Presidential power	0.0152	0.0165	0.0146	0.0224
	[0.0168]	[0.0181]	[0.0168]	[0.0181]
Polity	0.00847	0.00595	0.00691	0.00570
	[0.0661]	[0.0685]	[0.0664]	[0.0673]
ln GDP per capita PPP	-0.105	-0.0966	-0.123	-0.0638
	[0.149]	[0.154]	[0.151]	[0.151]
British colonialism	0.0505	0.0503	0.0203	0.0837
	[0.334]	[0.343]	[0.336]	[0.339]
_cons	0.161	0.269	0.569	-0.128
	[1.307]	[1.373]	[1.392]	[1.303]
N	41	40	41	40
adj. R-sq	0.205	0.186	0.199	0.212
ll	-32.41	-31.81	-31.92	-31.15

Standard errors in brackets; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors (VIF), the measure of multicollinearity, of all independent variables are below 3, except for the interaction term.

The results shown in Table 7.1 to 7.5 explore the relations between authoritarian regime types and the three dimensions of committee power. If there had been no elections under authoritarianism, and thus electoral favorite was less obvious at the time of institutional choice, or if the authoritarian legacy parties largely lost power after regime transition, committees tend to be strong with regard to their positive power. That is, the committee system is likely to provide members with more opportunities to make decisions on bill proposals. Furthermore, if there was a great change in the

political composition of the legislature after regime transition, committees are likely to have more information capacity. Multiparty authoritarianism and a prolonged transition process during which old regime elites still retain some control result in less inclusive committee procedures, because under these conditions, authoritarian incumbents have more time and bargaining power to craft institutions that restrict other actors' access to political power. The association is evident even after years of transition. If the founding democratic elections do lead to great changes in the composition of the legislatures, and thus the power of old regime elites is reduced, the resulting committee procedures may allow more checks and balances. Similar patterns have been identified in the research on Mexico's state legislatures: electoral competition yields the development of legislative oversight only to the extent that the competition is translated into more pluralistic legislatures (Beer 2003, Solt 2004).




FIGURE 7.3: Extra-system electoral volatility and committees' information capacity

Finally, the relations between electoral volatility and committees' information capacity is explored. Figure 7.3 displays that there is a clear positive correlation between extra-system electoral volatility and committees' information capacity.

Table 7.6: Electoral volatility and committees' information capacity (OLS regression)

DV	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Information capacity		
Extra-system volatility	0.0296*** [0.00890]		
Total electoral volatility		0.0155** [0.00599]	
Within-system volatility			0.00839 [0.0108]
2nd largest / Largest gov party	0.484* [0.250]	0.487* [0.257]	0.507* [0.268]
Opposition fractionalization	-1.204*** [0.370]	-1.274*** [0.394]	-1.049** [0.412]
Presidential power	0.0185 [0.0121]	0.0157 [0.0124]	0.0121 [0.0128]
Polity	0.00631 [0.0492]	-0.0239 [0.0498]	-0.0318 [0.0532]
Democracy stock	0.000113 [0.000313]	0.000215 [0.000348]	-0.0000705 [0.000366]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.116 [0.114]	0.146 [0.120]	0.0950 [0.127]
British colonialism	0.256 [0.281]	0.248 [0.292]	0.106 [0.301]
_cons	-1.213 [1.111]	-1.305 [1.179]	-0.532 [1.217]
N	75	75	75
adj. R-sq	0.157	0.106	0.025
ll	-63.21	-65.42	-68.68
Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.			

Models in Table 7.6 further tests the correlation. Since extra-system volatility is correlated with countries' experience with democracy (Sikk 2005, Tavits 2005), the democracy stock variable created by Gerring et al. (2005) is included. Consistent with previous analyses, in countries with less stable party systems, committees are granted more power to acquire information about policies. Hypothesis 10 is

Table 7.7: Electoral volatility and committees' positive and negative power (OLS regression)

DV	(1) Positive power	(2) Positive power	(3) Negative power	(4) Negative power
Extra-system volatility	-0.00261 [0.00727]		0.00961 [0.00859]	
Within-system volatility		-0.00140 [0.00785]		-0.00782 [0.00973]
Clientelism	0.0564* [0.0294]	0.0555* [0.0293]		
2nd largest / Largest gov party			0.671*** [0.241]	0.686*** [0.242]
Opposition fractionalization			-0.915** [0.357]	-0.733* [0.371]
Presidential power	0.00105 [0.0105]	0.00172 [0.0104]	0.0182 [0.0117]	0.0159 [0.0116]
Polity	-0.0246 [0.0421]	-0.0203 [0.0418]	0.0292 [0.0474]	0.0278 [0.0480]
Democracy stock	-0.000368 [0.000296]	-0.000367 [0.000317]	0.000506* [0.000302]	0.000272 [0.000330]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.101 [0.102]	0.0988 [0.105]	0.0561 [0.110]	0.0124 [0.114]
British colonialism	-0.656*** [0.230]	-0.645*** [0.229]	-0.151 [0.271]	-0.258 [0.271]
_cons	-1.361 [1.126]	-1.380 [1.155]	-0.732 [1.072]	-0.127 [1.096]
N	75	75	75	75
adj. R-sq	0.229	0.228	0.162	0.155
ll	-50.53	-50.59	-60.54	-60.88

Standard errors in brackets; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

supported. The comparison between the three models suggest that it is the vote share of the newly created parties, rather than the percentage of votes transferred to other existing parties, that is especially associated with committees' information capacity. It is still likely that the newly created parties are composed of politicians with legislative experience. However, on average, it is expected that in countries with higher levels of extra-system volatility, the composition of the legislature is less stable. Models in Table 7.7 shows the estimated relations between electoral volatility and committees' positive and negative power, and suggest that the instability of

legislative composition is not significantly associated with these two dimensions of committee power.

Conclusion

In this concluding chapter, I summarize the dissertation's main theoretical explanations and empirical findings. I then acknowledge the limits of the study and avenues for future research on legislative internal organization.

8.1 Findings

Based on an original dataset, this dissertation provides a framework to classify and compare committee powers across democratic legislatures. It argues that committee power is a multidimensional concept. Committee powers cluster empirically in three distinct dimensions: positive agenda-setting power, negative agenda-setting power, and information capacity. They benefit different legislative actors. Therefore, they are correlated with different features of a political system, and may not be consistently strong or weak. Legislators' electoral incentives, the composition of multiparty governments, preexisting authoritarian incumbents' uncertainty and bargaining power, and the changes in legislative memberships are correlated to different dimensions of committee power.

I highlight several empirical patterns in particular. First, if legislators tend to

pursue individualistic goals and focus on particularistic spending in their districts, committees' positive power is likely to be strengthened to provide members more opportunities to express preferences and influence legislative outputs. Second, if party leaders' have more control over members' behavior, committees tend to have strong negative power and allow the larger and more cohesive parties to delay legislation. Third, if the coalition governments are composed of parties of relatively equal size, committees are likely to be powerful with regard to all dimensions so that coalition partners are able to receive, scrutinize, and amend or delay proposals deviating from the coalition contracts.

One implication of the findings is that treating different committee functions as one-dimensional phenomena and then exploring correlates of the one-dimensional indicator may be misleading. The multi-dimensional framework proposed in the dissertation attempts to encompass the major theories on legislative committees, and suggest the conditions under which the arguments of these theories can be reconciled. The empirical findings demonstrate that the determinants of committee strength pointed on in these theories are correlated to distinct dimensions of committee power.

This dissertation also attempts to bridge the "Atlantic divide" (Martin 2008) in legislative research. It demonstrates whether and how the theoretical approaches developed based on the experience of the U.S. Congress can be applied to committee systems in other institutional contexts. It also shows how comparative studies could extends and reshape these theoretical approaches.

There are also some notable "non-findings" in the empirical analyses. One of them is the insignificance of most contextual indicators on committee power. In every single regression model on different dimensions of committee power, countries' per capita GDP and quality of democracy are included as independent variables, and not once do they achieve statistical significance. The claim that committees in countries with higher income levels are more powerful is not supported by the

sample. The analyses on the relationships between authoritarian legacy parties and committees' positive power also suggest that compared to the levels of countries' general democratic quality, the uncertainty and bargaining power of authoritarian incumbents have more effects on committee procedures¹.

The other surprising non-finding is the insignificance of executive-legislative arrangements on committee power. Once the effects of other independent variables are taken into account, committees under presidential systems are not on average more powerful on any of the dimensions. What is identified in the empirical analyses is that executive-legislative arrangements have indirect effects on committee power. Coalition governments, which are more common in parliamentary systems, are associated with committee strength on all dimensions.

8.2 Limitations

The dissertation assumes that committee procedures, at least in part, are endogenous to legislators and parties' preferences. It is expected that political actors have incentives to create or maintain committee procedures that help them achieve their goals. However, the relationships may be in fact reversed. It is also plausible that with powerful committees, the costs of monitoring coalition partners and trading locally targeted benefits decrease, and thus coalition governments are more likely to be established and politicians tend to supply targeted benefits to attract votes. Committee power and the conditions identified in the analyses could indeed be engaged in a circular relationship.

The main limitation of the dissertation is that my dataset is exclusively cross-sectional and does not allow to solve the endogeneity problem. The causal direction

¹ The coefficients of correlations is -0.13 between countries' Polity scores and authoritarian elections and -0.26 between Polity scores and vote shares of authoritarian legacy parties in the founding democratic elections. Only countries that experienced democratic transition between 1972 and 2010 are included in the calculation

cannot be verified with the quantitative analyses based on the cross-sectional data. The empirical results can only show that there are significant association between committee power and several features of a political system. To partially address this concern, all the independent variables used in the analyses temporally precede the indicators on committee procedures. However, this does not mean that the causal explanations proposed in the dissertation have been thoroughly tested and confirmed.

Within the quantitative research approach, one way to improve the limitation in future iterations of similar research and data collection projects would be including the indicators specifying when each particular committee procedure was chosen/changed, so that the temporal separation between the independent and dependent variables will be more clear. Another indicator that has to be included is the process through which legislative internal organization can be changed. If there are more constitutional or legal constraints on such changes, it is expected that committee strength is less likely to reflect legislators and parties' preferences. Furthermore, to more closely trace the causal mechanisms between the conditions identified in the dissertation and committee strength, evidence from case studies will be also required.

8.3 Extensions

In addition to further research addressing methodological limitations of cross-sectional quantitative analysis pointed out in the previous section, there are other ways in which the project could be extended. First, there may be other potential explanations for committee strength. For example, Western donors have launched various legislative strengthening programs in developing democracies. Many of the programs have focused on the capacity of committees, such as advising the drafting of legislative internal rules, encouraging committees to hold hearings, or training committee staff (NDI 2000, UNDP 2009). More systematic data has to be collected to explore the extent to which these programs shapes committee procedures. Another potential

explanation is institutional spillovers. Legislatures may adopt internal rules similar to those of their neighboring countries or countries of common language or cultural heritage. In the empirical analyses of the dissertation, regional and British colonial dummies are included to control for the effects. Spatial regression analysis could be the next step to more fully examine the possibility of legislative institution spillovers.

Inspired by the non-findings of the dissertation, another avenue for further research could involve a deeper exploration of the relationship between committee strength and other legislative oversight tools. As Chapter 4 shows, the correlations between the indicators of committee power and PPI, the measure of general legislative capacity, are close to zero. It could be that there may be trade-offs between powerful committees and certain other legislative control devices. As the research based on the experience of Norwegian parliamentary committees has pointed out, it is likely that the general influence of the parliament increased simultaneously with the declining functioning of committees (Rommetvedt 1998). What needs to be examined is the conditions under which politicians would prefer to utilize other plenary procedures than the committee systems to achieve their goals, and what those plenary procedures are.

Finally, it would be also interesting to explore whether powerful committees do help politicians and parties achieve their goals. Martin and Vanberg (2011) have found that with strong committees, bills proposed by hostile ministers are more likely to be delayed and amended. Similarly, it also needs to be examined whether legislative outputs in countries where the committees have extensive positive power are more likely to contain pork barrel projects. Furthermore, for legislatures where the committees have different levels of positive and negative power, one could compare the extent to which bills supported by minorities have access to committee time. The evidence from such research could strengthen the arguments of the dissertation. Extending the research on the effects of different committee capacities, it would be

also valuable to explore how various committee functions are related to democratic performance. The literature has argued that weak legislatures result in diminished democratic accountability and threats to the survival of new democracies. What has not been clearly addressed is why and how legislative institutional arrangements have effects on the fortunes of democracies. Focusing on committee procedures and examining whether powerful committee systems, either directly or in interaction with well-developed parties, affect the responsiveness of democratic process, could help address this gap.

Appendix A

Appendix A: Variables and Coding

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of independent variables used in Chapter 5, 6, and 7

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ln District magnitudes	75	2.146	1.48	0.095	6.109
No pooling	75	0.662	0.81	0	2
Clientelism	75	12.958	3.39	5.785	18.047
Parties control over assignments	67	2.064	0.50	1	3
Parties organizational centralization	75	3.059	0.60	1.116	4
Parties organizational extensiveness	75	3.377	0.41	1.935	3.959
Coalition government	75	0.618	0.39	0	1
Government fractionalization	75	0.267	0.24	0	0.804
2nd largest / Largest gov party	75	0.239	0.27	0	0.928
Policy difference	75	0.801	0.76	0	2
Opposition fractionalization	75	0.482	0.21	0	0.821
Extra-system volatility	75	10.054	9.74	0.100	41.8
Total electoral volatility	75	26.251	17.21	3.4	77.087
Within-system volatility	75	16.197	9.81	3.3	45.333
Authoritarian elections	48	1.601	0.78	0	3
Age of democracy	48	19.479	8.95	4	40
ALP in the first democratic election	41	0.274	0.27	0	0.953
Non-ALP party fragmentation	40	0.560	0.22	0	0.842
ALP in the first democratic election / ALP in the last authoritarian election	41	0.501	0.47	0	1.661
Presidential power	75	8.267	7.64	0	20
Polity	75	8.067	2.40	-2	10
ln GDP per capita PPP	75	9.249	1.10	6.630	10.807
British colonialism	75	0.147	0.36	0	1

Table A.2: One-party and multi-party authoritarianism and authoritarian legacy parties

Country	The last year before transition	Authoritarian legacy party
Albania	2001	Socialist Party
Bangladesh	2008	none
Botswana	1972	Botswana Democratic Party
Brazil	1984	none
Bulgaria	1989	Bulgarian Socialist Party
Croatia	1999	Social Democratic Party
Czech Rep.	1992	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
Dominican Rep.	1995	Social Christian Reformist Party
Ecuador	2008	none
El Salvador	1990	Nationalist Republican Alliance
Estonia	1992	none
Georgia	2008	none
Ghana	2000	National Democratic Congress
Greece	1974	none
Guatemala	1995	none
Honduras	1996	Liberal Party of Honduras and National Party
Hungary	1989	Hungarian Socialist Party
Indonesia	2003	Golkar
Kenya	2001	Kenya African National Union
Latvia	1990	none
Lithuania	1990	none
Macedonia	2001	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia
Mexico	1999	Institutional Revolutionary Party
Moldova	1994	Communist Party of Moldova
Mozambique	1993	Liberation Front of Mozambique
Panama	1990	Democratic Revolutionary Party
Paraguay	1998	National Republican Association-Colorado Party
Peru	2000	none
Philippines	1986	none
Poland	1989	Democratic Left Alliance
ROK	1987	Grand National Party
Romania	1995	Social Democratic Party
Senegal	1999	Socialist Party
Serbia	1999	Socialist Party of Serbia
Slovakia	1992	none
Slovenia	1990	Social Democrats
South Africa	1992	none
Spain	1976	none
Taiwan	1991	Kuomintang
Ukraine	2005	Party of Regions
Zambia	2007	Movement for Multiparty Democracy

Appendix B

Appendix B: Supplemental Analyses

Table B.1: Parameter estimates of the dimensionality of committee powers (CFA with GDP per capita as a covariate)

Indicator	Factor			Regressing indicators on (log)GDP pc
	Positive power	Negative power	Information capacity	
No plenary action before committee stage	.813 (.12)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.036 (.14)
All bills are referred to committees	.729 (.09)	-.052 (.18)	.088 (.14)	.048 (.13)
Minority reports	.380 (.14)	.156 (.17)	.132 (.16)	.032 (.12)
Multiple referrals	.531 (.09)	.057 (.17)	.045 (.16)	-.039 (.12)
(log) Committee assignments per legislator	.234 (.05)	.077 (.08)	-.114 (.08)	-.047 (.05)
Committee time is unique	.383 (.15)	.250 (.18)	.079 (.14)	-.099 (.11)
Floor considers bills as amended by committees	.458 (.13)	.340 (.16)	.177 (.17)	.077 (.11)
Committees do not have to report all referred bills	.000 (.00)	.791 (.13)	.000 (.00)	.211 (.11)
No time constraint on committee reports	-.004 (.13)	.855 (.13)	-.141 (.16)	.256 (.14)
Agenda control	.227 (.14)	.540 (.11)	-.042 (.15)	.033 (.14)
(log) Number and functions of committee staff	.180 (.11)	.233 (.13)	.364 (.11)	.234 (.11)
Committees can compel government officials' attendance	-.007 (.11)	.033 (.16)	.789 (.12)	-.084 (.14)
Committees can demand documents from government	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.991 (.08)	-.167 (.14)
Committees have the right to introduce bills	.141 (.12)	-.306 (.15)	.640 (.14)	-.156 (.12)
Committees can grant a closed rule	.226 (.12)	.016 (.17)	.617 (.13)	-.162 (.17)
Serving in the same committee is desirable	.047 (.06)	-.024 (.07)	.143 (.07)	-.007 (.06)
Correlation Matrix of Factors				
	Positive	Negative	Information	
Positive power	1.00			
Negative power	-.231 (.21)	1.00		
Information capacity	-.095 (.19)	.277 (.17)	1.00	

Note: Parameters were estimated with *Mplus*. The covariate is countries' log transformed per capita GDP in 2007. $p < 0.05$ are in bold. N=75. Multiple imputations were used for the indicators of the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee (N=68) and committee staff (N=69). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. $\chi^2=56.14$ ($p = .90$). RMSEA = .000 (90% CI: .000/.030). CFI= 1.00.

Table B.2: Parameter estimates of the dimensionality of committee powers (CFA with Polity score as a covariate)

Indicator	Factor			Regressing indicators on Polity
	Positive power	Negative power	Information capacity	
No plenary action before committee stage	.829 (.12)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.063 (.07)
All bills are referred to committees	.717 (.09)	-.040 (.16)	.090 (.14)	-.036 (.06)
Minority reports	.386 (.14)	.074 (.18)	.194 (.15)	.056 (.05)
Multiple referrals	.516 (.10)	.008 (.17)	.077 (.16)	.003 (.05)
(log) Committee assignments per legislator	.226 (.05)	.037 (.07)	-.079 (.08)	.008 (.04)
Committee time is unique	.378 (.15)	.212 (.17)	.101 (.13)	-.021 (.05)
Floor considers bills as amended by committees	.453 (.13)	.256 (.13)	.251 (.16)	.094 (.06)
Committees do not have to report all referred bills	.000 (.00)	.806 (.13)	.000 (.00)	.089 (.08)
No time constraint on committee reports	-.021 (.13)	.847 (.14)	-.123 (.16)	.151 (.09)
Agenda control	.218 (.14)	.487 (.11)	.007 (.15)	.057 (.08)
(log) Number and functions of committee staff	.175 (.11)	.253 (.14)	.359 (.11)	.065 (.06)
Committees can compel government officials' attendance	-.014 (.11)	.064 (.16)	.776 (.12)	-.063 (.08)
Committees can demand documents from government	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.995 (.08)	-.094 (.09)
Committees have the right to introduce bills	.142 (.12)	-.306 (.16)	.646 (.14)	-.100 (.05)
Committees can grant a closed rule	.226 (.12)	.010 (.16)	.620 (.14)	-.058 (.07)
Serving in the same committee is desirable	.054 (.07)	-.037 (.07)	.157 (.07)	.001 (.03)
Correlation Matrix of Factors				
	Positive	Negative	Information	
Positive power	1.00			
Negative power	-.172 (.20)	1.00		
Information capacity	-.136 (.20)	.257 (.16)	1.00	

Note: Parameters were estimated with *Mplus*. The covariate is countries' scores in 2007 on the Polity IV scale. $p < 0.05$ are in bold. $N=75$. Multiple imputations were used for the indicators of the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee ($N=68$) and committee staff ($N=69$). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. $\chi^2=55.67$ ($p = .90$). RMSEA = .000 (90% CI: .000/.028). CFI= 1.00.

Table B.3: Parameter estimates of the dimensionality of committee powers (CFA with executive-legislative relations as a covariate)

Indicator	Factor			Regressing indicators on presidential/parliamentary systems
	Positive power	Negative power	Information capacity	
No plenary action before committee stage	.795 (.11)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.474 (.30)
All bills are referred to committees	.746 (.09)	-.043 (.16)	.132 (.14)	.105 (.30)
Minority reports	.373 (.14)	.143 (.17)	.162 (.16)	.105 (.28)
Multiple referrals	.493 (.11)	.031 (.16)	.070 (.16)	.529 (.26)
(log) Committee assignments per legislator	.213 (.05)	.043 (.07)	-.086 (.08)	.223 (.14)
Committee time is unique	.365 (.14)	.190 (.17)	.118 (.12)	.237 (.28)
Floor considers bills as amended by committees	.441 (.14)	.372 (.15)	.180 (.17)	.278 (.28)
Committees do not have to report all referred bills	.000 (.00)	.783 (.12)	.000 (.00)	-.036 (.27)
No time constraint on committee reports	-.021 (.14)	.882 (.12)	-.163 (.16)	-.112 (.27)
Agenda control	.230 (.15)	.514 (.10)	-.001 (.15)	.068 (.29)
(log) Number and functions of committee staff	.131 (.12)	.353 (.14)	.270 (.12)	.326 (.24)
Committees can compel government officials' attendance	.007 (.12)	.054 (.15)	.774 (.12)	-.018 (.29)
Committees can demand documents from government	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	1.020 (.09)	.122 (.30)
Committees have the right to introduce bills	.072 (.13)	-.334 (.16)	.652 (.13)	.497 (.27)
Committees can grant a closed rule	.175 (.11)	-.002 (.16)	.620 (.13)	.394 (.30)
Serving in the same committee is desirable	.054 (.07)	-.013 (.08)	.138 (.07)	.059 (.19)
Correlation Matrix of Factors				
	Positive	Negative	Information	
Positive power	1.00			
Negative power	-.207 (.20)	1.00		
Information capacity	-.139 (.20)	.232 (.16)	1.00	

Note: Parameters were estimated with *Mplus*. The covariate is represented by a dummy code (parliamentary systems=0, presidential and mixed systems=1), based on Golder's classification (2005). $p < 0.05$ are in bold. N=75. Multiple imputations were used for the indicators of the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee (N=68) and committee staff (N=69). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. $\chi^2=55.97$ ($p = .90$). RMSEA = .000 (90% CI: .000/.029). CFI= 1.00.

Table B.4: Parameter estimates of the dimensionality of committee powers (CFA, the indicator of staff support forced to only load on the factor of information capacity)

Indicator	Factor		
	Positive power	Negative power	Information capacity
No plenary action before committee stage	.739 (.13)		
All bills are referred to committees	.787 (.09)		
Minority reports	.380 (.14)		
Multiple referrals	.509 (.10)		
(log) Committee assignments per legislator	.329 (.10)		
Committee time is unique	.366 (.13)		
Floor considers bills as amended by committees	.407 (.13)	.377 (.13)	
Committees do not have to report all referred bills		.819 (.14)	
No time constraint on committee reports		.770 (.12)	
Agenda control		.513 (.09)	
(log) Number and functions of committee staff			.454 (.10)
Committees can compel government officials' attendance			.821 (.09)
Committees can demand documents from government			.962 (.08)
Committees have the right to introduce bills			.518 (.12)
Committees can grant a closed rule			.619 (.11)
Serving in the same committee is desirable			.249 (.10)
Correlation Matrix of Factors			
	Positive	Negative	Information
Positive power	1.00		
Negative power	-.031 (.15)	1.00	
Information capacity	.132 (.14)	.259 (.13)	1.00

Note: Parameters were estimated with *Mplus*. N=75. Multiple imputations were used for the indicators of the desirability of serving in consecutive terms in the same committee (N=68) and committee staff (N=69). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. $\chi^2=92.385$ ($p = .61$). RMSEA = .000 (90% CI: .000/.054). CFI= 1.00.

Table B.5: Multi-party governments and committees' positive power (OLS regression)

DV	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Positive agenda power		
Largest gov party/ Government seats	-0.861*** [0.318]		
2nd largest gov party/ Government seats		1.613*** [0.471]	
2nd largest gov party vote share			0.0290*** [0.00765]
Opposition fractionalization	-0.429 [0.300]	-0.418 [0.282]	-0.385 [0.272]
Clientelism	0.0751*** [0.0245]	0.0751*** [0.0238]	0.0750*** [0.0234]
Presidential power	0.00374 [0.00989]	0.00474 [0.00961]	0.00668 [0.00952]
Polity	-0.0373 [0.0369]	-0.0396 [0.0358]	-0.0380 [0.0352]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.107 [0.0976]	0.108 [0.0947]	0.108 [0.0932]
British colonialism	-0.551** [0.213]	-0.524** [0.205]	-0.542*** [0.199]
_cons	-0.781 [1.100]	-1.691 [1.054]	-1.709 [1.037]
N	75	75	75
adj. R-sq	0.290	0.330	0.351
ll	-47.45	-45.28	-44.04

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B.6: Multi-party governments and committees' negative power (OLS regression)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Negative agenda power		
Largest gov party/ Government seats	-0.806** [0.394]		
2nd largest gov party/ Government seats		1.274** [0.599]	
2nd largest gov party vote share			0.0213*** [0.00750]
Opposition fractionalization	-0.806** [0.372]	-0.746** [0.358]	-0.821** [0.349]
Presidential power	0.0166 [0.0120]	0.0167 [0.0119]	0.0189 [0.0117]
Polity	0.0437 [0.0458]	0.0412 [0.0456]	0.0527 [0.0448]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.0884 [0.105]	0.0876 [0.104]	0.0723 [0.102]
British colonialism	-0.0777 [0.261]	-0.0839 [0.259]	-0.0924 [0.247]
_cons	-0.252 [0.993]	-1.064 [0.950]	-0.978 [0.924]
N	75	75	75
adj. R-sq	0.103	0.108	0.149
ll	-64.21	-64.03	-62.26

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B.7: Multi-party governments and committees' information capacity (OLS regression)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Information capacity		
Largest gov party/ Government seats	-0.486 [0.405]		
2nd largest gov party/ Government seats		1.048* [0.613]	
2nd largest gov party vote share			0.0225** [0.0108]
Opposition fractionalization	-0.996*** [0.374]	-1.009*** [0.356]	-1.172*** [0.360]
Extra-system volatility	0.0241*** [0.00848]	0.0238*** [0.00839]	0.0293*** [0.00846]
Presidential power	0.0119 [0.0126]	0.0125 [0.0123]	0.0201 [0.0124]
Polity	-0.0149 [0.0472]	-0.0185 [0.0467]	0.00559 [0.0465]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.123 [0.100]	0.123 [0.0994]	0.107 [0.102]
British colonialism	0.103 [0.222]	0.129 [0.215]	0.233 [0.214]
_cons	-0.531 [0.998]	-1.028 [0.935]	-1.178 [0.952]
N	75	75	75
adj. R-sq	0.100	0.120	0.170
ll	-59.75	-58.94	-63.17

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B.8: Multi-party governments, committee power, and executive-legislative relationships (OLS regression)

DV	(1) Positive power	(2) Negative power	(3) Information capacity
2nd largest / Largest gov party	0.982*** [0.305]	0.690* [0.349]	0.353 [0.357]
Opposition fractionalization	-0.500* [0.281]	-0.928*** [0.345]	-1.176*** [0.368]
Presidentialism (presidential systems=1)	0.317 [0.203]	0.142 [0.248]	0.291 [0.199]
2nd largest / Largest gov party X Presidentialism	-0.676 [0.415]	0.147 [0.473]	0.199 [0.473]
Clientelism	0.0954*** [0.0315]		
Extra-system volatility			0.0281*** [0.00829]
Polity	-0.0000259 [0.0400]	0.0289 [0.0482]	0.00197 [0.0477]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.0849 [0.104]	0.250** [0.123]	0.151 [0.112]
British colonialism	-0.529** [0.224]	-0.487* [0.275]	0.245 [0.255]
_cons	-2.033* [1.163]	-2.531** [1.157]	-1.433 [0.977]
N	75	75	75
adj. R-sq	0.358	0.206	0.176
ll	-40.73	-56.81	-62.36

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B.9: Multi-party governments, committee power, and presidential power (OLS regression)

DV	(1) Positive power	(2) Negative power	(3) Information capacity
2nd largest / Largest gov party	1.071*** [0.331]	0.526 [0.405]	0.372 [0.414]
Opposition fractionalization	-0.481* [0.285]	-0.823** [0.356]	-1.182*** [0.373]
Presidential power	0.0144 [0.0134]	0.0124 [0.0148]	0.0152 [0.0154]
2nd largest / Largest gov party X Presidential power	-0.0396 [0.0291]	0.0171 [0.0351]	0.0124 [0.0360]
Clientelism	0.0907*** [0.0322]		
Extra-system volatility			0.0283*** [0.00850]
Polity	-0.00794 [0.0411]	0.0323 [0.0480]	0.00422 [0.0512]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.0993 [0.103]	0.105 [0.105]	0.136 [0.110]
British colonialism	-0.434* [0.238]	-0.0900 [0.251]	0.273 [0.272]
_cons	-2.070* [1.172]	-1.063 [0.932]	-1.329 [1.048]
N	75	75	75
adj. R-sq	0.338	0.138	0.157
ll	-41.88	-62.19	-63.22

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B.10: Authoritarian regime types and committees' positive agenda power (OLS regression)

DV	(1)	(2)
	Positive power	
Authoritarian regime type (0= no election; 1= holding elections)	-0.343* [0.179]	
Authoritarian regime type (0= no party; 1= one-party; 2=multiparty)		-0.269** [0.110]
Age of democracy	-0.000305 [0.00776]	-0.00401 [0.00786]
Clientelism	0.101*** [0.0312]	0.0920*** [0.0294]
Presidential power	-0.00135 [0.00937]	-0.00618 [0.00886]
Polity	-0.0263 [0.0369]	-0.0367 [0.0352]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.119 [0.0838]	0.133 [0.0819]
British colonialism	-0.467** [0.208]	-0.500** [0.195]
_cons	-2.006** [0.951]	-1.603* [0.919]
N	48	48
adj. R-sq	0.311	0.345
ll	-16.13	-14.92
Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01		

Table B.11: Authoritarian legacy parties and committees' positive power and information capacity (OLS regression)

DV	(1) Positive power	(2)	(3) Information capacity	(4)
ALP in the first democratic election	-0.902*** [0.258]			
Avg. ALP in all democratic elections		-0.247 [0.272]		-0.498 [0.463]
ALP in the first democratic election / ALP in the last authoritarian election			-0.619** [0.232]	
Non-ALP party fragmentation	-1.018*** [0.341]			
Age of democracy	-0.00456 [0.00975]	-0.00299 [0.00947]	0.0129 [0.0157]	0.0251 [0.0153]
Clientelism	0.0740* [0.0382]	0.101** [0.0381]		
Extra-system volatility			0.0229** [0.0112]	0.0314** [0.0118]
Presidential power	-0.00552 [0.0135]	-0.0145 [0.0117]	0.0133 [0.0231]	0.0120 [0.0173]
Polity	-0.0233 [0.0362]	-0.0507 [0.0396]	-0.0150 [0.0663]	0.00981 [0.0687]
ln GDP per capita PPP	0.0692 [0.0962]	0.123 [0.100]	0.00931 [0.161]	-0.0978 [0.156]
British colonialism	-0.272 [0.248]	-0.545** [0.214]	-0.257 [0.434]	-0.0115 [0.345]
Latin America	-0.0900 [0.205]		-0.0639 [0.332]	
Africa	-0.323 [0.288]		0.426 [0.490]	
Asia/ Mideast	-0.229 [0.223]		0.651* [0.379]	
_cons	-0.331 [1.192]	-1.753 [1.136]	-0.373 [1.339]	0.00700 [1.377]
N	40	41	41	41
adj. R-sq	0.475	0.283	0.276	0.143
ll	-5.225	-14.15	-28.52	-33.95

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

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